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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
1.1 Background and Goals 
 
 
The topic of the present thesis is the impact of public transfers and public provision of social 
services on poverty in Latin America and how the institutional context shapes the impact of public 
transfers on poverty in this region. There has never been consensus in the discussion about the 
impact of social policies on poverty. From the Elizabethan Act for the Relief of the Poor in 1601 in 
England and Wales to the current conditional transfer programs in developing countries, two 
opposing arguments have been defended and rediscovered in this discussion. Both arguments are 
summed up insightfully by an old Chinese proverb: Give a poor man a fish and you feed him for a 
day; teach him to fish and he can feed himself for life.  
The first part of this proverb illustrates a redistributive view of social benefits for the poor1: Give 
a poor man a fish. In other words, take from the rich and give to the poor. According to this view, 
the poor are not to be left to fend for themselves because the poor could never be self-supporting. 
They need the help of others, either private individuals or the state. This desire to help the poor has 
inspired one of the most common and criticized anti-poverty public policies: transfer payments or 
benefits in cash for the poor. Modern poverty scholars have extended the definition of redistribution 
through public transfers to any public intervention that is concerned with preventing a general 
decline in living conditions (e.g. Dreze & Sen 1989).     
Contrasting with the redistributive view, the second part of the proverb says “Teach him to fish 
and he can feed himself for life”. This line suggests that others have to forget the desire to help; 
they have to give the poor incentives to help themselves. Put differently, the second part of the 
proverb goes to the heart of a second set of arguments, a view advocating productive investment in 
                                                
1 In the rest of the dissertation, the adjectives “social” and “public” are used as synonyms. 
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the poor. This view contends that self-help is the key to getting out of poverty. Similar to the 
redistributive view, the definition of self-help is based on a particular type of social policy, which 
aims to develop individual human capital endowments through social services that the state 
provides to citizens.  
As Lindert (2004: 6) notes, the debate between redistributive and productive investment views 
cannot be resolved easily because “there is no escape from the conflicts involving the desire to help 
others and the desire to give them incentives for self-help”. However, new facts and evidence can 
raise the level of the debate and, in doing so, reject flawed arguments, one of the main goals of this 
dissertation.  
To pursue this goal, it is critical to identify the gaps in the literature regarding social policy and 
poverty that the dissertation wants to fill. If, with respect to the goals of the research project, these 
gaps remain ambiguous, so will the contributions of the dissertation to the debate between the 
redistributive and productive investment views. In this vein, one of the most intriguing aspects of the 
study of social policy and poverty is the enormous cross-national differences in poverty. In recent 
years, this has been one of the most widely studied topics in the welfare state literature regarding 
advanced capitalist countries. These studies indicate that a significant cross-national variation in 
poverty levels exists among these nations. To explain these differences in poverty, the scholars 
typically contend that the cross-national variation in poverty is driven by the size of the welfare effort 
and its institutional organization (Andress & Lohmann 2008, Brady 2009, Garfinkel et al. 2010, 
Korpi & Palme 2004, Nolan & Marx 2009). Recent studies have attempted to understand the 
socioeconomic consequences of pressure for the liberalization of the institutional contexts in 
advanced capitalist countries (Esping-Andersen & Myles 2009, Kenworthy 2011, Pierson 1994).   
However, cross-national differences in poverty are not significant only in advanced capitalist 
countries. There is also substantial cross-national variation among developing countries (UNRISD 
2010).2 To evaluate such variation, a particularly interesting developing region is Latin America.3 In 
                                                
2 “Developing countries” is a term generally used to describe a nation with a low level of material well-being. However, there 
is no established convention for the designation of “developed” and “developing” countries. In common practice, Africa, North 
America (excluding Canada and the United States), the Caribbean, Central America, South America, Asia (excluding Japan), 
and Oceania (excluding Australia and New Zealand), are considered developing regions. In the 21st century, Hong Kong, 
Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan are classified as developed countries. See the website of the United Nations Statistics 
Division: http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49regin.htm 
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the late 1980s and subsequent decades, a set of reforms were initiated. These institutional changes 
aimed at reducing the intervention of the welfare state in the economy in many Latin American 
political economies, deregulating labor markets, privatizing social insurance and health care, 
decentralizing the public provision of social services, and promoting means-testing in social 
assistance programs (Barrientos 2004, 2009, Filgueira et al. 2008, Huber 1996). For scholars 
interested in the socioeconomic consequences of the welfare state’s dismantling outside the setting 
of advanced industrialized nations, the analysis of poverty levels during this period of reform in Latin 
America is relevant as this analysis carries implications for the relative value that liberal reforms 
may have for the well-being of populations in developing regions as Latin America. 
Figure 1.1 sheds prima facie light on cross-national poverty differences among Latin American 
countries during the period of reform. The figure maps 18 Latin American countries (LACs) for 
which data regarding poverty exist in the World Development Indicators Database of the World 
Bank—the leading international data source on poverty in the developing world.4 Each country is 
shaded according to its average level of poverty from 1980 to 2000. The average level of poverty is 
measured in terms of the percentage of the population living on less than two U.S. dollars a day at 
2005 international prices (adjusted at purchasing power parity rates)—that is, the headcount ratio.5 
This poverty threshold captures minimum basic needs and is used to measure absolute poverty.6 I 
use averaged data for the period 1980–2000 rather than single years to reduce the risk of 
distortions resulting from shocks that occurred in particular years. We find considerable differences 
in the extent of poverty among LACs. The highest poverty levels are found in some Central 
American countries—Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Honduras. These levels comprise more than 40% 
of the populations. At the other end of the spectrum are Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay, with an 
average of less than 12% poverty. In between are many countries, among which we see most 
South American political economies. This picture of poverty levels in Latin America has not 
changed substantively in recent years (CEPAL 2010). 
                                                                                                                                               
3 Latin America is a region of the Americas where Romance languages, particularly Spanish and Portuguese, are primarily 
spoken. This región includes twenty countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, the Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Puerto Rico, Uruguay, 
and Venezuela. 
4 Figure 1.1 also maps others countries of the Americas. These are Belize, French Guiana, Guyana, and Suriname.  
5 Figures downloaded in September 2011 from the World Bank’s Open Data Initiative. 
6 For a discussion of the concept and measures of absolute poverty, see Section 1.3. 
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Figure 1.1. Average absolute poverty in 18 Latin American countries, 1980–2000 
 
Note: Countries without shading represent cases for which there is no information regarding 2 U.S. dollars a day poverty levels in the Dataset of the World Bank. 
 
To understand the cross-national differences in poverty among Latin American countries 
during the last three decades and the role of social policies as causes of such differences, the 
literature provides scant guidance. In the 1990s, the dominant perspective in the scholarly 
community has argued that, with the proper liberal reforms, only economic growth should be 
necessary to reduce poverty in Latin America. Social policy and its institutional organization should 
play only a marginal role in poverty reduction (Dollar & Kraay 2002, Perry et al. 2006). In recent 
years, a new perspective has begun to challenge the hegemonic perspective by stressing the 
importance of public intervention in the economy. However, most existing research, which follows 
the second perspective, examines the impact of particular programs on the poverty status of 
individuals in particular countries or compares such impacts among a small number of LACs (for an 
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overview, see ECLAC 2009, Hanlon et al. 2010, Raczynski 1995). Only a couple of studies consider 
the significance of social policy and its embeddedness in different institutional contexts for the 
explanation of poverty reduction in Latin America (Pribble et al. 2009, UNRISD 2010). Thus, it is not 
an exaggeration to say that the conventional poverty and social policy literature stops short of 
confronting the enormous cross-national variation in poverty among Latin American countries 
during the last three decades and the role of social policies and institutional contexts to explain this 
variation.  
In an attempt to fill in this gap in the literature and, in doing so, to contribute to the scholarly 
community, this study aims to estimate and to explain the impact of social policies that represent 
both redistributive and human capital views, on poverty in Latin American countries. Thus, the 
central question that guides the dissertation is as follows: How do public transfers and the public 
provision of social services contribute to poverty reduction? In answering this question, I conceived 
the dissertation as composed by two cross-national analyses of Latin American countries for the 
period 1980–2000 and a single study of social assistance in Chile in the period 2001–2006.7 In 
these three studies, general hypotheses are formulated, which I tested in a sample of LACs. This 
dissertation design implies that Latin American countries are the population of the primary 
inferences of this study and the temporal domain of inferences is restricted to the last three 
decades. The analysis of these spacial and temporal domains carries implications for what can be 
expected from social policies for poverty reduction during the initial period of dismantling the welfare 
state in many Latin American countries. 
In the dissertation, I also examine a second research question. One of the most important 
areas of current poverty research investigates the extent to which public transfers reduce or 
increase poverty, depending heavily on context (e.g. Nolan & Marx 2009).8 To identify the role of 
context, studies of associations between cash benefits and poverty in industrialized nations have 
compared countries that represent different institutional contexts or welfare regimes (Brady 2005, 
                                                
7 In the rest of the dissertation, I classify cross-national studies as macro analyses; these are studies in which the unit of 
analysis is the country. The study of Chilean social assistance considers a micro inquiry because the unit of analysis is the 
individual. 
8 The debate about institutional context in advanced capitalist countries is characterized by the analytical focus on cash 
benefits. Scholars ignore the variation between countries in terms of the relative emphasis that welfare states place upon 
cash benefits and/or social services. For an exception, see Castles (1998). 
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Korpi & Palme 1998, Lohmann 2009). In the setting of Latin American countries, if we consider the 
scholarly views about Latin America as a continuous line whose middle point is the institutional 
approach, it becomes evident that studies of comparative political economy typically occupy the 
poles. On the one hand, scholars treat these nations as similar cases whose differences have no 
scientific relevance (Barrientos 2009, Draibe & Riesco 2007). On the other hand, Latin American 
countries are characterized by an enormous heterogeneity that precludes lumping these political 
economies together (Huber & Bogliaccini 2010, Rudra 2008).  
However, to understand the impact of public transfers among Latin American countries both 
splitting and lumping approaches present problems. With respect to splitting, this view can be used 
to explain the impact of public transfers on poverty in particular cases but at the cost of the 
generalization of the causal effects of public transfers to the population of Latin American countries. 
At the other extreme, the strategy of lumping produces results that are broad in scope but, if the 
goal is to estimate the effect of public transfers on poverty, this view should assume unit 
homogeneity—cases should be completely identical in all relevant characteristics except for the 
dependent and independent variables of interest. This means that lumping does not recognize any 
contextual differences within Latin America beyond public transfers and poverty.  
Recent research on social policy challenges both approaches and suggests that different 
institutional arrangements exist in Latin America and in other developing regions (Kwon et al. 2009, 
Pribble 2008, Rudra 2008). This finding indicates that it is possible to systematically capture 
differences among Latin American welfare states in terms of the limited number of clusters of 
nations without losing the goal of producing causal inferences regarding populations beyond 
particular countries. Moreover, the existence of different institutional contexts in Latin America 
opens the door to the dependency of the poverty impact of public transfers on such contexts and, 
thus, suggests that the focus be placed not only on the differences in public transfers and poverty 
among Latin American countries but also on the role of institutional contexts on the relationships 
between both variables. In this vein and following studies of institutional contexts, the research 
question given above will be further elaborated through a second question: How does the 
institutional context shape the impact of public transfers on poverty? To date, little work has been 
16 
 
done to systematically test theories of welfare arrangements developed in the context of advanced 
capitalist countries in other regional settings. By providing answers to this second research 
question, an underlying motivation of the present thesis is to extend and adapt the literature about 
the institutional context, especially different types of welfare states, from advanced industrial 
nations to new geographic and historical contexts. Furthermore, the dissertation attempts to 
improve upon previous research of institutional contexts in Latin America. 
In this dissertation, I follow a micro-macro modeling perspective, by which I attempt to answer 
the research questions of the study. This means that the impact of public transfers and the public 
provision of social services on poverty is explained in terms of the effect of both instruments of the 
welfare state on the actions and interaction of income groups. Two components of the model are 
pivotal in understanding the dissertation’s findings. First, I suggest that public transfers and benefits 
in kind are multidimensional concepts and, thus, a set of policy dimensions are distinguished: size 
or generosity, targeting, and duration. Each one of these dimensions may have different impacts on 
poverty. Second, I focus on size and targeting and intend to explain the influence of both policy 
dimensions by indicating three classes of action, which I use as explanatory mechanisms of the 
relationship between policy and poverty in different institutional contexts. These classes of action 
are as follows: productive investment, work effort, and public support for social policies in general. 
The examination of these mechanisms carries implications for expectations of poverty reduction 
from government programs that are characterized by specific targeting and generosity levels among 
Latin American countries. For those scholars not particularly interested in Latin America, my hope is 
that the application of this micro-macro approach will provide a framework that is useful to explain 
the impact of public transfers and the public provision of social services on poverty in general. For 
Latin American specialists not particularly interested in the micro-macro approach, my hope is that 
the empirical evidence of the dissertation will reveal the value of recognizing different types of 
institutional contexts in Latin America. 
17 
 
The decision to focus the examination of the research questions of the dissertation on Latin 
American countries is appropriate at least for three reasons.9 First, Latin American countries are 
substantively important in the field of social policy and poverty. Here, “substantively important” 
means “of special social relevance” because of the magnitude of poverty in these nations. As 
Figure 1.1 shows, poverty affects the well-being of many people in Latin America. Other measures 
of poverty provide a similar picture. For example, using national absolute poverty lines, the United 
Nations’ Economic Commission on Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) estimates that about 
33.1 percent of Latin Americans lived in poverty in 2009 (CEPAL 2010). This finding suggests not 
only that poverty shapes the everyday lives of many people in Latin America but also indicates the 
presence of many social problems, as poverty is associated with multiple social handicaps—such 
as crime, health problems and weak economic productivity—that can undermine the life in society 
(Rein & Winship 1999). Thus, it cannot be doubted that the study of poverty in Latin America is 
socially relevant and, thus, the scholarly community and citizens in general should put the focus in 
this region to understand poverty and the role of social policy to reduce it and, in doing so, to 
provide solutions. 
The second reason is, in essence, methodological and refers to the advantages that Latin 
America provides to estimate the impact of social policies on poverty. In general terms, to estimate 
causal effects in small-N research scholars suggest choosing the cases in a purposive fashion on 
the basis of information about the independent variable of interest and, at the same time, to control 
for the influence of confounding factors and to ignore all information on the dependent variable 
(King et al. 1994, Plümper et al. 2010). Latin America is very well suited to this research design. 
The countries of this region exhibit many important contextual similarities—such as religion and 
type of colonialism. It follows that the focus on Latin America helps to control for contextual 
variables that may substantially shape the effect of social policies on poverty across different 
regions of the developing world. Furthermore, unlike many other developing countries, Latin 
American countries exhibit substantial variation with respect to the independent variable of interest: 
social policies. For example, by measuring social policy in terms of average social expenditures as 
                                                
9 In Section 1.7, I discuss these reasons in more detail, particularly reasons related with the period under analysis, data 
availability, and the validity of the measure of social policy in Latin America in comparison with other developing regions. 
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a percentage of government spending for the period from 1973 to 2000, Segura-Ubiergo (2007) 
shows that the highest figures occur in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, and Uruguay. In these 
welfare states, social expenditures range from 42.3% for Brazil to 63.3% for Uruguay. The lowest 
levels of social expenditures are found in Central American nations and Peru, where the measures 
range from 24.1% for Peru to 30% in El Salvador. Mexico and the rest of the South American 
countries (Bolivia, Ecuador, and Paraguay) occupy intermediate positions. This cross-national 
variation in social policy suggests that Latin America seemed ideally suited for an examination of 
how different levels of such variation are associated with particular poverty levels. Furthermore, by 
exploiting cross-national variation in social policy to explain the differences among LACs in poverty, 
Latin America appears theoretically relevant, as it provides an opportunity to confirm and deepen 
the theoretical insights developed in the setting of advanced capitalist countries.  
I have left the most pragmatic reason for last. In the empirical social sciences, it is a general 
truth that data availability and knowledge of potential cases has a strong influence on an 
investigator’s choice of the cases under study. Where the substantive knowledge of the investigator 
is greatest and the evidence of particular cases is richer and more accurate, there is a strong prima 
facie reason for studying those cases. Latin American countries fulfill both conditions. As a Latin 
American citizen, my prior knowledge of Latin America constitutes a pragmatic reason to examine 
social policies and poverty in this region. Nonetheless, from the perspective of a potential 
contribution to social science, this pragmatic reason is insufficient. To produce such a contribution, 
it is more important that the selection of Latin America and the temporal domain under analysis is 
driven by the quality and quantity of information about social policy that is currently available. The 
last three decades in Latin American countries is an evidence-rich environment in which all relevant 
factors for the topic of the dissertation are relatively precisely measured and rendered in 
comparable terms across the countries under study. 
In the remainder of this introduction, I will present the study’s overall conceptual framework. 
First, I present descriptive information regarding the relationships between social policy, institutional 
context, and poverty. In doing so, I characterize the explanandum of the dissertation. The second 
section establishes the concept of poverty that I use in the dissertation. The third section discusses 
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the dissertation’s conceptualization of the main independent variables: public transfers and public 
provision of social services. The fourth section establishes the concept of institutional context. In the 
fifth section, micro-macro models of policy impact on poverty are presented in which I explain 
associations between poverty, social policies, and institutional context. Furthermore, in this section, 
I present the main hypotheses of the dissertation. The sixth and seventh sections review the 
research design of the dissertation and the main contributions of this study, respectively. Finally, an 
overview of the chapters and the findings are presented in the last section.   
 
1.2 The Explanandum: The Impact of Public Transfers and the Public Provision of Social 
Services on Poverty and the Influence of the Institutional Contexts 
 
Social regularities are the basic explanandum of sociological analysis (Goldthorpe 2001). To 
establish the phenomena that the scholar will explain (the explanandum), descriptive analysis plays 
a pivotal role. In this section, I characterize the dissertation’s explanandum by providing descriptive 
evidence of the relationships between social policies, institutional contexts, and poverty among 
Latin American countries. However, before this descriptive characterization, I highlight the historical 
context in which these relationships arise.  
Modern social insurance systems emerged in some Latin American countries between the 
early 1990s and 1934. They experimented a strong development between the 1950’s and 1970’s in 
countries that followed an import substitution strategy of industrialization (ISI) (Filgueira et al. 2008, 
Huber 1996). This model of economic intervention was implemented with the intention of helping 
Latin American countries to reduce their foreign dependency through the development of internal 
markets and industries. ISI pushed the development of social policy—particularly pension 
systems—but at the cost of a truncation of access to benefits. These mostly favored workers in 
formal markets and in urban regions, leaving the informal sector and rural workers without 
protection. On the basis of this characteristic of social policy, scholars suggest that social insurance 
systems have reproduced economic inequality in Latin America (Mesa-Lago 1978, Schneider & 
Soskice 2009).  
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In spite of the significant heterogeneity in the origin and development of welfare state in Latin 
America (Section 1.5 and Chapter 2), most LACs implemented some social policy programs by the 
early 1980s. During this decade, however, devastating economic shocks battered the region. Many 
countries faced severe problems, including economic recessions and hyperinflation. So deep was 
the crisis that the 1980s came to be known as “the lost decade” in the region (Torche 2010). 
Discussion of politics and policy linked the economic problems with structural features of the ISI 
model, so a set of market-oriented reforms was suggested that attempted to dismantle this model of 
organizing the economy. The liberal impulse dominated the discussion of policy in the 1990s and 
the 2000s in the region (Rodrik 2006). In the domain of social policy, the social agenda of liberal 
reforms prioritized the privatization of pension systems, efforts to expand basic social services, and 
the adoption of social assistance programs (Kaufman & Haggard 2008).  
This dissertation focuses on this period of reform. To highlight the explanandum, Figure 1.2 
shows the associations between social policies and poverty in such a temporal domain. More 
specifically, this figure presents scatter plots with information from fifteen Latin American countries 
for the period from 1980 to 2000. Poverty is measured by the percentage of the population living on 
less than two purchasing power parity U.S. dollars per day at 2005 international prices. The 
measures of social policies are spending figures. In Chapter 3, the indicator of public transfers is 
public transfer spending as a percentage of the gross domestic product (GDP). This variable is 
measured on a yearly basis on the grounds that the effect of public transfers on the income of 
citizens is immediate. The measure of public provisions of social services is government spending 
on health and education as a percentage of GDP. My theoretical argument in the dissertation 
assumes that this instrument of the welfare state affects poverty in the long term, so I use 
cumulative figures of health and education spending from 1970 to 2000.10 
Regarding the public provision of social services, the scatter plot in the upper left of Figure 1.2 
provides some initial evidence of the relationship between the generosity of this instrument of the 
welfare state and poverty in Latin America. The graph suggests a negative relationship between the  
                                                
10 In Chapter 3, I explain the theoretical grounds and the way in which I estimated cumulative figures. 
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Figure 1.2. Poverty levels and type of social spending, 1980-2000 
Note: Triangles refer to pioneer corporatist welfare states, squares reflect universalist welfare state, and circles denote other countries. Labels include the country 
code plus the year of observation. The codes are as follows: ARG (Argentina), BOL (Bolivia), BRA (Brazil), CHL (Chile), COL (Colombia), CRI (Costa Rica), DOM 
(the Dominican Republic), ELV (El Salvador), GTM (Guatemala), MEX (Mexico), NIC (Nicaragua), PRY (Paraguay), PER (Peru), URY (Uruguay), and VEN 
(Venezuela). Sources: see Chapter 3. 
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public provision of social services and poverty because higher levels of cumulative spending are 
associated with lower levels of poverty rates.   
The rest of the scatter plots in Figure 1.2 illustrate the social regularity that characterizes the 
association between public transfers and poverty. There is a great deal of variation among Latin 
American countries. To capture this heterogeneity, I classify the countries on the basis of the 
typology developed in Chapter 2 (see also Sections 1.5 and 1.9).11 There are five clusters. The first 
cluster is composed of Costa Rica (upper right in Figure 1.2), which is the empirical example of the 
universalist welfare state in Latin America: that is, low program segmentation and high benefit 
coverage.12 Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay form a quite distinct second cluster (lower left in 
Figure 1.2). The policy orientations of these nations present a corporatist profile: program 
segmentation and a focus on social insurance. Because the welfare systems of these nations are 
the oldest in Latin America, I call this group the “pioneer corporatist welfare states.” The remaining 
clusters are composed of examples of the productivist welfare model (Central American countries 
plus Ecuador), which prioritizes the commodification of the labor force, examples of residual 
corporatism (Colombia, Paraguay, and Peru), and a cluster that presents a mix of corporatism and 
productivism (Bolivia, Honduras, Mexico, and Nicaragua). Although the policy orientations of these 
last three clusters differ, in Chapter 3, I argue that their effect on poverty should be similar, so I they 
are presented together in Figure 1.2. 
Figure 1.2 shows that the association between public transfers and poverty differs among the 
clusters.13 For the pioneer corporatist and universalist welfare states, there is a negative 
relationship between public transfer spending and poverty rates. This result indicates that public 
transfers contribute to poverty reductions in these political economies. Moreover, the slope of the 
fitted regression line for the universalist systems is higher than the slope for the pioneer corporatist 
systems (see the equations at the bottom of scatter plots). This finding suggests that the effect of 
                                                
11 For the public provision of social services, I will argue that the impact of this instrument of the welfare state on poverty is 
the same among Latin American welfare states, so the variation of such effects among institutional contexts is not 
considered in the analysis of the dissertation. See Chapter 3. 
12 The findings also indicate that Panama presents a significant program universalism. However, the historical particularities 
of this country raise doubt regarding the classification of the Panamanian welfare system as a universalist welfare state 
(Chapter 2).   
13 The scatter plots in Figure 1.2 suggest that there are some outliers (e.g. Uruguay in panel c and Nicaragua in panel d) that 
may influence the direction of the slopes of the regression lines. In Chapter 3, I report on a sensitivity analysis that considers 
this methodological problem. 
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public transfers is higher in universalism than in corporatism. For the rest of the Latin American 
welfare states, however, the slope of the regression line shows a radically different pattern. We see 
in the graph that this is positive, which suggests that public transfers may contribute to increasing 
poverty in these welfare states. 
This descriptive evidence characterizes the dissertation’s explanandum—that is, the 
association between social policies and the poverty level and the influence of the institutional 
context on the association between public transfers and the poverty level. More specifically, the 
evidence indicates that the associations between social policies and poverty reflect regularity 
among Latin American nations. The effects tend to be either positive or negative. However, 
descriptive analysis needs to be improved in at least three respects. First, we have to demonstrate 
that the associations really exist by using statistical methods that introduce control variables to 
obtain consistent estimations. Second, the measure of public transfers assumes that the effect of 
this social policy on poverty is immediate. However, scholars indicate the existence of dynamic 
effects. These effects rely on the fact that cash payments may contribute to the persistence of 
poverty over time, insofar as the benefits impact the work effort and productive investment of 
beneficiaries. An area of the welfare state that is particularly inclined to produce these undesired 
consequences of government programs is social assistance (Chapter 4). Third, we need to explain 
the regularities that characterize the associations between social policy and poverty. Why do social 
services reduce poverty? Why do public transfers reduce poverty in universalist and pioneer 
corporatist welfare states? Why is such an effect positive for a group of Latin American nations? In 
this dissertation, I contribute to filling these three gaps in the descriptive analysis and, in doing so, 
to answer the research questions of the dissertation. I estimate the impact of public transfers and 
social services on poverty and the moderating effect of institutional context on the impact of public 
transfers by using multivariate cross-sectional and longitudinal analysis. Furthermore, I study the 
indirect effect of benefits on work effort and productive investment by examining social assistance 
in Chile. Finally, I explain the associations by suggesting a theoretical framework that 
conceptualizes social policies as multidimensional factors that affect the actions and interaction of 
agents. In the following sections, I explain this theoretical framework. 
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1.3 The Dependent Variable: Poverty 
 
 
In this study, I use poverty in an absolute sense. Absolute poverty is usually defined as a condition 
characterized by severe deprivation of basic physical subsistence needs, but not social needs 
(Spicker et al. 1999: 7). According to Sen (1985), the criterion of basic subsistence needs is 
absolute, not in the sense that needs must not vary between different social contexts or over time 
but that social judgment about the needs of the poor regards a minimum standard of living as a 
threshold of subsistence. If the resources of a person are not enough to reach this threshold, this 
person is poor. It follows that the comparison of needs between different individuals is not relevant 
to classify who is poor or not poor in an absolute sense. As Sen (1985: 670) points out, the core 
element of the concept of absolute poverty is that:  
 
 “...people’s deprivations are judged absolutely, and not simply in comparison with 
the deprivations of the others in that society. If a person is seen as poor because he 
is unable to satisfy his hunger, then that diagnosis of poverty cannot be altered 
merely by the fact that others too may also be hungry (so this person may not be, 
relatively speaking, any worse off than most others).”  
 
 
In this dissertation, I define and measure absolute poverty for three reasons. First, the main 
concern of the present thesis is absolute poverty because, as said above, meeting basic needs is 
an issue for a large portion of Latin Americans (see Section 1.1). This finding suggests that, before 
knowing the extent to which these people’s standard of living differs from that of well-off citizens  
(such as through relative poverty measurements), it is necessary to put the prime concern on the 
ability of the people to afford basic subsistence needs. Specifically, the concept of “absolute 
poverty” in this dissertation regards individuals whose resources do not satisfy basic subsistence 
needs in Latin American countries. 
Second, I examine the indirect effects of government programs on poverty. These effects 
impact work effort and productive investment for individuals at the micro level as well as economic 
growth and income distribution at the macro level. There are theoretical reasons to presume that 
25 
 
these indirect effects of government programs may have the perverse effect of increasing poverty 
(Chapters 3 and 4). To identify these types of effects, it is more useful to employ an absolute 
measure of poverty because this criterion to identify the poor holds constant over time14 (Kenworthy 
1999, Pontusson 2005). Third, I decided to use a concept and measurement of absolute poverty  
determined by the existing data of poverty levels in Latin America. I use estimations of poverty 
levels, which are calculated by Latin American governments and international agencies; most of 
these organizations provide only information about absolute poverty measures. 
Having explicitly marked the conceptualization of poverty as an absolute condition, I go on to 
the measures of absolute poverty used in the dissertation. This aspect is very important to the 
present thesis because the measurement considers how I concretely identify the threshold of basic 
subsistence needs. Following Sen (1981), the measurement of poverty comprises two sequential 
steps. The first regards the identification of the poor by using a threshold, below which people can 
be considered to be poor. Scholars call this threshold the “poverty line.” To identify the poor in an 
absolute sense, the determination of the poverty line typically requires the specification of a basket 
of goods that is the indicator of basic subsistence needs. The second step refers to the aggregation 
of the deprivation of the poor into a poverty index. 
There are basically two ways of accomplishing the identification task (Ringen 1988). The first 
one is an indirect method in which the poor are identified on the basis of their resources. The 
scholars distinguish between monetary (salary, private and public transfers) and non-monetary 
resources (physical capital). One of the most used resource indicators to identify the poor is 
household income, which is a monetary resource. In the indirect method, anyone whose income is 
lower than the monetary poverty line is identified as poor. The second method is a direct one in 
which one identifies the poor in terms of the results of resource use. In the origin of this second 
method, the motivation to use it relies on the fact that, if poverty is defined as low consumption, we 
should note that “many of those not on low income suffer deprivation in consumption, and far from 
all the members of low income groups suffer such deprivation” (Callan et al. 1993: 142). In other 
words, income is not a reliable measure of poverty. The poor must therefore be identified using a 
                                                
14 Over time, Latin American governments usually adjust absolute poverty lines only for inflation but basic needs, which are 
considered by the poverty threshold, do not vary. 
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direct measure of standard of living. The most famous application and defense of this approach is 
the study “Poverty in the United Kingdom,” conducted by Peter Townsend (1979), who measured 
deprivation by developing a deprivation index on the basis of indicators of lifestyle for British 
households.  
To identify the poor, most Latin American governments follow the indirect method by using 
expenditures (Mexico), income (Argentina), or a mix of income and expenditures (Bolivia). Cross-
national evidence of direct measurement of poverty in a large sample of Latin American countries 
does not yet exist.15 The poverty estimations of international agencies for Latin America (e.g. the 
World Bank) are also based on these monetary indicators of well-being. Because I use official 
estimations of poverty—data from national government and international agencies—in the analysis 
of this dissertation, I use the indirect method to identify the poor.  
Most Latin American countries calculate two absolute poverty lines: extreme national poverty, 
which is based on the cost of a basic food basket, and moderate poverty, computed from the 
extreme poverty lines using the Engel/Orshansky ratio of food expenditures (Gasparini et al. 2007). 
Despite some similarities, the methodologies for estimating national poverty lines differ 
substantively across Latin American nations (Perry et al. 2006: 23). Due to these differences in 
defining poverty, I use the international poverty line of two purchasing power parity U.S. dollars per 
day to make cross-national comparisons (see Chapters 2 and 3). This poverty line was developed 
by the World Bank for the purpose of international comparisons (Chen & Ravallion 2004). Table 1.1 
presents a measure based on this poverty threshold. The indicator of poverty in the macro empirical 
analysis of this dissertation is the headcount index in each Latin American country, which 
aggregates poverty levels in terms of the percentage of the population living on less than two-
purchasing power parity U.S. dollars per day at 2005 international prices.16 The World Bank 
recommends this poverty threshold to measure poverty in middle income countries such as Latin 
American countries (see also Section 1.7).17 Notwithstanding the advantage of this measure of 
poverty, it is important to mention that the international poverty line of two U.S. dollars does not 
                                                
15 See Battiston et al. (2009) for a study of multidimensional poverty in six Latin American countries. 
16 In Chapter 2, due to change of the particular year of prices that is used to calculate the poverty line, the poverty line is not 
exactly 2 US dollars but 2.5. 
17 Middle income countries are economies with gross national income per capita between $1,006 and $12,275 (U.S. dollars 
in 2010).  
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directly refer to a concrete basket of goods but reflects the median value of extreme poverty lines 
fixed by governments in Latin America. Furthermore, most official poverty estimations in Latin 
America do not use equivalence scales to take into account economies of scale within households; 
they are based on per capita household income. Given my use of official poverty estimations, I use 
this concept of income in the dissertation.  
 
Table 1.1.  Concepts and measures of poverty in the dissertation 
 
Type of poverty Definition Measure Level of aggregation Chapter 
     
Absolute poverty  
(static) 
Condition 
characterized by 
severe deprivation of 
basic subsistence 
needs 
Headcount index Country 2 and 3 
     
Absolute chronic poverty 
(dynamic) 
Condition 
characterized by 
mean income over 
time below absolute 
poverty line 
Index using squared 
poverty gap 
Individual 4 
     
Absolute transitory poverty 
(dynamic) 
Inter-temporal 
variability in income 
of the poor 
Index using squared 
poverty gap 
Individual 4 
    
 
 
In my micro study of the Chilean welfare state (Chapter 4), I analyze two types of absolute 
poverty status over time. The first is chronic poverty, which is defined in terms of poverty that 
persists in inter-temporal mean income, which is lower than the absolute poverty line. This concept 
of chronic poverty denotes a condition characterized by a low level of capital and is associated with 
insufficient welfare-generating assets that persist over time. By contrast, transitory poverty regards 
inter-temporal variability in the income of the poor, regardless of persistence. This means that not 
only do individuals who experience poverty at a particular time point contribute to transitory poverty 
but the persistent poor may also present some degree of transitory poverty if the income of this last 
group varies over time. This type of deprivation is associated with short-term financial shocks, which 
have a negative impact on the accumulation of capital but do not annul the accumulation process.  
To measure chronic and transitory poverty, I use the indexes of Jalan and Ravallion (2000), 
which were estimated using the moderate absolute poverty line computed by the Chilean 
government. Each individual receives scores on both indexes, which range from zero for the not 
poor to one for the maximal level of deprivation. The scores are constructed on the basis of the 
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squared poverty gap. In comparison to the headcount ratio, the advantage of this last measure 
relies on the fact that the squared poverty gap considers income inequality among the poor. 
Furthermore, the measure scale of indexes is continuous, which makes it easier to estimate causal 
effects, particularly in the case of the comparison of causal effects across groups.18  
 
1.4 The Independent Variables: Public Transfers and the Public Provision of Social Services 
 
 
What do I mean by social policy? Conventionally and narrowly defined, social policy consists, in this 
dissertation, of public transfers and the public provision of social services or, in other words, 
benefits in cash and benefits in kind. Both social policies are instruments by which governments 
pursue the two fundamental goals of the welfare state (Flora & Heidenheimer 1995): security and 
equality.19 
Public transfers refer to all state payments in cash that aim at improving the standard of living 
of individuals who have experienced any type of social risk, including sickness, maternity, 
unemployment, retirement, and poverty (Esping-Andersen 1999: 40-3).20 We can distinguish 
subtypes of public transfers on the basis of two dimensions: the method of financing public 
provisions and the eligibility criterion by which individuals qualify as welfare state beneficiaries. At 
first glance, many combinations are theoretically plausible on the basis of both dimensions. 
However, following a standard classification in the literature of welfare states (e.g. Pontusson 
2005), I distinguish two subtypes of public transfers. One of these subtypes is social insurance 
transfers. These transfers are government benefits in cash,21 which are financed by contributions 
with eligibility based on a combination of contributions and belongingness to specific occupational 
categories, excluding workers who are not attached to the formal labor market. In Latin American 
welfare states, for example, the most important social insurance transfers in the government budget  
are pensions (Huber et al. 2006). 
                                                
18 In Chapter 4 and Appendix 3 I discuss the advantages of continuous variables in estimating causal effect. 
19 Flora and Heidenheimer identify a third basic means by which the welfare state pursues its goals: the indirect extension of 
benefits through tax deductions and credits. I do not consider this instrument of the welfare state in the dissertation. 
20 Following Esping-Andersen (1999: 33), a risk is considered “social” in the sense that it is a matter of state. 
21 For the arguments of the dissertation, the distinction between government and state is not relevant; thus, I use both 
concepts as synonyms in the following chapters.  
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The second type of public transfers refers to social assistance transfers. These are benefits in 
cash with financing based on non-contributory funding where eligibility is not conditional on the 
payment of contributions by the protected person or by other parties on their behalf. However, there 
may be a means test as a condition of receipt for some transfers payments. Social assistance 
transfers typically serve the poor or near poor. As mentioned above (see Section 1.1), one of the 
motivations to provide this type of social policy is the desire to help others because the poor could 
not function socially at adequate levels without special assistance.  
Social services refer to the expansion of individual human capital endowments.22 In 
comparison to public transfers, the public provision of social services does not include cash 
payments. Rather, this instrument of the welfare state involves goods that do not take a tangible 
and storable form (Black et al. 2009: 408). Furthermore, although public transfers and social 
services are transfers in the sense that they take purchasing power away from taxpayers and 
transfer it to beneficiaries, social services can be used only for the purchase of specific goods 
(Friedman 2002: 81). Public transfers do not have this restriction. Social services include a large 
range of benefits, but I focus on government investment in education and healthcare in this 
dissertation. The public provision of both social services is especially important in developing 
countries such as Latin American nations, as it increases the human capital of the poor (Haggard & 
Kaufman 2008). 
In this thesis, I conceptualize public transfers and the public provision of social services as 
multidimensional constructs while arguing that an explanation of the impact of public transfers and 
social services must take into account different dimensions of a given social policy because each 
one of these dimensions may impact poverty differently. As Figure 1.3 illustrates, I identify three 
dimensions of a given type of social policy that may be of crucial importance in determining the 
effectiveness of poverty alleviation in government programs: size or generosity, targeting, and 
duration (Bäckman 2009, Korpi & Palme 1998, Palme 2006). The remaining portion of this section 
                                                
22 Human capital is the stock of skills and productive knowledge embodied in people that has value as a source of current 
and future flows of output and income. The return on human capital investments lies in enhancing the productivity and 
earning power of a person in the market economy (Rosen 2008). Furthermore, another important role of human capital is to 
facilitate the implementation of technology in the production process. At the heart of the concept of human capital lies 
improvements in workers’ skills based on education, but other sources of progress in human capital involve the improvement 
of the population’s health (Schultz 1961; Barro 1996). See Chapter 3.  
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explains these three dimensions along with the measures of dimensions, which are used in the 
dissertation and the following analysis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.3. Dimensions of social policy 
 
Size refers to the monetary level of the benefit. For public transfers, it is important to 
distinguish between size at the micro and macro levels. At the micro stage, the size regards the 
monetary level of payments to individual or household recipients. A measure of this concept is 
typically the proportion of household income that is actually paid by the government, indicating a 
high proportion or high size of transfers. At the macro level, the size of public transfers regards the 
total sum of the budget that is available for redistribution. A mainstream measure of this last 
meaning of size is expenditure on transfers. With respect to social services, direct monetary 
indicators of the size of a social service policy do not exist at the micro level because this type of 
social policy does not transfer cash, by definition. However, indirect measurements at the macro 
level indicate how much the state spends on social services. One of the most often-used indicators 
in developing countries is government expenditures on education and health. 
Targeting is used to identify which social group is eligible to receive the benefits of a social 
policy. The target is determined by entitlement requirements associated with social policy. Broadly 
speaking, studies of the welfare state identify three principles that are the basis of entitlement 
requirements for concrete government programs (Esping-Andersen 1990, Korpi & Palme 1998, 
Duration Size Targeting 
SOCIAL POLICY 
Public transfers 
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Pontusson 2005). Targeting comprises these principles. The first is called means-testing, and it 
considers the extent to which public programs are targeted to a specific group, mostly the poor, by 
using a means test: that is, a test applied as a condition for the receipt of some benefit. The second 
principle is social citizenship, which refers to an egalitarian strategy of paying benefits, i.e. providing 
the same benefits to all citizens.23 Social insurance is the third entitlement principle, under which 
eligibility is derived from prior contributions.  
The duration of a social policy refers to the time limits of a particular public program. According 
to Saez (2006), introducing the duration dimension in the design of transfers raises questions that 
have not yet been studied very extensively. Furthermore, most of the research on the effect of time 
limits on social outcomes focuses on developed economies, especially the U.S.A (Grogger & Karoly 
2005). Unfortunately, there are no studies on the effect of time limits on poverty in Latin America. 
One of the reasons may be the lack of longitudinal data at the micro level in most Latin American 
countries. This fact implies that it is impossible to make an empirical cross-national analysis of the 
effect of time limits on poverty in a large sample of Latin American countries. Given this data 
problem, my explanations and the empirical analysis of the impact of social policies in the 
dissertation focus only on the size and the targeting strategy of government programs.  
As stated above, to assess the effect of a social policy on social outcomes, we have to take 
into account a set of public intervention dimensions, not a particular dimension. Table 1.2 presents 
the effects of poverty that should result from the combination of size and targeting.24 As Chapter 3 
points out, the universalist welfare states are associated with the lowest poverty levels among 
OECD countries (Korpi & Palme 1998). This poverty impact is associated with the combination of 
social citizenship and a large size of the redistributive budget. Citizenship-based policy is 
characterized by high coverage of the population, which means that a significant portion of citizens 
receive benefits, including low-income segments. It follows that social citizenship should reduce 
poverty. The size of benefits can be understood as a second mechanism that accentuates this 
                                                
23 Following Korpi (1989: 314), social citizenship refers to “rights that individuals have as an outflow of their status as 
citizens. These social rights can be claimed without citizens having to demonstrate economic need (for example, via a 
means test). Instead, claims are accepted if the individual falls into a specific category, such as in terms of age, health, or 
employment.” 
24 On the grounds of welfare state theory and empirical evidence (e.g. Korpi & Palme 1998), the cell in Table 1.3 that 
combines social citizenship and small size is unlikely and, thus, empty.  
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impact. Citizenship tends to encourage the formation of collective interest among citizens and, thus, 
stimulate public support for public transfers and social services expansion. It follows that 
citizenship-based policy should have a large size in the redistributive budget.  
 
 
Table 1.2. Expected effect of social policy on poverty 
 
  Sizea 
  Large Small 
    
 Social citizenship -  
    
Targeting Social insurance - + 
    
 Means-testing + - 
    
Note: Negative effect is “-“; positive impact is “+”. (a) For social citizenship and social insurance, the size refers to the 
redistributive budget; for means-testing, I discuss size at the micro (individual or household recipient) and at the macro 
levels (budget).  
 
The social insurance entitlement criterion includes transfer payments where eligibility is based 
on contributions. In Latin America, this type of transfer is attached to formal work. This characteristic 
of Latin America indicates that the poverty effects of social insurance transfers differ by institutional 
context. In pioneer corporatist welfare states (e.g. Argentina and Uruguay), the coverage of social 
insurance is high, insofar as a significant portion of the labor force is in the formal sector (Chapter 
2). This fact suggests that a large portion of the citizens is eligible for benefits; thus, social 
insurance transfers in pioneer welfare states should reduce poverty levels at the macro level 
through the provision of payments to different income groups. However, the negative effect of social 
insurance transfers on poverty in pioneer corporatist welfare states should be lower than the impact 
of citizenship-based benefits because the size of benefits is smaller in corporatist systems than in 
universalist welfare states. Social insurance institutions generate separate interest groups that act 
on their specific interests. Citizenship promotes common interests among social classes, which 
increases the redistributive budget. In other words, public support for redistributive policies is higher 
in citizenship-based regimes than in corporatist arrangements (Chapter 3).  
Contrasting with pioneer corporatist welfare states, social insurance transfers may increase 
poverty levels in welfare systems characterized by low generosity and, most importantly, social 
insurance-based targeting of transfers that benefits particular interest groups, namely middle- and 
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high-income groups. In Latin America, residual corporatist welfare states such as Peru or Paraguay 
present this combination of size and targeting. This benefit favors a minority and increases income 
inequality and, in turn, poverty. 
In Table 1.2, I indicate that the effect of means-testing policy or social assistance transfers is 
bidirectional. At the macro level, scholars suggest that the size of the government budget assigned 
to this type of transfer is small because means-testing does not stimulate public support for 
redistributive policies among citizens (Korpi 1983). In spite of the small size at the aggregated level, 
social assistance transfers may have a negative effect on poverty because money reaches the 
poor. For example, in Argentina in the mid-1990s, intense targeting in favor of the poor converged 
to create a strong negative impact (Lindert et al. 2006). However, the impact of social assistance 
transfers may be positive when we consider indirect effects. As I discuss in Chapter 4, cash 
payments based on means-testing may increase poverty, as they raise the incentive for individuals 
to be poor and qualify for benefits when the size of the benefits assigned to recipient households is 
similar to their earning capacity. 
Once the main independent variables of this study are theoretically defined, I will briefly explain 
the measures of public transfers and public provision of social services that I used to estimate the 
impact of social policies on poverty (see Table 1.3). Despite my conceptualization of social policy as 
a multidimensional construct, the lack of data, unfortunately, precludes measuring the complete set 
of dimensions, particularly the size of the benefit assigned to individual recipients and citizenship 
and social insurance targeting. This fact means that each analysis of the present thesis intends to 
answer the leading questions of the dissertation by evaluating the connections between particular 
policy dimensions and poverty in empirical examinations. However, it is important to say that in the 
theoretical arguments, from which I derive the hypothesis for a particular policy dimension, I discuss 
how the combination of the size and targeting of a given policy contribute to poverty reduction. 
In cross-national analyses, the indicators of public transfers and social service policies are 
measures of social spending as a percentage of GDP (Chapter 3).25 Social spending 
measurements capture the size dimension in the sense that they identify how much emphasis the 
                                                
25 Lack of data precludes separate public transfer spending into social insurance and social assistance cash payments 
(Chapter 3). 
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government has placed on transfers and/or social services. However, they do not permit an 
assessment of the targeting. Contrasting with macro social analysis, my micro study of the Chilean 
welfare state focuses on social assistance transfers that are explicitly targeted at the poor (see 
Chapter 4). Following the studies of impact evaluation (e.g. Khandker et al. 2010) to assess the 
impact of transfers on poverty, the indicator of social assistance transfers is a dummy variable for 
the beneficiaries of social assistance transfers. By using this measure, I intend to capture the 
effectiveness of benefits based on means-testing in reducing poverty.   
 
Table 1.3.  Concepts and measures of social policy used in the estimation of causal effects in the dissertation 
 
Type of social policy Definition Measure Level of 
aggregation 
Policy 
dimension 
Chapter 
      
Public provision of social 
services 
Benefits that 
involve intangible 
goods; focus on 
education and 
healthcare 
Health & 
education 
spending as a 
percentage of 
GDP 
Country Size of 
government 
budget 
assigned to 
social services 
3 
      
Public transfers State payments in 
cash 
Public transfer 
spending as a 
percentage of 
GDP 
Country Size of 
government 
budget 
assigned to 
public 
transfers 
3 
      
Social assistance 
transfers 
Non-contributory 
benefits in cash 
provided on the 
basis of a means 
test 
Dummy variable 
in which 
receiving cash 
payments is 1 
Individual Targeting; only 
means-testing 
4 
    
 
 
1.5 The Moderator Variable: Institutional Context26 
 
Context means conditionality in the sense that the effect of a cause on an outcome tends to vary 
across contexts. By applying this idea to the analysis of institutions, the new institutionalism 
contends that the effects of social structures are shaped by the institutional structure of the 
economy and polity (Hall & Taylor 1996). As Hall (1986: 19) states in one influential statement: 
 
 
                                                
26 An interaction effect hypothesis states that the effect of one variable on a second one depends on the value of a third 
variable. This third factor is labeled a moderator variable because the first-order relationship is moderated. That is, it 
changes as the moderator variable changes. A variable operates as a mediator to the extent that it accounts for the 
relationship between an independent variable and an outcome. In this dissertation, I consider the institutional context only as 
a moderating variable that influences the association between social policy and poverty.  
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 “The concept of institutions is used here to refer to the formal rules, compliance 
procedures, and standard operating practices that structure the relationship 
between individuals and various units of the polity and economy…Institutional 
factors play two fundamental roles…[They] affect the degree of power that any one 
set of actors has over policy outcomes […and they…] influence an actor’s definition 
of his own interests, by establishing his institutional responsibilities and relationship 
to other actors…With an institutionalist model we can see policy as more than the 
sum of countervailing pressure from social groups. That pressure is mediated by an 
organizational [i.e., institutional] dynamic that imprints its own image on the 
outcome. ”27  
 
 
Thus, in an institutional analysis, institutional contexts are variables that shape the processes, 
translating the social structures of interest into effective political pressures, these pressures into 
government responses, and those policies into social outcomes (Franzese 2007: 48). In this 
dissertation, I analyze the impact of the institutional context on this last association - the relationship 
between social policy and outcomes. Following the contemporaneous welfare state theory (Castles 
1993, Esping-Andersen 1990, Korpi & Palme 1998), I use the term “institutional context” to 
designate clusters of welfare states and to contend that the impact of public transfers on social 
outcomes, particularly poverty, varies across different clusters in Latin America. To identify these 
clusters, I develop a typology of ideal welfare states and classify LACs into the identified types 
(Chapter 2).  
In general terms, typologies have several components. One of the core elements is the 
overarching or primary concept measured by the typology (Collier et al. 2008). In my typology, the 
overarching concept is the “welfare state.” To define this concept, it is very important to recognize 
that the welfare state is a “nebulous yet sharply contested concept” (Esping-Andersen 1994: 712). 
Correspondingly, one finds disputes over the appropriate meaning and definition of the welfare 
state. In broad terms, conceptualizations of the welfare state can be divided into social rights, 
                                                
27 The text in square brackets is not in Hall’s original statement. Because I do not present the complete statement, I added 
the text in square brackets to aid in understanding the original statement.   
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outcome, and policy definitions. To construct the typology of welfare states, I use a policy definition 
and define the welfare state as the sum total of a nation’s social policy repertoire, consisting of 
political interventions into the functioning of the economy and the societal distribution of life chances 
that seek to promote the security and equality of citizens in order to foster the social integration of 
modern societies (Alber 1988: 456). Equalization of opportunities is usually accomplished through 
public health and educational systems, whereas equalization of results (mainly income) and 
security against social risks—associated with poverty, sickness, old age, and unemployment—are 
accomplished through public transfer programs (Castles 1998, Flora & Heidenheimer 1995).28 
According to this policy definition of the welfare state, if a state provides cash benefits and social 
services to citizens, it is defined as a welfare state.   
By using a policy definition, I avoid the problem of conceptual stretching that arises when a 
given concept is applied to cases for which it is not appropriate. Even the poorest Third World 
nations have some form of public transfers and social services, which is not the case for social 
rights-based definitions. Defenders of this last type of welfare state conceptualization contend that 
social citizenship constitutes the core idea of the welfare state (Esping-Andersen 1990). The idea of 
social citizenship suggests that the entire social community can claim social rights without having to 
demonstrate economic need (for example via a means test). However, the extension of social rights 
—such as protection against social risks (unemployment, old-age, sickness) and improving human 
capital—is limited in Latin America, where large segments of the population lack access to even the 
most basic public programs. As Esping-Andersen (1994: 713) points out, “The concept  [social 
citizenship] can hardly be stretched beyond the eighteen to twenty rich capitalist countries in the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development area.” The limited extension of social 
rights in Latin America indicates that a policy definition of the welfare state is more appropriate than 
a social rights definition to understand welfare systems in this region. 
Outcomes definitions emerged in the context of the debate about welfare state retrenchment in 
the 1990s and the 2000s in advanced western democracies. In this setting, the welfare state is 
                                                
28 Price controls and subsidies have constituted important instruments of social protection in Latin America. However, most 
studies on social policy in this region have not included analyses of both instruments (Huber & Bogliaccini 2010). 
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defined with reference to certain outcomes. For instance, Korpi and Palme (2003: 428) 
conceptualize the welfare state in terms of policies to affect the outcomes of distributive processes 
in the sphere of markets. According to this definition, these authors consider the level of 
employment as an indicator of the welfare state. Clayton and Pontusson (1998) provide another 
example that includes social inequality as a dimension of the welfare state. However, outcome 
definitions are not free of problems. One of the most important difficulties is that many factors other 
than government interventions affect outcomes. For instance, in economic science, the Phillips 
Curve shows an inverse relationship between unemployment and inflation in an economy. The 
multi-causal character of socio-economic outcomes indicates that scholars have to take care with 
the interpretation of changes in, for instance, inequality and employment as a result of government 
programs. A second problem of outcome definitions is that this type of definition of the welfare state 
is inappropriate for analyzing the impact of the welfare state on social outcomes. If analysts wish to 
study the causal relationship between the welfare state and social outcomes, then the latter must 
be excluded from the conceptualization of the former.  
A second element of a typology is the dimensions around which the typology is organized. In 
Chapter 2 of this dissertation, the particular types of welfare states are derived from three 
dimensions. The first dimension is the instruments by which the welfare state pursues its goals. 
According to my conceptualization of social policies, I distinguish between social assistance 
transfers, social insurance transfers, and the public provision of social services (Section 1.3). The 
second dimension is the “public-private mix,” that is, the way in which welfare production is divided 
among the state, market, and family (Esping-Andersen 1999).  Finally, the third dimension is “labor 
relations,” comprising modes of bargaining between collective actors, such as the state, organized 
labor, and associations of employers.  
In Chapter 2, I identify four types of ideal welfare states on the basis of these three 
dimensions. The types are understood as full instances of the root definition of the welfare state; at 
the same time, they are differentiated by having more defining attributes. The first type is the 
corporatist welfare state, in which the main provider of welfare is the family, while the state performs 
a subsidiary function. This type is also characterized by corporatist labor relations and by a focus on 
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social insurance transfers. The universal welfare state is another type. Like the former, labor 
relations are corporatist. However, the main welfare source is the state, and the main instruments of 
public intervention are social services. The last two ideal types are the liberal and the productivist 
welfare states. In the liberal type, labor relations are pluralist, taking the form of agreements 
between diverse and competing private organizations; meanwhile, the state upholds the principle of 
non-intervention, leaving the market as the main provider of welfare. The main instruments of public 
intervention in this ideal type are social assistance transfers. Finally, the productivist type is 
characterized by a focus on the commodification of the labor force through public investment in 
social services. Labor relations are also corporatist in this type, but the cooperation between labor 
and capital is at the firm level. The state and market share the role of the central welfare provider in 
the productivist welfare state. 
To determine the ideal types of welfare states into which Latin American countries can be 
categorized, I created measures that capture the dimensions of the ideal typology related to the 
instruments of the welfare state and public-private mix. A lack of data precludes the inclusion of 
information on labor relations. I collected information on seventeen Latin American countries for the 
1990s and used the statistical technique of “hierarchical-agglomerative” cluster analysis to classify 
the countries. Table 1.4 shows the measures that operationalized the dimensions of the typology 
that were used to identify the ideal models operating in Latin America. The four measures are 
continuous variables. In the rest of this section, I briefly present the measures of welfare state 
types. Chapter 2 discusses the measurement validity of the variables in detail. 
The indicator of the role of the market in the public-private mix is the average private 
expenditures on health as a percentage of total expenditures on health for the period from 1995-
1999. This variable captures the liberal emphasis on the market with reference to the importance of 
private efforts in the health sector. The role of the state in the public-private mix is operationalized 
by the average of the coverage rates of public pensions and the coverage rates of public healthcare 
programs for particular years of the 1990s. This indicator captures program universalism. One of 
the core characteristics of the corporatist welfare state is a subsidiary role in the public-private mix. 
This role of the state produces status segmentation. To measure this characteristic, I developed an 
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index that assesses program segmentation in terms of the number of significant pension programs 
in 1993. To compensate for differences related to the focus on social insurance among Latin 
American welfare states, the number of pension programs is weighted by social insurance spending 
as a percentage of total social spending in 1993. The higher the score in the index is, the higher the 
status segmentation of a welfare state is. Finally, with respect to the aims of economic growth and 
the international competitiveness of the country’s economy, the productivist welfare state stimulates 
the commodification of the labor force by providing social services—particularly healthcare and 
education. To capture the focus on social services as an instrument of the welfare state, I used the 
average health and education spending as a percentage of total public spending for the period from 
1990-1999. A productivist welfare state should present a high score for this variable.  
 
Table 1.4. Indicators of the typology’s dimensions 
 
Dimension Indicators Level of aggregation Chapter 
    
Role of the market in public-
private mix 
Private expenditures on 
healthcare as a percentage 
of total expenditures on 
health 
Country 2 
    
Role of the state in public-
private mix  
The average between 
coverage rates of public 
pensions and coverage 
rates of public healthcare 
programs 
Country 2 
    
Subsidiary role of the state 
in public-private mix and 
focus on social insurance 
Summary index of status 
segmentation 
Country 2 
    
Focus on social services Average health and 
education spending as a 
percentage of total public 
spending 
Country 2 
   
  
 
Cluster analysis does not use only one variable to identify clusters of countries but, instead, 
uses all of them. The profiles of the clusters (e.g. corporatist) are then recognized by identifying the 
variables for which the clusters present high levels. In Chapter 3, I assess the role of clusters as 
moderators by using dummy variables for the groups of welfare states identified in cluster analysis. 
The goal of this operationalization is to examine how the institutional context shapes the impact of 
public transfers on poverty levels with data for the period from 1980-2000. An alternative approach 
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is to analyze the continuous variables used in the cluster analysis as independent variables in the 
regression analysis of policy impact in Chapter 3. Unfortunately, with the exception of expenditure 
data, there are no time-series data for the variables used in the cluster analysis. It follows that, if I 
used these variables in policy impact analysis, I would have scarce degrees of freedom, so the 
analysis may have a problem with robustness of findings, insofar as I should include only a small 
number of control variables.  
 
1.6 Micro-Macro Explanations of the Impact of Public Transfers and the Public Provision of 
Social Services on Poverty: The Arguments of the Dissertation 
 
Social science almost never is able to show that one factor in isolation from all other factors is the 
cause of a phenomenon. The study of poverty is no exception. The explanation for poverty involves 
a host of causes. For some, it is an issue of joblessness; for others, it is a lack of opportunities. For 
still others, poverty is a problem of political representation for citizens without a voice. In fact, claims 
regarding a causal factor of poverty typically are tentative. 
In this dissertation, I do not intend to capture the multitude of poverty causes. Rather, I suggest 
a set of mechanisms that may be helpful to explain the impact of one causal factor (social policy) on 
poverty. To this end, three perspectives in social science appear to be relevant. The proponents of 
the first perspective, the investment-oriented view, assess the impact of benefits on the capital of 
the poor. Seen from this perspective, capital can be understood as the stock of any type of 
resources that an actor controls. There are different kinds of capital. For example, physical and 
human capital typically are analyzed in economics. Policy analysis stresses the direct impact of 
transfers on the financial capital of households. The literature in other social sciences considers 
other kinds of capital, including social, cultural, institutional, and political capital (Esser 2000). To 
predict the impact of a particular social policy on poverty, it is very important to recognize these 
different types of capital because the effect of a specific social benefit depends on the particular 
type of capital that the benefits impact. For example, in general terms, the poverty effect of the 
benefits will be negative when social transfers may improve access to financial or human capital 
(e.g. Dercon & Clarke 2009, Garfinkel et al. 2010). Nonetheless, the impact of social benefits may 
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be associated with a higher level of poverty if more redistribution implies decreasing the financial 
capital of the income groups (middle- and high-income individuals) that have a high propensity to 
save and invest (Kenworthy 1999).  
To understand the impact of social policies on poverty, we should also take into account a 
second perspective, the work-oriented view. Defenders of this perspective highlight the effect of 
social policies on the labor supply of the income groups. A standard economic model of labor 
supply provides clear predictions of this effect. Overlooking the particular assumptions of this model 
(Chapter 4), it states that the higher the size of the transfers assigned to individual recipients is, the 
fewer hours will be worked. By extending this prognosis to poverty, modern scholars argue that 
generous benefits may produce poverty if the difference between the size of the benefits and the 
wages is insignificant. In such a situation, a beneficiary will choose not to work at all and to profit 
from public benefits as a lifestyle. In other words, the beneficiary is “trapped” in unemployment, 
which, in turn, produces poverty (for an overview, see Gebauer 2007). 
To fully grasp the impact of public transfers and the public provision of social services on 
poverty, concentrating only on productive investment and the work decisions of the income groups 
is insufficient because the choices of actors are not determined only by the motives and interest of 
the players. Rather, any particular action and interaction must be seen as embedded in a more 
extensive institutional context. The impact of public transfers and the public provision of social 
services on poverty presents a prime case of the institutional context approach’s utility, as it 
emphasizes the contribution of welfare state types to the formation of motives and interests among 
citizens (Aberg 1989, Korpi & Palme 1998, Nelson 2003). To explain the association between types 
of welfare states and motivations, the core idea of this institutional approach is the concept of the 
feedback effects of institutional contexts (Svallfors 2007, 2010). It is argued that, once in place as 
result of the actions and interactions of social groups, institutional contexts produce effects on the 
groups from which they have arisen. For the topic of the dissertation, a particular action that is 
relevant in understanding the contribution of institutional contexts for poverty reduction is concerned 
with public support for redistributive policies in general among citizens. According to the concept of 
feedback effects, support for redistributive policy is shaped by the social policy that characterizes a 
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specific institutional context. Such support may, in turn, if channeled into the political legitimacy of a 
government aimed at building broad targeting and a generous size of public programs, contribute to 
future poverty reduction (Nelson 2004). An implication of this argument is that the association 
between social policy and poverty levels may vary among different institutional contexts because 
institutional structures generate different levels of public support for redistributive policies in general 
among the citizens that, in turn, affect the size and targeting of specific social policies.29 
This dissertation is informed by these three complementary perspectives of productive 
investment, work effort, and public support for redistributive policy in general. I frame the roles of 
these three explanatory factors in explaining the impact of social policies on poverty in Latin 
America and the role of the institutional context by adopting micro-macro modeling (Coleman 
1986)—see Figure 1.4.30 More particularly, I pursue two goals with this micro-macro approach. 
First, I intend to clearly illustrate the fact that the association between social policy and poverty at 
the macro level is the result of micro-mechanisms related with productive investment, work effort, 
and public support for redistributive policies in general. Second, the micro-macro models aim to 
show the contribution of each dissertation’s chapter to the examination of the leading questions of 
the present thesis. 
The explanatory models assume two levels. At the macro level, the dotted lines in Figure 1.4 
represent the explanandum of the dissertation – that is, the association between social policies and 
poverty level and the influence of the institutional context on the association between public 
transfers and the poverty level. Two components of the model are pivotal in explaining these 
macro-relationships (Section 1.1). First, public transfers and the public provision of social services 
are multidimensional concepts that have three dimensions: size, targeting, and duration. Each of 
these dimensions may influence poverty in different ways. Second, in this dissertation, I focus on 
size and targeting and attempt to explain the influence of both policy dimensions on poverty by 
indicating three explanatory micro-mechanisms. More specifically, the explanation of the impact of 
                                                
29 The explanatory mechanism associated with the moderating role of institutional context is concerned with the public 
support of social groups for redistributive policy in general. Scholars, who adopt the institutional approach, stress the term “in 
general” in the sense of social policy that includes broad categories of citizens. The opposite concept is policy with 
pronounced targeting, as this includes only specific social groups (Nelson 2004). 
30 Micro-macro models are a standard way of representing micro-macro links in the social sciences. For details, see 
Coleman (1986). 
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size and targeting of a social policy on poverty at the macro level entails three steps, as shown in 
Figure 1.4: how macro-level social policies at one point in time influence the three explanatory 
mechanisms and how the institutional context moderates the influence of public transfers (arrows 
with 1); how the mechanisms affect the poverty status (poor or not poor) of individuals (arrow 2); 
and how a particular level of poverty at the macro-social level at a later time is the macro-outcome 
of the aggregation of poverty status (arrow 3). The structure of the dissertation reflects different 
components of these micro-macro models in the sense that each chapter evaluates a particular 
social policy, mechanism, and step of the models. In the rest of this section, I discuss the 
components of the models on which the dissertation focuses. Furthermore, by using the models of 
Figure 1.4 as a general guide, the main hypotheses of the thesis and their justifications are 
highlighted.31  
 
A 
 
INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT 
 
 
PUBLIC TRANSFERS                                                                                                          POVERTY LEVEL 
 
 
 
 
 
          
Public support for                                                                                                              ¨Poverty status 
      redistributive policy in general 
 
 
B 
 
PUBLIC TRANSFERS                                                                                                                                     POVERTY LEVEL 
          
 
                      SOCIAL SERVICES 
 
 
 
                        Productive investment                                                                                                
                                                                                                                                                      Poverty status 
                              Work effort 
 
 
Figure 1.4. The basic structure of the theoretical explanations of the dissertation: micro-macro modeling 
                                                
31 To make the general micro-macro explanation as simple as possible, models A and B in Figure 1.4 do not show some 
specific explanatory factors that I suggest in the main arguments of the dissertation. More specifically, Figure 1.4 does not 
illustrate the role of economic output and income distribution as components of the micro-macro explanations of the policy 
impact on poverty levels. In Chapter 3, I discuss the role of economic output and income distribution in the micro-macro 
explanations in detail.  
1a’ 
                                
1a 
1b 1c 3 
3  1d 1e 1f 
2 
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Chapter 2 focuses on step 1 (arrow 1a’ in model A). It provides a classification of welfare 
states in Latin America in the 1990s on the basis of an ideal typology of four welfare states: 
corporatism, universalism, liberalism, and productivism. In doing so, I characterize the institutional 
contexts that are used as moderators of the influence of public transfers on micro-explanatory 
mechanisms in the following chapter. As stated in Section 1.2, the findings of Chapter 2 indicate the 
existence of five clusters in Latin America (for details of these findings, see Section 1.9): pioneer 
corporatist welfare states (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay), universalist welfare states (Costa 
Rica), productivist welfare states (Central American countries plus Ecuador), residual corporatist 
welfare states (Colombia, Paraguay, and Peru), and mixed welfare states (Bolivia, Honduras, 
Mexico, and Nicaragua). This classification of welfare models operating in Latin America carries 
implications for what can be expected from institutional contexts more generally. 
Chapter 3 is a second macro study that illustrates the three steps of macro-micro-models. This 
study evaluates how the size of the redistributive budget that the state allocates to public transfers 
and social services impact poverty levels and how the institutional contexts shape the poverty 
impact of public transfers in Latin America in the period from 1980-2000. More particularly, by 
focusing on the size dimension of policies, this study explains the impact of public transfers and 
social services on poverty by stressing the macro-to-micro transition in terms of the impact of both 
social policies on micro-mechanisms—particularly, public support for redistributive policy in general 
and productive investment—, the micro-relationships between mechanisms and poverty status, and 
poverty level as a function of poverty status.  
In Figure 1.4, model A contains a general explanation of the impact of public transfers on 
poverty levels. For the institutional context, the dotted line indicates that the impact of the size of the 
redistributive budget allocated to public transfers on poverty varies across different clusters of 
welfare states in Latin America. In Chapter 3, I explain the variation of relationships between the 
size of public transfers in the budget and poverty among different types of welfare states in terms of 
general public support for redistributive policies among income groups. Arrows 1a and 1b illustrate 
how this explanatory mechanism works. Following the idea of feedback effects, public transfers 
influence the public support; this, in turn, affects future policy. Arrow 1a’ indicates that the influence 
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of public transfers on the redistributive preferences of citizens varies among institutional contexts. In 
specific institutional contexts (see below for details), the welfare state provides cash benefits for the 
poor and, thus, tends to reduce the likelihood of poverty status among individuals (arrow 1c). 
Finally, the aggregation procedure of the resulting poverty status should produce a lower poverty 
level in this specific institutional context. The theoretical reason for this specific micro-to-macro 
relation relies on the fact that the aggregation procedure that associates poverty level with poverty 
status (arrow 3) in Chapter 3 is simply the sum of the poverty status of individuals divided by the 
size of the population. It follows that, if the likelihood of poverty status decreases at the micro level, 
then the poverty level will also decrease.32 
More specifically, in Chapter 3, I contend that public transfers should decrease poverty in 
pioneer corporatist and universalist welfare states because countries with larger welfare states not 
only have high transfer rates via social insurance programs but also gain legitimacy and public 
support for increased spending on income-tested transfers, which raises the income of poor 
households. At the macro level, larger public transfers, then, should decrease the inequality of 
income distribution, which, in turn, is assumed to reduce poverty levels. This hypothesis is further 
elaborated with the expectation that, because of different entitlement criteria, the reduction in 
poverty associated with the public transfers’ generosity should be higher in a universalist welfare 
state than in pioneer corporatist systems. Finally, I argue that the size of public transfers should 
increase poverty in residual corporatist, productivist, and mixed welfare states because public 
support for redistributive policies in these welfare systems is low and the targeting of public 
transfers that predominates among these arrangements implies that the welfare state provides 
benefits only for middle- and high-income groups. In doing so, public transfers have increased 
income inequality and, thus, poverty in these Latin American welfare states. 
As evident in model A, the institutional theory described above does not consider relationships 
between the micro variables. In the literature of poverty and social policy these relationships 
concern additional micro mechanisms: productive investment and work effort. With respect to 
                                                
32 In the literature of poverty, this relationship between poverty status and poverty level involves the “monotonicity” axiom, 
which specifies that an increase in the income of the poor should lead to a decrease in the measured level of poverty. The 
headcount ratio index satisfies this axiom when an increase in income pushes the poor out poverty (Foster et al., 1984). 
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productive investment, I use this explanatory mechanism to explain the impact of the public 
provision of social services on the poverty level. Model B in Figure 1.4 depicts a general micro-
macro explanation of this relationship. Benefits in kind change poverty levels because this social 
policy (a macro factor) influences productive investment (a micro factor); this then impacts the 
poverty statuses of individuals (a micro factor), which, in turn, results in a specific poverty level (a 
macro factor). Using this general model as a guide, I argue in Chapter 3 that the size of the 
government budget allocated to social services decreases poverty across Latin American countries 
because the public provision of social services increases the productive investment of income 
groups, particularly investment in human capital, which, in turn, impels the key to poverty reduction: 
economic output. In terms of micro-macro modeling, this means that greater human capital, which 
results from policy investment in social services, stimulates economic output; this then raises 
demand for workers, which, in turn, increases the earnings of the poor and, in doing so, decreases 
the likelihood of poverty status. Finally, the aggregation procedure of individual poverty status, 
illustrated above, should result in a lower poverty level at the macro level. 
Chapter 4 evaluates the impact of social assistance transfers on poverty status over time – that 
is, chronic and transitory poverty—in Chile with household panel data for 2001 and 2006. In this 
study, I discuss the connections between this type of cash payment and micro-mechanisms related 
to productive investment and the poor’s work effort at the micro level. It follows that Chapter 4 
examines a particular targeting criterion: means-testing. Arrows 1d and 1e in model B of Figure 1.4 
illustrates these connections in general terms. However, it is important to say that this model does 
not provide a complete picture of the research design that is used in Chapter 4. This study focuses 
on micro relations. More specifically, Chapter 4 measures social assistance transfers as a 
characteristic of individuals. Furthermore, this study does not examine the significance of 
explanatory mechanisms for poverty at the aggregate level. Rather, Chapter 4 focuses on step 2 
(arrow 2 in model B) and evaluates the role of productive investment and work effort on individual 
propensity to live in chronic and transitory poverty. The findings of the chapter show that social 
assistance transfers in the Chilean welfare state are characterized by a small payment size 
assigned to beneficiaries. Moreover, the benefits favored only low-income segments. In such a 
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context, I argue that social assistance transfers do not affect transitory poverty because the size of 
the payments is too small to smooth inter-temporal income variability, which defines this type of 
poverty. By contrast, in spite of the small benefit size, I argue that social assistance transfers have 
a positive impact on chronic poverty because the design of transfers may increase the incentive for 
the chronically poor to change their work efforts to qualify for Chilean social assistance benefits. 
More particularly, cash payments may be associated with incentives for the chronic poor to apply 
for benefits and to work in the informal sector. Doing so causes chronic poverty. 
In empirical research, theoretical explanations typically have assumptions or statements that 
cannot be tested. To explain this problem, a standard reason involves data restrictions. In such a 
context, the studies of the dissertation are no exception. Though the explanations of policy impacts 
on poverty depend on micro-macro models, I provide empirical evidence in the dissertation only for 
some parts of the models. More particularly, I provide the results of empirical tests for the 
association of interests—that is, the associations between social policies, institutional contexts, and 
poverty—but not for associations that involve the explanatory mechanisms. The reason is a lack of 
data. 
However, the lack of an empirical test for the explanatory mechanisms does not invalidate the 
findings of the dissertation. With respect to the dissertation’s aim of estimating the impact of social 
policies on poverty, we do not need to have any knowledge about mechanisms to know that a 
causal relationship exists. A classic example in science is helpful in illustrating this point. Aspirin 
has been known to help with pain since it was discovered by Felix Hoffmann in 1897, but it was not 
until 1971 that John Vane discovered the mechanism by which the effect of aspirin can be 
explained. This example shows very well that we can know what is likely to happen if a treatment 
(aspirin or social policy) is applied without being required to also explain why it is likely to happen. 
All the same, though, no causal account can be considered complete without an explanatory 
mechanism being demonstrated or, at the very least, hypothesized (Sekhon 2004: 289).  
In this dissertation, I estimate the causal relationships between social policies and poverty and 
explain such associations on the basis of micro-mechanisms that are suggested only at a 
theoretical level. Here, “at a theoretical level” means that I explicitly discuss the relevance of 
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mechanisms to explain the causal relationship under examination and, drawing on this theoretical 
discussion, I derive empirical implications (hypotheses) regarding the poverty impacts of public 
benefits. Moreover, I attempt to document the validity of micro-mechanisms by discussing 
references in the literature and, in doing so, to show their plausibility. In the dissertation’s 
conclusion (Chapter 5), I offer suggestions for further thorough research on explanatory 
mechanisms. 
 
1.7 Research Design 
 
The studies of the dissertation combine comparative investigations and a micro study of Chilean 
social assistance. In this section, I discuss the research design of these studies using two basic 
typologies of research design in the social sciences. The first is factor-centric versus outcome 
centric research designs; the other one is large-N versus small-N designs. The latter dichotomy 
refers to the number of observations in the analysis. The dichotomy factor-centric versus outcome 
centric research is based on another aspect that describes alternative causal inference strategies 
(Gschwend & Schimmelfennig 2007). A research design is factor-centric if the goal of the study is to 
estimate the direction and size of a particular causal effect of one or a few independent variables on 
a dependent variable and to assess their robustness. The research design is outcome-centric if the 
goal of the study is to explain outcomes by taking into account many explanatory variables and, in 
doing so, to maximize the explained variance of the dependent variable.  
The studies of the dissertation take a factor-centric research design to pursue the main goals 
of the dissertation. As said above (Section 1.1), one of the main goals of this dissertation is to 
estimate the impact of two independent variables (public transfers and the public provision of social 
services) on poverty. To achieve this goal, the association between social policies and poverty is 
analyzed at two levels. At the macro level, I examine an unbalanced panel of fifteen Latin American 
countries for the period from 1980-2000 (Chapter 3). In using this type of data set, a moderate 
sample size (n=67) is available for statistical analysis. At the micro level, the analyses are based on 
a representative and large sample of the Chilean population, which provides panel data for the 
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years 1996, 2001, and 2006 (Chapter 4). With this data, I examine the impact of social assistance 
transfers on the poverty status of individuals over time.  
Another main goal of the dissertation is to estimate the impact of the institutional context on the 
association between public transfers and poverty. To achieve this objective, it is first necessary to 
classify Latin American countries into different institutional structures. A small-N research design is 
used in which institutional differences that exist between LACs are identified by analyzing 
seventeen countries with a cluster analysis using data from the 1990s (Chapter 2). The findings of 
the cluster analysis are used in the policy impact analysis with the panel of Latin American nations.  
The focus of these three studies on Latin American countries is appropriate for the examination 
of the research questions of the dissertation for a number of reasons that I provide in Section 1.1, 
and I discuss some of them in detail in the rest of this section. First, the selection of Latin American 
countries is appropriate because they are a new research site that provides the opportunity to 
evaluate general propositions developed in the setting of advanced capitalist countries. For 
example, the study of the impact of public transfers and the public provision of social services on 
poverty at the macro level offers the chance to evaluate general propositions regarding the 
socioeconomic consequences of institutional arrangements in a new regional context.  
At the micro level, Chilean social assistance also constitutes a new research site that is 
theoretically interesting. In the study of this social assistance system, I evaluate the impact of cash 
benefits on chronic and transitory poverty. To understand this association, microeconomic theory of 
the labor market suggests that social assistance transfers should increase chronic poverty because 
cash benefits decrease the incentive to work (Chapter 4 and Section 1.6). However, most tests of 
such a hypothesis analyze data regarding welfare beneficiaries in advanced capitalist countries. 
There have been few attempts to test this hypothesis in other regional settings (Skoufias & Di Maro 
2008). To fill in this gap, the Chilean social assistance appears to be an appropriate research 
environment. This welfare system provides some of the best examples in Latin America to 
understand the causal mechanism (work effort) underlying the relationship between cash benefits 
and poverty at the micro level.  
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More specifically, many skeptical scholars argue that any study of the disincentive effects of 
welfare programs does not makes sense in Latin American countries because social assistance 
systems are relatively weak and the size of benefits is minimal (Draibe & Riesco 2007).  Against 
such background, however, Chile appears to be a deviant case.33 This welfare state has 
experienced a significant development of different social assistance programs since the 1990s (for 
details, see Chapter 4). This suggests that the study of Chilean social assistance is important, as it 
is relevant for Chilean policy-makers to evaluate the results of public investment on social 
assistance and, in doing so, to suggest improvements of such programs (Chapter 4). Furthermore, 
upon examination of social assistance programs in Chile, this welfare state appears to be relevant 
for the theory because it provides the opportunity to evaluate the proposition of labor 
microeconomics in a new context and, in doing so, to examine the generality of the hypothesis 
regarding the negative impact of benefits on poverty.  
With respect to the study of Chilean social assistance, it is, however, important to say that the 
individuals are the primary domain of inference in this research study. In spite of this delimitation of 
the micro study’s scope, Chapter 4 suggests that the findings of the micro analysis have 
implications at the country level, particularly for the evaluation of the consequences of the means-
testing-based welfare model for poverty during the period of liberal reform in Latin America.    
The focus on Latin American countries also is appropriate for methodological reasons. As 
stated in Section 1.1, to estimate the causal effect of social policies on poverty, the key independent 
variables, public transfers and the public provision of social services, must vary. Latin American 
countries, unlike many other developing countries, meet this methodological requirement. This is 
evident in Figure 1.2. The variation in social policy in this region ranges from pioneer countries with 
large and old welfare systems, where most of the population has access to social security and 
social services, to Central American nations with marginal welfare states, where most of the 
population is not covered by social insurance and assistance schemes. By using this between-
country variance, a comparative research study of LACs helps us to identify differences in 
institutional contexts and social policies that may produce divergent outcomes. 
                                                
33 In recent years, many Latin American countries have invested in social assistance programs. Studies of the disincentive 
effect of these programs should appear in the upcoming years. See Hanlon et al. (2010). 
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Another methodological reason relies on the fact that the focus on Latin America helps to 
control for unknown contextual variables that may substantially shape the effect of social policies on 
poverty across different regions of the developing world. For example, studies suggest that, 
whereas Spanish and Portuguese colonialism is negatively associated with long-run development, 
British colonialism is positively associated with long-run development (Katz et al. 2005). A model 
that mixes developing countries with different types of colonialism may have serious specification 
problems if does not control for factors that explain such differences between the types of 
colonialism because Spanish, Portuguese, and British colonialism may produce particular 
institutional legacies (e.g. types of redistributive preferences) that, in turn, would generate particular 
levels of poverty. It follows that it is more reasonable to delineate a population of cases that were 
subjected to similar styles of colonialism or other contextual characteristics (e.g. religion), such as, 
Latin American countries. 
Methodological reasons are also relevant to justify the decision to concentrate the thesis on 
Latin America and not on other regions of the world. With respect to advanced capitalist countries, 
the exclusion of these nations from the analysis is associated with the problem of conceptual 
stretching. This problem involves the distortion that occurs when a concept does not fit new cases 
(Collier & Mahon 1993: 845). This problem precludes lumping Latin American and advanced 
capitalist countries together. The concept of the welfare state used in the dissertation denotes the 
existence of transfers or social services in a country (Section 1.5). However, for advanced capitalist 
countries, this definition may be too minimal to capture the different dimensions that public 
intervention has in these welfare states (Esping-Andersen 1994). Furthermore, unlike in this 
dissertation, studies of advanced capitalist countries typically analyze relative poverty. It follows that 
the investigation of a mix of LACs and advanced western democracies will produce stretching 
problems with respect to the concept of poverty. 
A core problem of cross-case comparison is establishing the equivalence of measures used to 
capture the concepts under analysis (Landman 2000). This problem is particularly relevant for the 
measurement of poverty. As stated in Section 1.3, the measure of absolute poverty used in the 
macro studies of the dissertation (2 dollars a day) attempt to capture the well-being of the poor in 
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middle-income developing countries, as most LACs are (Section 1.3). This means that, by using the 
same measure of poverty across the cases, I avoid the problem of the equivalence of the poverty 
measurement. However, the inclusion of other developing regions in the analysis of the dissertation 
would open to question this cross-case comparison strategy. Studies indicate that poverty has a 
different magnitude in the developing countries of Africa and Asia. A significant portion of the 
population in these nations lives in extreme material deprivation. It follows that a measure of 
poverty that captures well-being not in middle- but in low-income contexts is necessary (UNRISD 
2010). In fact, scholars typically use a 1-dollar-a-day measurement of absolute poverty to capture 
poverty in low-income countries. Thus, the analysis of a mix of Latin American countries and other 
developing nations may cause a problem with the equivalence of the measures of poverty. To avoid 
such a problem, the dissertation focuses only on Latin American nations. 
The exclusion of African and Asian developing countries from the scope of the dissertation was 
also determined by pragmatic reasons. In comparative studies, the explanatory power of the 
concepts can be enhanced if they cover contexts with which the researcher is most familiar 
(Landman 2000: 35). Following this recommendation, the focus on Latin American countries of the 
dissertation is commanded by my knowledge of these welfare states. Furthermore, another 
pragmatic reason regards data availability. The macro studies of the dissertation measure social 
policies by using government spending (Chapters 2 and 3). However, existing spending data for a 
large sample of developing countries outside Latin America have not included health and education 
expenditures, or they cover a limited period of time (Pribble 2008). Contrasting with this situation, 
Latin America provides rich information about spending. In fact, to my knowledge, the analysis in 
Chapter 3 is based on one of the largest periods for which information about social insurance and 
human capital expenditures in the developing world exists (see Chapter 3 for details).    
Data availability also justifies the focus of the dissertation on Chilean social assistance and the 
period under analysis. With respect to the Chilean case, as stated above, tests of the disincentive 
effects of public programs on work effort are scarce in Latin America. This is somewhat 
understandable because the test requires longitudinal data, which are expensive and demand a 
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complex administrative organization.34 However, Chile appears to be an exception against this 
background. High-quality cross-sectional and longitudinal data regarding social programs and 
poverty exist in this welfare state. It follows that Chile provides good conditions to conduct an 
empirical evaluation of the effect of social assistance transfers on chronic and transitory poverty.  
Studies typically do not limit their scopes to spatial domains but also to temporal periods. In 
this dissertation, the population of Latin American countries is the spatial domain of the primary 
inferences of the dissertation. The temporal domain is the period from 1980 to 2000 in the macro 
studies and the period from 2001 to 2006 in the micro study of Chilean social assistance. The 
selection of these periods is commanded by data availability.  A lack of data precludes the analysis 
of other periods.  
At first glance, the period under analysis in the macro studies (1980-2000) of the dissertation 
suggests that the findings are not relevant for contemporary poverty levels in Latin America, 
particularly when considering the liberal reforms of Latin American welfare states in the last three 
decades. However, this dissertation examines the moderator role of institutional contexts, and 
scholars suggest that there is likely to be a considerable time-lag between important institutional 
changes in welfare systems and their observable socioeconomic outcomes (Pedersen 1999). For 
example, the effect of changes in pension systems on income distribution takes a generation to 
mature. The same pattern is expected for the reform of social services, as the return on investment 
for human capital is expected by definition in the future (Chapter 3). It follows that the current 
poverty levels reflect institutional changes that occurred in the past. With respect to the relevance of 
the dissertation’s findings, adding information from the 2000s should not affect the analysis of 
institutional contexts, as it will take a lifetime, particularly with respect to the pension system, to 
clearly perceive the socioeconomic consequences of the institutional changes of the 1990s and the 
2000s. Overall, by examining data for the last three decades, the studies of the dissertation provide 
a picture of the relationship between social policy and poverty in the initial period of liberal reforms 
and, in doing so, they may supply useful insights into the current debate about the welfare state and 
socioeconomic inequality in Latin America.  
                                                
34 However, it is important to say that the number of developing countries undertaking panel household surveys in recent 
years is increasing. See Baulch (2011).  
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1.8 Contributions 
 
The purpose of all research is scientific progress. However, if social science is to matter to 
policymakers or citizens, researchers also must be clear about the social contribution of their 
research. Scholars have to demonstrate how the findings of their studies can solve social problems 
(Gschwend & Schimmelfennig 2007). Accordingly, the findings of my dissertation can be 
commended for their scientific and social contributions. From a social standpoint, the findings of this 
study are important because Latin America’s high level of poverty is one of the deepest and most 
persistent social problems in the region (Section 1.1), and therefore, estimating and explaining the 
impacts of social policies on poverty is of critical importance for scholars, policy-makers, and 
citizens. In fact, following one of the principles of the philosopher John Rawls (1999), it can be 
argued that the study of intersections between social policy and poverty may provide a powerful 
diagnosis of the success of the entire system of social protection. In the conclusions of this 
dissertation (Chapter 5), I discuss a set of concrete policy implications that are suggested by the 
findings of this thesis. 
At the scientific level, current approaches to poverty focus on the measurement of “things” and 
often ignore the causes of poverty (UNRISD 2010: 2). This situation is particularly true for policy 
studies, which do not sufficiently take into account the different ways in which social policies 
produce poverty. To fill this gap, the general contribution of this dissertation is to provide empirical 
tests of a set of hypotheses on public transfers and the provision of social services as causes of 
poverty (Section 1.6). In doing so, this study improves the scientific understanding of the 
association between social policies and poverty in developing countries such as LACs.  
I also would like to stress three particularly important contributions in this introduction.35 First, 
studies of social policy and poverty in Latin American countries and other developing countries are 
dominated by evaluations of specific government programs (Section 1.1). However, if we aim to 
unravel the redistributive mechanism of the welfare state, it is of interest to know not only the impact 
of specific programs but also the institutional structures and how these structures produce poverty. 
In this vein, following the growing interest in the institutional structure of social policies in advanced 
                                                
35 I point out more specific and technical contributions in the following chapters. 
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democracies, this dissertation fills the gap of the scarce institutional analysis of social policy in 
developing countries by assessing how poverty and other socioeconomic outcomes are related to 
institutional structures (types of welfare states). 
Second, most studies in Latin America analyze direct and static impacts of social policies on 
poverty. The problem with this corpus of research is that it may hide indirect dynamic effects of 
government programs—specifically the possibility that such programs reduce work effort and 
productive investment, and therefore, hurt the poor (Kenworthy 1999: 1123).  As stated above 
(Section 1.6), I examine in this dissertation these kinds of dynamic and indirect effects. While, at the 
macro level, I analyze the long-term impacts of social services policy on poverty levels, at the micro 
level, this study provides evidence of the poor’s behavioral responses to social assistance 
programs.  
Third, while recent studies of poverty in Latin America are dominated by the hegemonic 
consideration of economic growth as a key causal factor of deprivation, the study of social policy 
and institutional contexts allows me to add nuance to this view (Section 1.1). The findings indicate 
not only the relevance of both factors to poverty reduction but also suggest that the universal-
citizenship approach of welfare provision is the most successful policy intervention in reducing 
poverty. This result verifies the evidence for advanced nations and suggests that the socioeconomic 
consequences of certain institutional contexts do not depend on the geographic and historical 
characteristics of a single country. 
 
1.9 Organization of the Dissertation 
 
The remainder of this dissertation is composed of four chapters. As stated above (Section 1.6), the 
position of each chapter in the dissertation plan is organized on the basis of the micro-macro 
models. In doing so, the chapters are related through the dissertation’s organization, which goes 
from the characterization of institutional contexts (Chapter 2) to the study of impacts of policy on 
poverty at the macro level (Chapter 3) to the analysis of such impacts at the micro level (Chapter 4). 
The dissertation presents general conclusions in Chapter 5. It is important to note, however, that 
each of the studies that comprise the dissertation contributes to answering the leading questions of 
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the dissertation through particular research questions, so they also can be taken as independent 
studies.  
The focus of Chapter 2 is on the macro-to-micro transition (step 1). To understand the macro-
micro link, it is necessary to determine the characteristics of the institutional context (types of 
welfare state) that may shape the beliefs, desires, and opportunities of the actors and, in doing so, 
moderate the impact of social policies on poverty. Policy analysis uses classifications of countries 
into different social policy clusters or welfare regimes to identify such characteristics (see Arts & 
Gelissen 2010). These classifications in the comparative analysis of policy are relevant, as they 
help us to understand why there are differences between welfare states and how social structure 
affects differences (Korpi 2000). 
In such a context, Chapter 2 develops a classification of Latin American welfare states. This 
chapter attempts to answer two research questions and, in doing so, to contribute to the 
comparative study of social policy in Latin America. First, this chapter asks whether there are 
different policy orientations in Latin American countries and whether these policy orientations can 
be summarized in a typology of welfare states. Second, to illustrate how types matter or, in other 
words, to validate the typology, Chapter 2 asks whether the types of welfare states found in the 
analysis are connected with a set of different social-economic outcomes. In answering both 
research questions, I suggest a typology of ideal welfare states (Section 1.5) and determine the 
welfare state types into which Latin American countries can be categorized using a “hierarchical-
agglomerative” cluster analysis with measures of the typology’s dimensions in a sample of 
seventeen Latin American countries for the period of the 1990s. Finally, I present empirical 
evidence of the connections between the findings of the cluster analysis and socio-economic 
outcomes. 
The results of Chapter 2 suggest that there is some support for the ideal typology. However, 
there are also some countries that fit more poorly than others. More particularly, the social policy 
orientations of Latin American countries with pioneer welfare systems, which were designed 
between 1900 and 1925, approximate the ideal corporatist model (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and 
Uruguay), involving program segmentation and significant policy intervention in the economy. 
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Because of the comprehensive public coverage of pensions and healthcare, Costa Rica appears to 
be a unique instance of the universal welfare state in Latin America. Panama also presents 
significant program universalism. However, because of the particular historical characteristics of this 
country, the classification of Panama as a universal welfare state is open to question. The Central 
American countries (Dominican Republic, El Salvador, and Guatemala) plus Ecuador approximate 
productivist policy orientations.  
The typology represents models that are ideal types. It follows that there are also bound to be 
ambiguous cases among real welfare states. In this vein, the results of the cluster analysis indicate 
the existence of a fourth cluster (Colombia, Paraguay, and Peru), which is characterized by 
program segmentation but with low priority of social insurance into the government budget, which 
indicates a marginal welfare state. Contrasting with this last characteristic, the corporatist ideal type 
assumes a focus of the welfare state on social insurance. I interpret this ambiguous combination of 
status segmentation with marginal government intervention as a residual version of the corporatist 
model.  A fifth cluster appears to be a mix of corporatism and productivism (Bolivia, Honduras, 
Mexico, and Nicaragua). Finally, the results also show the coexistence of liberalism with other type 
of welfare provision. This finding indicates that a liberal cluster, which is quite distinct from all other 
groups of nations, does not exist in Latin America. I suggest that this coexistence and the presence 
of the hybrid welfare arrangement in Latin America indicate regime-shifting in the region. 
Furthermore, I explore the connections between the five identified clusters of welfare states and a 
set of social economic outcomes. The results indicate that corporatist and universal welfare states 
seem to progressively reduce poverty, child mortality, and informal work.  
Chapter 3 focuses on one outcome of social policy (reducing poverty) and intends to answer 
the leading questions of the dissertation by examining the impact of the size of the redistributive 
budget allocated to public transfers and social services on poverty levels in Latin America. The 
research questions of this study seek to understand how the size of the budget allocated to public 
transfers and the public provision of social services contribute to poverty reduction and how the 
institutional context shapes the impact of the public transfers’ size on poverty. More specifically, by 
using the findings of the description of institutional contexts in Chapter 2, I illustrate the three steps 
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of the micro-macro models (Section 1.6) and derive hypotheses based on the explanatory roles of 
institutional contexts and micro mechanisms—particularly public support for redistributive policy in 
general and productive investment. These hypotheses are tested in a sample of Latin American 
countries 
In Chapter 3, using data from 1980-2000, I conduct a regression analysis with an unbalanced 
panel of fifteen Latin American countries. The findings suggest that public transfers reduce poverty 
only in corporatist and universal Latin American welfare states, having a stronger impact in the 
universal model. In contrast with both institutional contexts, the payment of cash benefits increases 
poverty levels in productivist, residual corporatist, and mixed welfare arrangements. The generosity 
of redistributive budgets allocated to social services does not have a statistically significant impact 
on poverty levels. 
Chapter 4 takes a different angle, looking at the impact of social policy on absolute poverty 
status over time—that is, chronic and transitory poverty—at the micro level. This study contributes 
by reaching the primary goal of the dissertation: to estimate and explain the impact of public 
transfers and the public provision of social services on poverty. It does so by analyzing indirect 
effects of means-testing benefits on poverty that operate through productive investment and work 
effort in Chile. As stated in Section 1.6, it follows that Chapter 4 focuses on step 2 of the micro-
macro explanations. In other words, this study discusses how the poor assimilate the impact of 
social assistance transfers on both actions and, in doing so, how this type of public transfer affects 
poverty status over time.  
In concrete terms, Chapter 4 asks the following research question: How do social assistance 
transfers contribute to reducing chronic and transitory poverty? Regression analysis of Chilean 
household panel data for the years 2001 and 2006 suggest that social assistance transfers increase 
absolute chronic and transitory poverty in Chile, with a stronger impact in the case of the chronically 
poor. I explain such effects in terms of the effect of social assistance transfers on the work efforts of 
beneficiaries. 
Finally, Chapter 5 reviews the study’s findings and arguments while reconsidering its 
theoretical and social relevance. It stresses the study’s contribution to a better understanding of the 
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complex influences of particular dimensions of social policy on the productive investment and work 
efforts of the poor in different institutional contexts. I also highlight policy implications and potential 
areas for future research. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Institutional Contexts in Latin America: Findings of 
Cluster Analysis  
 
 
 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
A grand tradition in welfare state research is aimed at clustering nations in terms of distinctive social 
policy profiles. In the setting of advanced industrialized democracies, one of the most central and 
most-cited recent expressions of this tradition is Esping-Andersen’s (1990) typology of social 
democratic, conservative, and liberal “worlds” of welfare capitalism. Much discussion has focused 
on whether there are more than these three clusters and whether particular welfare states have 
been correctly classified. Less attention has been paid to the questions of why there are differences 
between welfare states and what effects can be expected because of these differences. These 
gaps in the literature are a critical problem for “the welfare modeling business” as the relevance of a 
typology depends on the answers to these questions. As Korpi (2000) points out, typologies in the 
comparative analysis of policy are relevant not because they reduce the complexity into a limited 
number of constructs but because they help us understand the causes of the differences among 
existing welfare systems and their connections to socioeconomic outcomes. 
In Latin America, recent efforts to identify and characterize social policy orientations have been 
stimulated by the Esping-Andersen typology,36 yet there is little consensus among the scholars 
about the number of clusters in this region (Barrientos 2009, Filgueira 1998, Martínez Franzoni 
2008, Schneider & Soskice 2009). Furthermore, although analysis of causes and consequences of 
social policy clusters is crucial to an understanding of the relevance of the typologies, most studies 
                                                
36 “Social policy orientation” is defined in this dissertation as a general tendency of social policy towards a certain type of 
welfare state. 
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about social policy arrangements have focused only on the description of cluster’s characteristics. 
Only a few authors have primarily assessed causal factors associated with the emergence of social 
policy clusters and the connections of these arrangements with particular socioeconomic outcomes 
in Latin America (Martínez Franzoni 2008, Pribble 2008, Rudra 2008, Segura-Ubiergo 2007). 
Against such a background, this study attempts to fill some of these gaps in the comparative 
research of Latin American social policy. This study focuses on two issues. First, the study presents 
an ideal typology of welfare states and classifies social policy orientations in Latin American 
countries into the types that compose the typology. Second, it also provides an evaluation of the 
connections of the types of welfare states operating in Latin America with a set of socioeconomic 
outcomes. The leading questions are whether there are different policy orientations in Latin 
American countries and whether these policy orientations can be summarized in an ideal typology 
of welfare states. Moreover, to illustrate how the types matters—or, in other words, to validate the 
typology—this study also asks whether the types of welfare states operating in Latin America are 
connected with a set of specific socioeconomic outcomes. 
In this study, the term welfare state designates the sum total of a nation’s social policies that 
seek to promote the security and equality of citizens to foster the social integration of modern 
societies (Alber 1988, Flora & Heidenheimer 1995). Drawing on this definition, I suggest an ideal 
typology of welfare states in which social policy orientations of Latin American countries can be 
classified. This typology consists of three dimensions. The first dimension includes the instruments 
of the welfare state. These are social assistance transfers, social insurance transfers, and the public 
provision of social services. The second dimension is the public-private mix; that is, the way in 
which welfare production is divided among state, market, and family. The third dimension denotes 
the labor relations, comprising modes of bargaining among collective actors. 
I classify the social policy orientations of seventeen Latin American countries into the ideal 
typology using the technique of hierarchical-agglomerative cluster analysis with measures of the 
dimensions that compose the typology for the 1990s. Lack of data for these measures precluded 
the analysis of additional decades. Furthermore, I discuss in detail the historical development of 
social policy in some countries that represent empirical realizations of ideal types in Latin America. 
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The findings of the chapter suggest considerable support for the typology and demonstrate the 
relevance of the suggested typology by showing systematic connections of clusters operating in 
Latin America with socioeconomic outcomes—in particular, poverty and informal labor.37 The 
analysis carries substantial implications for fruitfulness of an institutional approach of social policy in 
Latin America.  
This study’s contribution to the scholarly discourse is threefold. First, in general terms, the 
central components of a typology regard the overarching concept that is captured by typologies 
(e.g., welfare state) and dimensions around which typologies are organized (Collier et al. 2008). In 
the discussion of the institutional context in Latin America, however, most existing classifications of 
LACs do not explicitly discuss the central components of typologies. In such a context, this study 
contributes by explicitly providing the central components of a welfare state typology in which Latin 
American countries can be characterized as belonging and, in doing so, provide clear conceptual 
grounds for the classification that I propose herein.  Second, studies do not use only social policy 
indicators to measure policy profiles in Latin America; they also use outcome variables (Martínez 
Franzoni 2008, Pribble 2008, Rudra 2008). These studies, however, present the following 
methodological problem: in addition to the social policies, other factors might determine outcomes. 
This suggests that the validity of outcomes as indicators of social policy orientations is open to 
doubt. To avoid this problem, I measure the dimensions of the typology by using only social policy 
variables. Third, in the 1990s and early 2000s, the study of socioeconomic outcomes in Latin 
America was dominated by a focus on economic growth as the key causal factor. As noted above, 
there is scarce evidence about connections among institutional models and socioeconomic 
outcomes in Latin America (Huber & Stephens 2010). This study fills this gap and, in doing so, 
stresses the importance of institutional factors in explaining these outcomes. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The first section discusses the main 
arguments and gaps of studies about welfare arrangements in Latin American nations and other 
less-developed countries. The second section derives an ideal typology of welfare states and 
discusses some countries as empirical realizations of the ideal types in Latin America. On the 
                                                
37 In the rest of the study, the term “type” refers to the ideal-theoretical construct and the term “cluster” denotes the group 
that is a result of the empirical analysis of the measures of the typology’s dimensions. 
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grounds of this classification, I conduct an empirical analysis. In this vein, the third section details 
the data and methods used in this study. The fourth section shows the results of the empirical 
analysis regarding classification of welfare states in Latin America and the evaluation of its 
effectiveness for outcomes associated with equality and security. Finally, I conclude by going back 
to a general theoretical discussion and I provide some suggestions for future research.   
 
 2.2 Review of Literature 
 
2.2.1 Informality, Conservative Policy Profile and Liberal Reforms as Distinctive Features of 
Welfare States in Latin America 
   
Scholars argue that Latin American welfare states share a set of common elements that distinguish 
the region from the rest of the world. One of these is the high percentage of workers engaged in 
informal labor markets. Most self-employed people and those working in the informal sector either 
remain formally excluded from the social insurance system by lack of legal coverage or are 
excluded de facto by their lack of effective contributions to the social security system (Huber 1996).  
Because of this characteristic, when speaking about Latin American welfare states, some authors 
use terms such as “truncated welfare states” (Lindert et al. 2006) or “informal welfare regimes” 
(Gough et al. 2004).   
Another common element is the conservative profile of Latin American welfare states in the 
period leading up to the 1980s. The conservative profile seems to rely on the fact that Latin 
American welfare states have taken the shape of the male breadwinner model of family that is 
common in southern European countries and have protected this model by introducing stratified 
and corporatist social insurance schemes and job protection (Barrientos 2004). In corporatist Latin 
American welfare states, pension systems were organized in terms of pay-as-you-go (PAYG) 
schemes. A distinctive characteristic of these schemes is that they are administrated by the state, 
and the financing regards taxes and contributions. Pensions of the beneficiaries are paid by their 
former employers, by contributions from those still in employment or from general taxation (Black et 
al. 2009).  
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In the 1980s, Latin America suffered the most severe economic crisis since the Depression in 
the 1920s. Many countries of the region underwent drastic reductions of their export earnings, 
leaving the Latin American economies with chronic deficits of balance of payments and strong 
inflationary pressures. The problems of payment’s balance affected the welfare states, which had 
serious problems of financial stability, particularly in social insurance (Barrientos 1998).  
In this context of economic crisis and problems of financial solvency, the need of social policy 
reforms emerged in Latin America. The reforms were designed by a hegemonic neoliberal view, 
emphasizing the importance of a business-friendly environment and openness to globalization 
through the privatization of state enterprises and deregulation of trade, financial flows, and prices 
(Huber 1996, Rodrik 2006). In regard to Latin American welfare states, several Latin American 
countries shifted their social policy profiles in the late 1980s and 1990s to a more liberal welfare 
arrangement. The domain per excellence in which the liberal spirit attempted to produce a shift was 
the pension systems. In many Latin American countries, PAYG schemes were replaced by 
individual savings plans offered by private firms (Calvo et al. 2010). Other central aspects of social 
policy liberalization were decentralization of social services, deregulation of the labor market, 
increases in private health insurance, and focalization of social assistance programs on low-income 
groups (Del Valle 2010). Barrientos (2009) argues that such changes in social policy in Latin 
America provide a rare example of shift in welfare regimes from a “conservative/informal” profile to 
a “liberal/informal” arrangement. This shift in social policy profiles in Latin America differentiates this 
region from more developed countries, where welfare regimes show a strong path dependency 
(Castles & Obinger 2008, Pierson 1994).  
Martínez Franzoni (2008) points out that one limitation of studies that focus on informality is an 
overgeneralization that positions all Latin American countries together under one single welfare 
regime. However, the evidence shows a quite heterogeneous region, especially regarding social 
expenditures. In this sense, it is hardly surprising that pioneer countries show lower rates of 
informality (Gasparini & Tornarolli 2007). Regarding liberal reforms, Martines Franzoni and Voorend 
(2009) argue that historical paths of welfare states filter such pressures of policy reform. As a result, 
different countries react in different ways to liberal stimuli. In fact, Filgueira, Errandonea, and 
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Katzman (2008) show that corporatist benefits—which emerged between the early 1900s and 1925 
in some LACs—have remained among Latin American welfare systems, even after the liberal wave 
in the 1980s and 1990s.38 In this sense, the notion of a change of policy profile in Latin American 
welfare states would be an overgeneralization. 
 
2.2.2 Different Welfare Arrangements in Latin American and in Other Developing Regions 
 
 
In the 1990s and the 2000s, the cross-national welfare state research in developed countries 
underlined the importance of institutional variations for social policy. One of the most-cited studies 
of institutional variation is Esping-Andersen’s Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (1990).  This 
author deduces his famous typology of welfare regimes using three dimensions: (1) the degree of 
decommodification (i.e., the extension of social rights independent of market mechanisms); (2) the 
system of stratification (i.e., inequality of social status); and (3) the public-private mix, that is, the 
way in which welfare is produced and allocated between state, market, and family. Clustering of 
West European and North American countries along the three dimensions was clear on several 
indicators. Esping-Andersen indentified three welfare regimes: the liberal model, the conservative 
model, and the social democratic model. In the latter, the state is the main provider of welfare, 
manifesting high levels of decommodification and guaranteeing universal rights to all citizens. The 
liberal model limits the role of the state in intervening in the market to supply basic social provisions 
for the needy. The conservative model manifests a moderate degree of decommodification, and the 
state has a commitment to subsidiarity and the preservation of traditional family structures. 
In the setting of Latin America—despite the common elements across the political 
economies—during the 2000s, there emerged a set of studies that suggests that LACs and 
developing nations of other regions are distinctively clustered in terms of logically coherent policy 
profiles. These studies typically were built on the theory of welfare regimes developed by Esping-
Andersen (1990; 1999).  However, these scholars have developed classifications of welfare states 
in developing countries based on particular dimensions of Esping-Andersen’s typology. Most of 
these studies focus exclusively on the decommodification processes (Pribble 2008, Rudra 2008, 
                                                
38 In Uruguay, the first pension law is dated in 1829. 
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Wibbels & Ahlquist 2007). Only a couple of studies consider the effects of stratification and the 
public-private mix (Gough et al. 2004, Martínez Franzoni 2008). 
I distinguish two assumptions that inspire the studies of welfare arrangements in developing 
countries. The first assumption builds upon theoretical principles of the institutionalist approach 
(Hall & Taylor 1996). One of these concerns the idea of institutional complementarities. Following 
Hall and Soskice (2001: 17), there is complementarity between two institutions “if the presence (or 
efficiency) of one increases the returns from (or efficiency of) the other.” The concept of institutional 
complementarities leads us to the first assumption, which is that welfare regimes in developing 
countries are institutional complements of particular models of economic development.   
A second assumption is that a welfare regime is the result of an aggregation of the preferences 
for particular social policies of actors. Although it is not clear from the studies how the aggregation 
process operates in reality, this assumption reveals the importance of distinguishing particular 
actors. The Marxist political economy puts the focus on the relationship between capital and labor.  
Studies of welfare regimes in developing countries include other actors. Wibbels and Ahlquist 
(2007) argue that the bargaining among capitalists, workers, and landowners defined development 
strategies in developing countries, thereby shaping the preferences of the agents with regard to 
social insurance in the 1960s and the 1970s. The resulting social spending regime fostered the 
emergence of a labor force that complemented the development strategy. Filgueira (1998) argues 
that the state is also a relevant agent in understanding welfare regimes in Latin America. During the 
post-World War II period, the state had an active role in the emergence of development strategies 
in this region through the provision of incentives for the development of the national industrial sector 
and public employment.   
Given the two assumptions, it is not surprising that studies provide similar characterizations of 
welfare regimes in developing countries. Scholars provide such characterizations in terms of ideal 
types. In this vein, Wibbels and Ahlquist (2007) distinguish two models of economic development in 
the developing world. The first is the import substitution development strategy (ISI). Under this type 
of economic production, the state has a central role in the economy, and it stimulates domestic 
markets and national firms.  Scholars argue that the welfare regime that interacts with ISI is a fusion 
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of Esping-Andersen’s categories of corporatist and social democratic arrangements (Rudra 2008). 
By stimulating decommodification, in this type of welfare arrangement, the leaders promote social 
benefits as a strategy to legitimize the authority of state and to create social divisions among social 
groups. Countries with pioneer social security schemes in LACs approximate this ideal type 
(Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Cuba, and Uruguay). These schemes were granted between the early 
1900s and 1925 to key occupational sectors (Mesa-Lago 1978). Huber (1996) argues that the 
welfare systems in most of these nations were created and reproduced along corporatist lines 
between the early 1900s and the 1970s. Later, gradual or radical management of economic crises 
in the 1980s led these nations on one of two roads: either a state-oriented strategy (Costa Rica and 
Uruguay) or a market-oriented strategy (Argentina and Chile). 
The second development strategy focuses on export-oriented policies and international 
competitiveness. As a complement to this strategy, the welfare regime that interacts with this 
system of production prioritizes commodification of the labor force through public investment in 
human capital. Because of the trust in markets, this welfare regime shares elements of the liberal 
model. Following Rudra (2008), the state-market relationship is complementary rather than 
adversarial in export-oriented models. The goal of the social policy is to stimulate the 
commodification without providing disincentives for the business of private actors. Empirical cases 
that approximate this ideal-type are newly industrializing East Asian countries.  
Empirical analyses suggest that welfare states in developing countries are grouped in two 
regimes that are consistent with the two welfare regimes outlined above (Rudra 2008, Wibbels & 
Ahlquist 2007).  Results also indicate the presence of a third cluster that represents a mix between 
the ideal types of inwardly oriented and externally oriented development strategies, although most 
political economies in this third cluster follows partial variants of domestic markets strategies. In the 
setting of Latin America, empirical studies confirm the theoretical expectation that pioneer countries 
form a cluster that approximates the conservative-corporatist ideal type; at least they have until 
recent reforms (Huber & Bogliaccini 2010, Segura-Ubiergo 2007). However, there is little consensus 
about how many clusters exist in the rest of Latin American nations (Martínez Franzoni 2008, 
Pribble 2008).    
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2.2.3 Outcome Effects of Welfare Arrangements in Latin America 
 
 
One of the central claims of welfare regime theory is that a welfare arrangement refers not only to 
social policies but also to the effects of a welfare mix on the social structure (Esping-Andersen 
1990, p. 2). In fact, the findings of studies suggest the superior capacity of Scandinavian welfare 
states and, in a lower extension, conservative-corporatist Central European nations to reduce 
inequality and poverty in advanced OECD countries (Esping-Andersen 1994, Korpi 1989, Korpi & 
Palme 1998).  The distinctiveness of the Scandinavian institutional models regard, first, the fusion 
of generosity with universalism and, second, a pooling of the risks and resources of all citizens. 
Because of this characteristic, Scandinavian welfare states generate large redistributive budgets. 
Corporatist welfare systems also reduce poverty and inequality by generating large budgets but in a 
different context. These welfare states segment different occupational categories by providing 
earnings-related benefits. 
In the setting of Latin America, although a large number of studies have analyzed the effect of 
specific social policies on socioeconomic outcomes (e.g. Lindert et al. 2006, Perry et al. 2006), 
impact evaluation of welfare arrangements is scarce in the literature. Studies analyze simple 
correlations and do not consider explanatory mechanisms to explain these connections among 
welfare models and outcomes (Marcel & Rivera 2008, Martínez Franzoni 2008). To my knowledge, 
only Rudra (2008) offers a multivariate assessment of the impact of institutional arrangements on 
areas of policy effectiveness in a large sample of developing countries. The findings of this study 
indicate that decommodification is not associated with poverty in these countries. 
In such a context, despite the analysis of simple statistical correlations, Huber and Stephens’ 
(2010) study stands out above the rest since they analyze the connections of different types of 
welfare states with a large set of socioeconomic outcomes in Latin America over a lengthy period, 
1970–2001. By developing the concept of social policy regime to denote the totality of social 
programs, the findings of this study suggest that Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, and Uruguay have 
clearly developed the most effective social policy regimes. They are consistently in the top range in 
both outcomes and welfare effort indicators. These countries have the lowest poverty rates, the 
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lowest Gini indexes, the highest average years of education, and the highest literacy rates among 
the adult populations in Latin America.   
To sum up this literature review, a set of studies suggests that Latin American welfare states 
cluster in a limited number of social policy profiles, but the size of the number is itself not clear. 
Moreover, studies typically derive typologies only from the decommodification dimension; few 
consider stratification effects, the public-private mix, or the impact of welfare arrangements on 
socioeconomic outcomes. In the following sections I attempt to fill some of these gaps. Specifically, 
I develop an ideal typology of welfare states, considering the public-private mix as a dimension of 
this. Furthermore, I examine the connections of socioeconomic outcomes with the empirical 
clusters, which represent in Latin America the ideal types of welfare states. I leave the study of the 
kind of stratification system that is promoted by social policy for future research. 
 
2.3 Typology of Welfare States 
 
 
In this section, I provide a typology of ideal welfare states. In broad terms, a typology has three 
central components (Collier et al. 2008): (1) the overarching concept that is captured by the 
typology, (2) the dimensions around which the typology is organized, and (3) the types that result 
from combinations of the dimensions. The overarching concept of my typology is “welfare state,” 
which can be interpreted in sociological terms as a response to two developmental problems arising 
in the course of modernization (Flora & Heidenheimer 1995). The first problem is the demand for 
socioeconomic security in the context of increasing division of labor and the weakening of family as 
welfare provider. The second regards the demand for equality related to democratic societies. 
Equality might be interpreted either as the provision of equal opportunities or as an equalization in 
the disposal of resources. 
On the basis of this sociological perspective, in this study, welfare state is defined as the sum 
total of a nation’s social policy repertoire, consisting of political interventions in the functioning of the 
economy and the societal distribution of life chances that seeks to promote the security and equality 
of citizens in order to foster the social integration of modern societies (Alber 1988: 456). Security 
and equality are usually accomplished through the direct payment of cash benefits and the direct 
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provision of social services (Castles 1998, Flora & Heidenheimer 1995).39 According to this policy 
definition, if a state provides cash benefits and social services to the persons, it is defined as a 
welfare state.40    
The dimensions of my typology of a welfare state are threefold. The first dimension regards the 
instruments by which the welfare state pursues its goals. On the basis of the definition of welfare 
state, I distinguish between social assistance transfers, social insurance transfers, and social 
services or benefits in kind (Chapter 1). Social assistance benefits are payments in cash from the 
government to private actors based on non-contributory funding. The eligibility to receive social 
assistance transfers is not conditional on the payment of contributions by the protected persons or 
by other parties on their behalf. There may, however, be other eligibility criteria, such as a means 
test, resulting in flat-rate benefits to those who fall below the poverty line. Social insurance transfers 
are also payments in cash, but they involve contributory funding and eligibility is based on a 
combination of contributions and belongingness to specific occupational categories; thus, it 
excludes informal workers. This instrument typically includes provision for retirement pensions, 
disability insurance, survivor benefits, and unemployment insurance.41 According to Lindert and 
colleagues (2006), the reason for classifying these benefits as public transfers in LACs is that many 
pension systems in this region incur significant budget deficits and thus are financed by the state.  
In other words, social insurance transfers include subsidies from the government to beneficiaries.  
The third basic instrument of the welfare state is the direct provision of services in kind. In 
contemporaneous welfare states, four services predominate: education, health care, social care 
and advisory services, and housing. Social services, especially education and health care, are often 
granted as citizenship rights and thus provide better coverage than transfers for all groups of 
society (Pribble et al. 2009). 
                                                
39 Flora and Heidenheimer (1995) identify a third instrument of welfare state. This is the indirect extension of benefits through 
tax deductions and credits. Price controls and credits have constituted important indirect means of social protection in Latin 
America.  However, studies of these instruments are rare in Latin America (Huber & Bogliaccini, 2010). 
40 In addition to policy definitions, I find other definitions of welfare state in the literature (Chapter 1). For example, Esping-
Andersen contends that social citizenship constitutes the core idea of a welfare state. However, as Esping-Andersen (1994) 
recognizes himself, the concept of social citizenship can hardly be stretched beyond OECD countries. This certainty applies 
for Latin America, where large segments of the population cannot satisfy basic human needs. However, regarding social 
policy definitions, even the poorest Third World nation has some form of social policy. Thus, in comparison with social 
citizenship conceptions of the welfare state, policy definitions are more appropriate to understanding welfare states in 
developing countries since they avoid the conceptual stretching problem of the social citizenship definition. 
41 The dominant criterion of eligibility for unemployment insurance is based on voluntary contributions that give membership 
in the respective schemes. As Korpi and Palme (1998) point out, it has never worked in the area of pension. 
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The public-private mix is the second dimension of the typology; that is, the way in which 
welfare production is divided among state, market, and family (see Section 2.2). Following Esping-
Andersen (1999: 34), studying only the state as the provider of welfare leaves a huge “welfare 
residual” unaccounted for. To remedy this, during the 1980s, several studies emerged that 
examined the interplay of public and private provisions (e.g. Rein & Rainwater 1986).  In this study, 
I distinguish the theoretical types of welfare states by identifying which of the three sources of 
welfare is the main provider of social support in each type. By doing so, my typology does not 
presume that the state is the main source of welfare. 
Studies of welfare regimes in developing countries indicate that a particular welfare 
arrangement refers not only to a specific public-private mix but also it is the result of decisions of 
collective actors (Section 2.2). Furthermore, according to Korpi and Palme (1998), we can expect 
that public-private mixes are of significance for the formation of interests and preferences of actors. 
These feedback effects between the public-private mix and relations of collective actors suggest 
that this last factor should be included as a third dimension of my typology. By building on an 
institutionalist approach (Ebbinghaus 2006), I include the relationships of collective actors in the 
form of labor relations between the state, organized labor, and associations of employers.   
Labor relations refer to modes of interest intermediation that shape the relations among 
collective actors (Collier 1995). Following Crouch (1993), I distinguish two modes of interest 
intermediation: pluralist bargaining and corporatism.42 In pluralist bargaining, the state upholds the 
principle of non-intervention. Under such mode of interest intermediation there is mutual 
acceptance among collective actors. This takes the form of agreements between diverse and 
competing private organizations. However, these agreements suffer from short-termism and 
particularistic interest representation. A second mode of interest intermediation is corporatism, 
which means that the “state shares its public-order functions with organized business and labor” 
(Traxler 1999: 56). Under corporatist relations, there is also mutual recognition but it is among 
                                                
42 To understand labor relations in developed democracies, Crouch (1993) also identifies a third mode of collective 
intermediation, which he calls “contentious relations.” This mode is characterized by an antagonistic conflict of interest 
between labor and capital along with active state interference on terms of employment and working conditions. Although the 
combination of contentious relations and different welfare sources is theoretically plausible, there are no real welfare 
states—at least not in democratic Western countries—that result from this mode of interest intermediation. For example, 
France is typically quoted as an empirical case of contentious labor relations. However, this nation has a strong corporatist 
welfare system. See Ebbinghaus (2006). 
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centralized organizations of interest. Conflicts of interest are handled as positive-sum agreements 
that are based on long-term common interests. State interference is active but usually in 
consultation with organized labor and capital.     
Table 2.1 illustrates the ideal types of welfare states that have been constructed on the basis 
of these three dimensions. They have been constructed by idealizing distinctive empirical realities in 
developed and developing nations. Following in this section, I discuss each one of these ideal types 
in detail and present some real Latin American welfare state as examples of ideal types. I selected 
these countries because there is some consensus in the literature about their policy profiles. 
Furthermore, the information about the development of social policy for the selected real Latin 
American welfare states is richer and more accurate than for other LACs.  
 
Table 2.1. Ideal types of welfare states 
 
 Liberal Corporatist Universalist Productivist 
     
Role of:     
      
 Family Marginal Central Marginal Marginal 
 Market Central Marginal Marginal Central 
 State Marginal Subsidiary Central Central 
     
Labor relation Pluralist Corporatist Corporatist Corporatist 
     
Type of benefits Social assistance Social insurance Social services Social services 
     
Modal examples Chile Argentina Costa Rica El Salvador 
 
  
 
 
The liberal welfare state 
 
The first ideal type is the liberal welfare state, where the market dominates the provision of 
welfare. In this regime, the public provision of welfare is marginal and takes the form of means-
tested social assistance for low-income groups. Means-tested assistance goes together with 
pluralist labor relations, which reinforce the principle of the market as the main welfare provider by 
emphasizing the free competition of autonomously organized groups, each seeking its own 
advantage. Since the early 1990s, LACs have experienced similar pressure toward liberalization of 
their economics and state retrenchment (Section 2.2.1). However, the countries present different 
reactions to liberal stimulus (Martinez Franzoni & Voorend 2009). 
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Chile is the Latin American political economy most approximating the liberal ideal type; that 
country pursued a radical neoliberal economic course during the 1970s and the 1980s. The 
adoption of the liberal model broke with the corporatist welfare state that emerged in the first half of 
twentieth century. The origins of the corporatist system were in the 1920s, during the first 
government of Arturo Alessandri (1920–1925). The first benefits included the provision of different 
social insurance programs that reflected a deliberate strategy of government and the conservative 
party to reach support of the labor movement and control it (Valenzuela 2006). This policy 
development clearly suggests that the Chilean welfare state emerged as a corporatist system. The 
corporatism was expanded in the subsequent decades. In the 1960s and the 1970s, the policy 
development was dramatically accelerated when a series of electoral reforms increased the 
franchise (Kaufman & Haggard 2008). By the early 1970s, the intervention of the Chilean welfare 
state reached many domains of society; in fact, the welfare system provided a comprehensive set 
of social services and transfers, offering coverage to 70 percent of the population (Huber 1996).  
The liberalization of the Chilean welfare state occurred during the dictatorship of Augusto 
Pinochet (1973-1989). The social policy reform was part of a package of interventions aimed to 
reduce the role of the state in the economy. The most dramatic reforms of the welfare state came in 
the 1980s, including the privatization and decentralization of the health system, the introduction of 
competence in education, the exchange of the state’s role as regulator of education by the market, 
and the focus of social policy on mean-testing. The focalization of social policy attempted to confine 
the public intervention of the welfare state into the limits of social assistance.  
The most cited example of the liberalization of the Chilean welfare state in the literature 
occurred in social insurance, which is the domain per essence of the corporatist welfare state 
(Barrientos 1998, Castiglioni 2005, Draibe & Riesco 2007, Filgueira et al. 2008, Hertel-Fernandez 
2009, Pribble 2008). In the 1980s, policy reforms ended the pay-as-you-go social insurance system 
that had persisted since the 1920s and established a system based on individual contributions and 
compulsory private insurance, to be administrated by a private pension fund (Administradora de 
fondos de pensions, AFP). The new system does not receive contributions either from employers or 
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from the state, except for the guarantee that is provided by the state to those with 20 years of 
contributions (Huber 1996).  
In spite of the radical shift that represents the liberalization of social insurance, some legacies 
of the old corporatist system remained.  The pension reform permitted the possibility of staying in 
the old corporatist systems for workers already under older programs and maintained the 
corporatist benefits for certain interest groups, such as members of the army and some public 
servants. It follows that the Chilean welfare state did not drastically shift toward a liberal model. 
Rather, corporatist and liberal policy orientations were actually allowed to coexist in Chile 
(Valenzuela 2006). 
In the 1990s and the 2000s, democracy was reestablished in Chile, and the center-left 
Concertacion coalition came into office in successive periods until 2010. These governments 
pushed a set of equity-oriented reforms that expanded the role of the state in welfare provision in 
health and pension (for an overview of these reforms, see Larrañaga 2010). However, the reforms 
avoided affecting the main pillars of the liberal model in Chile; that is, privatization of social 
insurance and health systems, deregulation of education, and focus on social assistance.  
 
The universalist welfare state 
 
The universalist welfare state is defined by the role of the state as the main provider of welfare.  
The state is particularly committed to minimization of market dependency through the provision of 
generous benefit levels. This departure from a pure market economy reflects corporatist labor 
relations, characterized by strong centralized unions. Workers and employers recognize each other 
and are also consulted by the state in political decision-making. Besides the high levels of public 
transfers, what is unique in the universalist welfare state is the combination of generosity with 
comprehensive coverage of the population through the provision of public transfers and social 
services granted universally as a citizenship right. This implies a high degree of equality in the 
benefit provision; that is, similar replacement rates among citizens. In the setting of advanced 
democracies, the universalist type is represented by Scandinavian countries, which complement 
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standard income protection with the public provision of social services and generous income 
support for working women (Esping-Andersen 1999, Huber & Stephens 2001).  
Costa Rica is the only Latin American welfare state conforming to the principles of universal 
coverage and extensive public investment in social services. Compared with pioneer countries, the 
initiation of this welfare state came 20 years later. In 1941, the government of Rafael Calderon 
(1941–1945) instituted a social insurance program that was compulsory for all employees below a 
certain income threshold. Unlike the corporatism based on the grounds of pension programs in 
pioneer Latin American welfare states, social insurance benefits in Costa Rica were unified in a 
single fund that insured the great majority of beneficiaries. However, the extension of the program’s 
coverage was slow. In 1960, only a quarter of the economically active population was beneficiary of 
the social insurance program (Huber 1996). 
The first big impulse for the universalization of social insurance coverage passed in 1961. The 
National Liberation Party, a political party with a social democratic ideology, promoted a reform that 
took the form of a constitutional amendment enacting the universalization of coverage. This 
universalization had to be reached within a decade (Segura-Ubiergo 2007). As a result, in 
subsequent decades, the Costa Rican welfare state expanded. Moreover, during the governments 
of Jose Figueres (1970–1974) and Daniel Oduber (1974–1978)—both candidates of the National 
Liberation Party—many additional policy developments emerged. These consisted of obligatory 
pension coverage for self-employed workers, extension of healthcare and education coverage, 
housing programs, family assistance to all sectors of the population, and non-contributory old-age 
pensions for indigents (Kaufman & Haggard 2008).  At the end of the 1970s, the architecture of the 
universal welfare state in Costa Rica was consolidated: it had targeted programs and four primary 
pillars of program universalism—education, health, pensions, and housing (Martinez Franzoni & 
Voorend 2009). 
This architecture of the Costa Rican welfare state experienced limited change during the last 
three decades. Following Kaufman and Haggard (2008), two factors help us understand this 
resistance of the universalism in Costa Rica. First, the effect of debt crisis of the early 1980s was 
lower in this country than in other nations of the region (e.g. Argentina and Mexico). Early 
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stabilization efforts avoided large fiscal deficits and high inflation. Second, distributional coalitions 
and the labor movement operated to make difficult any substantive changes to the welfare state. 
However, that does not mean attempts to reform the welfare system were nil. In 2000 and 2005, 
two reforms of the pension systems were carried out. The major change was the creation of a 
mixed system, which opened the chance for citizens to choose between the collective scheme and 
individual retirement accounts (Martinez Franzoni 2008).  
 
The corporatist welfare state 
 
The essence of the corporatist welfare state lies in status segmentation and the centrality of 
family as welfare provider. While the family is ultimately responsible for its members’ welfare, the 
state upholds the principle of subsidiarity; that is, to limit the intervention of state only to those 
situations in which the family fails as a welfare source (Esping-Andersen 1999). Because 
modernization involves an increase of dislocations in welfare support by the family, the size of the 
corporatist welfare state within the economy goes up during modernization processes, being high in 
modern societies. Like the universalist welfare state, corporatism dominates labor relations under 
this ideal type. However, in comparison with universal welfare states, unions are more fragmented 
and not powerful enough to enforce a strongly redistributive agenda. This union fragmentation 
illustrates the basic idea of the state corporatist model (Korpi & Palme 2004): to create 
“occupational communities” within different sectors of the labor force and induce cooperation 
between labor and capital within these sectors. The eligibility of public benefits is based on 
contributions and membership in specific occupational groups, excluding economically non-active 
citizens and workers in the informal labor market. This results in a welfare state that displaces the 
market as a welfare source by providing separate social insurance programs organized for different 
occupations, creating a status segmentation among occupational groups. This indicates that the 
domain per essence of the corporatist welfare state is social insurance. Scholars argue that in Latin 
America, corporatism has been an enduring characteristic of Latin American politics in the twentieth 
century (Burchanan 1985, Malloy 1977). Central features of corporatism in the region are the lack of 
social insurance coverage of informal workers and the attempt of government to control unions
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through high levels of state intervention in the organization of the labor movement (Collier & Collier 
1979, Murillo 2000). Corporatism in Latin America has been less central to understanding 
associations of employers (Collier 1995).  
Argentina is an example of the corporatist welfare state in Latin America. The first social 
insurance programs in this country were enacted in 1904. However, the coverage was confined 
mainly to the military, white-collar workers, and a few strategically situated blue-collar unions. Thus, 
the Argentinean welfare state was limited in scope in its origin. The break point that impelled the 
development of social policy in Argentina was the first period in office of Juan Domingo Peron 
(1946–1955). To establish popular political support, Peron promoted an aggressive strategy of 
import-substitution. Further, in the vein of the essence of corporatism, he developed several 
particular social insurance programs for different interest groups. These social benefits took the 
form of PAYG schemes. In respect to corporatist orientations of the benefits, these were used to 
gain political support of interest groups, particularly the labor movement, and to control them 
through a set of institutional mechanisms—such as labor legislation and the organization of the 
state apparatus responsible for administering the interests of particular social groups (Burchanan 
1985, Kaufman & Haggard 2008). The pension system covered about 70 percent of the labor force 
by the 1950s. Another social policy development was the expansion of health insurance to low-
income segments of the population (Mesa-Lago 1978).   
In spite of recurrent restrictions on democracy, the corporatist welfare system of Argentina was 
not fundamentally challenged until the 1980s. In this decade, the country underwent a democratic 
transition that opened the door for the expansion of the welfare state. However, the chance to 
expand the welfare system was restricted by severe economic crises. An important problem for the 
welfare state was the large deficit because of the widespread evasion of contributions while the 
pension system continued to run (Huber 1996). These economic problems provided the context that 
allowed the emergence of deep reforms of the welfare state aimed to produce a shift toward a 
liberal policy profile. Such reforms were taken during the governments of Carlos Menem (1989–
1995 and 1995–1999) and focused mainly on the privatization of public firms and the liberalization 
78 
 
of the pension system.43 Unlike social insurance, the influence of liberal reforms in health care and 
education was lower. It proved harder to conciliate these reforms in the domain of social services 
with the interest of unions, which until the reform’s attempt, received generous benefits from their 
participation in the health sector in particular (Kaufman & Haggard 2008: 279). 
The reform of pension programs implemented a mixed system, in which mandatory-funded 
individual retirement accounts complemented PAYG schemes. However, the attempts to change 
the policy profile of the welfare state did not minimize the role of unions in the bargaining of reforms. 
Rather, they were taken into account by government, and unions cooperated with the 
implementation of market reforms. Due to this cooperative behavior, unions were able to negotiate 
concessions on reforms of social insurance and privatization (Murillo 2000). It suggests that 
corporatist relationships still were relevant in the liberalization of the Argentinean welfare state. In 
2008, the liberal elements of social insurance provision were replaced by a model along lines of the 
old corporatist model; that is, a full PAYG scheme was implemented (Calvo et al. 2010).  
 
The productivist welfare state  
 
As noted above (Section 2.2), scholars distinguish between a substitution development 
strategy and an export-oriented development strategy. The productive welfare state is an 
institutional complement of the latter variety of capitalism. The aim of export-oriented development 
strategies is to stimulate economic growth and international competitiveness of domestic firms. The 
interventions of the productive welfare state are circumscribed by this goal. The distinctive 
characteristic of the productivist ideal type is that the state and the market share responsibility for 
providing welfare for citizens. The market provision of welfare lies with the firms—particularly the 
larger companies—which are organized as communities that provide welfare for employees and 
employers (Becker 2009). In respect to the state, public interventions focus on the commodification 
of the labor force by increasing human capital—especially, education and the health of citizens—
through the provision of social services (Chapter 3).44 When the productivist welfare state increases 
citizens’ human capital, it instigates economic growth and international competitiveness as higher 
                                                
43 The government promoted additional reforms regarding trade liberalization and the convertibility law in 1991.  
44 Commodification refers to activities and efforts that increases individuals’ reliance on the market for their well-being. 
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education and better health among the population increases productivity of the labor force and 
facilitates technological innovation (Rosen 2008, Schultz 1961).  
Unlike the corporatist model, the state-organized social insurance is only supplementary in the 
productivist welfare state. However, both types of institutional contexts present corporatist labor 
relationships. Regarding the productivist model in firms, the relations between employers and 
employees are cooperative and consensual. It means that labor relations in the productive welfare 
state can be said to be corporatist, but the cooperation between labor and capital is at the firm-
level. Furthermore, in labor relations of the productivist type, the state promotes worker loyalty 
without hindering business activity (Rudra 2008). East Asian countries, such as South Korea, are 
typically mentioned as examples that approximate this ideal type. In these countries, the welfare 
state, with the aims of economic growth and international competitiveness, particularly invests in 
secondary and tertiary education (Holliday 2000, Kwon et al. 2009, Wibbels & Ahlquist 2007).  
In Latin America, productivism appeared by the 1990s in the context of liberal reforms that 
emphasized the importance of a business-friendly environment and openness to globalization 
(Section 2.2.1). To reach such aims, productivism emerged in some Latin American welfare states 
in terms of public attempts to commodificate the labor force through public provision of social 
services, particularly basic education and health service access (Perry et al. 2006). Furthermore, 
the liberal reforms of the 1990s attempted to minimize the role of the state as welfare provider in 
favor of the market, preserving the state only for the provision of basic social services. This means 
that the level of state’s intervention into the economy, which characterizes the Latin American 
productivism, is limited in scope and leaves a significant portion of welfare provision to the market.  
Unlike the productivist ideal type, corporatism in terms of cooperation between workers and 
capital at the level of firms is also scarce among LACs. As stated above (see also Chapter 3), Latin 
American corporatism is characterized by the absence of employers in bargaining between workers 
and the state. This characteristic of Latin American corporatism suggests that the productivism that 
emerged in some countries of the region in the 1990s is lacking some elements of the productivist 
ideal model. 
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El Salvador is an example of the Latin American version of productivism. During the twentieth 
century, the Salvadoran economy experienced virtually no industrialization (Rueschemeyer et al. 
1992). It was a mono-export economy focused on coffee as its main exportation (Halperin 1990). 
The welfare state in El Salvador, which reflected this style of economic organization, was 
characterized by a residual size, leaving most of the population without public assistance (Pribble 
2011). Furthermore, the development of the welfare state was inhibited by long periods of political 
violence. Particularly relevant for the socioeconomic development of El Salvador was the civil war in 
the period 1980–1992 in which some 75,000 people were killed. By the end of the war, 
approximately one half of the population lived on less than two U.S. dollars a day.45 
Since 1992, when the peace accords were signed and democracy emerged, social policy 
development became significant in this country (Martinez Franzoni & Voorend 2009). One of the 
main goals of social policy was to contribute to reducing poverty by impelling economic growth. At 
that goal, the Salvadoran welfare state adopted a clear productivist orientation. We note the 
productivist orientation of policy in the relevance that took human capital as an instrument to 
helping the poor. As the World Bank (2005: 47) points out, one of the main goals of the welfare 
state in this country over the last two decades has been “to strengthen the capabilities of the poor 
and to ensure that the poor are able to take best advantage of emerging economic opportunity in El 
Salvador.” Put otherwise, the Salvadoran welfare state adopted a “human capital for poverty” 
agenda, was complemented with “human capital for growth” strategies.    
To commodificate the labor force, education is one domain of human capital in which El 
Salvador has made considerable progress. A central public intervention in this domain was 
educational reforms in the 1990s that decentralized the educational system. As a result of this 
reform, progress was made in access to education among the poor, particularly for basic education. 
Net enrollment rates in basic education of 7- to 15-year-old children rose from 74.3 percent in 1991 
to 85.1 percent by 2002. Progress is noted in other relevant areas for human capital such as health 
(life expectancy and health service access) and safe water (World Bank 2005).  
                                                
45 Figures downloaded in September 2011 from the World Development Indicators Database of the World Bank, available 
from http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators. 
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In spite of the public investment in education and health care, the Salvadoran welfare state 
illustrates well the incomplete character and the limitation of scope related with productivism in Latin 
America. An industrialization that foments the role of firms as welfare providers is still absent in the 
last decades (Pribble 2011). Furthermore, unions are not allowed among public employees, trade 
unions are limited to specific sectors, and one half of the workers is employed in the informal sector 
without rights to public benefits (Gasparini & Tornarolli 2007, Martinez Franzoni & Voorend 2009). 
These characteristics indicate a corporatist type of labor relationship in which capital and labor 
cooperate at the firm level lacks in the current Salvadoran welfare state.  
In respect with the scope limitations, El Salvador has made considerable progress in raising 
basic social services since the early 1990s, but there are still serious problems with regard to 
coverage and quality of services. For example, by 2002 about 50 percent of the poor lacked access 
to water (World Bank 2005). Furthermore, on the grounds of social insurance targeting, until the 
1900s the pension system covered only employees in industry and commerce (SSA 1993). In 1996, 
pensions went from a collective pay-as-you-go system to one based on private individual savings 
(Calvo et al. 2010). This institutional change indicates that productivism in El Salvador is 
characterized by the focus of state intervention on social services, leaving a significant quota of 
welfare provision to the market.  
 
 2.4. Research Design 
 
 
In the last section, I developed an ideal typology of welfare states. In the following, I also measure 
dimensions of the typology and socioeconomic outcomes that might be connected with the ideal 
types operating in Latin America. To do this, I use data for seventeen LACs. The sample-selection 
criterion is a simple one: It included all Latin American countries for which I found information for 
each indicator used in the analysis. According to this single criterion, the following countries were 
selected: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay. 
Furthermore, in the following analysis, I focus on information from the 1990s because high-quality 
data for each of the measures used in this chapter exists for this last decade of the twentieth 
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century. Lack of data precluded analysis of a longer time period. Most indicators are average data 
for the period 1990–1999, rather than data for single years, to reduce distortions from idiosyncratic 
factors (e.g., exogenous shocks) and to focus on between-country variance. I used single-year 
measurements only when I did not find time series for the indicators or on the ground of theoretical 
reasons (see below). In the rest of this section, I will discuss the indicators and the method of 
analysis I used. 
 
Indicators and Data Sources 
 
a) Measures of  typology 
 
To classify Latin American countries, I used a set of indicators to measure the dimensions of 
the ideal typology (see Table 2.2).  In broad terms, these variables capture the dimensions related 
to the instruments of welfare states and to the public-private mix. Due to the unavailability of data, 
the measures do not include information on labor relations. Furthermore, measures of the 
dimensions do not include information about socio-economic outcomes. In doing so, I avoid two 
problems. First, in measuring the public-private mix in developing countries, scholars use outcome 
variables (e.g. poverty rates) (Gough et al. 2004, Martínez Franzoni 2008, Pribble 2008, Rudra 
2008). However, these variables might capture not only aspects of the public-private mix but other 
type of sources (e.g. economic situation), as outcomes should be affected by many factors. It 
suggests that the validity of outcomes as indicators of the public-private mix is open to doubt. 
Second, I wished to classify not only Latin American welfare states but also examine the 
connections between types operating in Latin America and outcomes, so it is recommendable that 
the latter be excluded from the measure of the typology’s dimensions (Adcock & Collier 2001). Put 
otherwise, if I included information of outcomes in the measure of typology’s dimensions, I could not 
analyze the association between both variables because I would have only one. 
The role of the market as welfare provider in the public-private welfare mix was measured by 
private expenditure on health care as a percentage of total expenditure on health. This indicator is 
an average for the period 1995–1999, and it captures the liberal emphasis on market solutions in 
the sense that the larger the size of the private healthcare sector, measured in terms of 
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expenditure, the larger the role of the market. The indicator was taken from National Health 
Accounts’ online database (World Health Organization).46  
 
Table 2.2. Indicators of typology’s dimensions 
 
Indicators Dimension 
  
Private expenditure on health care as a percentage of total 
expenditure on health 
Role of the market in public-private mix 
  
The average between coverage rates of public pension and 
coverage rates of public healthcare programs 
Role of the state in public-private mix  
  
Summary index of status segmentation Subsidiary role of the state in public-private mix and focus 
on social insurance 
  
The average health and education spending as a 
percentage of total public spending 
Focus on social services 
  
  
 
My measure of the role of state in the public-private mix was intended to capture the degree of 
program universalism by using the average between coverage rates of public pension and 
coverage rates of public healthcare programs. I used coverage rates for different single years of the 
1990s. Lack of data precluded the use of the same year for both types of coverage.47 The values of 
this measure should be interpreted in the sense that the higher the average coverage, the higher 
the role of the state in welfare provision and, following the definition of the universalist welfare state, 
the higher the universalism of social policy. The data of coverage rates were taken from Rofman 
and Lucchetti (2006) and Mesa-Lago (2005).48 
On the grounds of criterion validity I selected the indicators of the roles of market and state in 
public-private mix. It means that these indicators are the standard of reference to evaluate 
measures of liberalist market provision and program universalism in literature and, thus, they are 
considered reliable measures of the phenomena of concern (Bambra 2007, Scruggs & Allan 2008). 
In fact, they were used by Esping-Andersen in his classic study of worlds of welfare capitalism to 
capture both aspects of the public-private mix (Esping-Andersen 1990).49  
                                                
46 Figures downloaded in January 2011 from http://www.who.int/nha/country/en/. 
47The universalist welfare model is also characterized by high benefit equality. To measure this aspect of the universalist 
welfare state, for example, Esping-Andersen (1990) uses the ratio of standard to maximum income replacement rate in 
national unemployment, sickness, and public pension programs. Unfortunately, I did not consider “benefit equality” in the 
measure of universalism because, to my knowledge, there is no public information of replacement rates in most countries of 
sample analyzed in this study. 
48 I provide details of the measures of coverage rates in the Appendix 1. 
49 In respect with private expenditure on healthcare, Esping-Andersen (1990) uses this indicator plus measures of means-
tested benefits and private pension spending for his index of liberalism. The source, which Esping-Andersen used, was the 
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Corporatism is defined by the subsidiary role of state in public-private mix and the focus on 
social insurance as instrument of the welfare state (Section 2.3). To measure both attributes, I 
created a summary index on the basis of two variables. First, one of the core characteristics of a 
corporatist state is the reinforcement of status segmentation by providing different social insurance 
plans for different occupational groups. I captured the level of status segmentation through the 
number of significant public pension funds for the year 1993. A high number of programs should 
indicate high status segmentation and, thus, high subsidiary role of the state. This variable was 
elaborated on the basis of information in the Social Security Administration (1993).  
Second, the variable designed to identify the focus on social insurance as instrument of the 
welfare state was public transfer spending as a percentage of total public spending in 1993. Public 
transfer spending includes not only social insurance transfers but also social assistance transfers. 
However, this does not invalidate public transfer spending as measure of social insurance because 
the largest portion of this spending goes to social insurance in Latin American welfare states (for 
details, see Appendix 1). This measure captures the focus on social insurance transfers in terms of 
the priority of social insurance within the government budget. Although the standard approach in the 
OECD is to measure spending as a share of GDP, I use spending relative to the total budget 
because this measure of spending more clearly reveals differences among developing countries 
(Rudra 2008, Wibbels & Ahlquist 2007). The source was Avelino et al. (2005), who took spending 
figures compiled by the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(ECLAC/CEPAL).50 
In the summary index, the number of pension programs was used as the baseline because it 
captures the essence of corporatism; that is, status segmentation. Furthermore, there is justification 
for using this indicator to measure the subsidiary role of the state because it is a direct measure of 
status segmentation in the literature of the welfare state (Bambra 2005, Esping-Andersen 1990, 
                                                                                                                                               
publication of the International Labour Organization (ILO) “The Cost of Social Security” for the year 1981. However, after 
1990, ILO no longer collected separate data for both additional indicators, so I was unable to collect data for these two 
additional indicators of liberalism for Latin America in the period under analysis.    
50 For Chile, I took only information of old social insurance systems; thus, the summary index does not capture the 
liberalization of pension provision in this country. By doing so, I minimize the measurement error of the connections of 
clusters with outcomes because pension information for Chile regards only one type of pension system. See Appendix 1 for 
details about the index. 
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Scruggs & Allan 2008). The number of pension programs was then weighted by the public transfer 
spending. In Appendix 1 I show that the higher the score in the index, the higher the status 
segmentation and, thus, the greater the degree of the role of state in the public-private mix. On the 
basis of the definition of the corporatist welfare state, a high score in the summary index should 
suggest high corporatism. 
In respect to the role of weights in the summary index, weights compensate for the relevance 
of social insurance as instrument of the welfare state. By doing so, I solved the following problem of 
the measure of corporatism in Latin America. As shown in the empirical analysis of this chapter (see 
below Section 2.5), there are many Latin American welfare states that present high score in the 
index status segmentation but low priority of social insurance within the government budget. It 
follows that if I were to use only the number of pension programs to capture corporatism, I would 
have countries with status segmentation but low priority on social insurance. This clearly contradicts 
my definition of the corporatist model. The weighting procedure solves this problem by giving more 
weight to countries where the priority of social insurance is high and less weight to countries with a 
low priority. 
Finally, I used a measure to capture the relevance of social services as instrument of the 
welfare state. The measure is the average health and education spending as a percentage of total 
public spending for the period 1990–1999. A high score in health and education spending indicates 
a high focus of the welfare state on social services. By assessing the role of social services as 
instrument of the welfare state, this indicator also captures the level of commodification of the labor 
force; that is, the core idea of the productivist welfare state. Social services are used by the 
productivist welfare state to increase human capital in the economy; doing so, stimulates economic 
growth and international competitiveness of a given country (Section 2.3).51 The data source was 
Avelino et al. (2005).52 
                                                
51 Health and education spending also might capture the focus of the universalist welfare state on social services. On the 
basis of hypotheses, herein I illustrate how the measures, which I used in cluster analysis, discriminate the different welfare 
state models. 
52 One of the characteristics of social services is that these are provided as citizen rights and should have a large coverage 
of population. Spending figures perhaps do not capture this universalist aspect of social services. To test the role of 
coverage in human capital spending, I weighted the measures of productivism by indicators of the coverage of health and 
educational systems. Following Pribble (2008), the indicators were deaths among newborn infants (during the first 27 days) 
for health spending and literacy rates of adult populations between 15- and 24-years-old for education spending. In cluster 
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The variables chosen therefore covered different aspects of the public-private mix and different 
instruments of the welfare state. By doing so, they should also be good discriminators of ideal 
models of welfare states operating in Latin America because they measure different conceptual 
referents. In the rest of this section, I present hypotheses that relate the above-described indicators 
to the elements of the typology (see Table 2.3). These hypotheses also guide the interpretation of 
the findings of analysis. 
 
Table 2.3. Measure hypotheses of the associations between indicators and ideal models 
 
  Universalism Corporatism Liberalism Productivist 
     
Private expenditure on healthcare as a percentage of 
total expenditure on health 
Low Low High High 
     
Average between coverage rates of public pension and 
coverage rates of public healthcare programs 
High High Low Low 
     
Summary index of status segmentation Low High Low Low 
     
Average health and education spending as a 
percentage of total public spending 
High -- Low High 
 
 
 
Corporatist and universalist welfare states are expected to exhibit similar patterns. They should 
show high levels of program universalism (averaged coverage rates) and low levels of private 
healthcare spending because the state has an important role as welfare provider in both welfare 
arrangements—either as subsidiary state or on the basis of citizenship. However, corporatist and 
universalist welfare states are expected to have different levels of status segmentation and health 
and education spending. Corporatist welfare states should show high levels in the summary index. 
By contrast, countries that approximate the universalist type are expected to have low levels of 
such an index because the citizen’s right criterion of entitlement implies low social segmentation 
(e.g.,  low number of pension programs). Furthermore, because social services are granted on the 
basis of social citizenship, universalist welfare states are expected to have high levels of human 
capital spending. I have no a priori prognosis about the relationship between the corporatist type 
and health and education spending. Corporatist welfare states tend to place more emphasis on 
social insurance transfers. However, the evidence for advanced nations confirms this association 
                                                                                                                                               
analysis, there are no substantive differences between estimations with and without weight. In this article, I present the result 
without weights. 
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only for health care. Studies also suggest that the level of educational spending of this welfare state 
type is at the middle of the hierarchy, with Scandinavia and North America at the top and Southern 
European countries at the bottom (Castles 1998).     
Liberal welfare states are expected to have high levels of private healthcare spending, as this 
indicator captures the role of the market. Furthermore, this type should show low-levels status 
segmentation, health and education spending, and program universalism, insofar as these three 
measures take the role of the state either as transfer provider or social services source. Finally, 
productivism in Latin America is characterized by a state that, at the aims of the commodification of 
labor force, puts the focus of its instruments on social services—particularly basic education and 
health service access. However, in Latin America, the state assumes such functions in the context 
of increasing importance of market as welfare provider (Section 2.3). It follows that productivist 
welfare states in these regions should show high priority of health and educational spending in the 
government budget, as this type of expenditure should reflect a focus on basic social services. 
Furthermore, Latin American productivism should exhibit low levels of the summary index of status 
segmentation and low degrees of averaged coverage rates because the emphasis of the 
productivist type is on commodification of the labor force. Regarding private healthcare spending, 
the discussion of productivism in Latin America in this chapter suggests that there is considerable 
welfare effort for improving the human capital of citizens; nonetheless, there are still big problems of 
access to social services and serious attempts to transfer a significant portion of welfare provision 
to the market in those Latin American welfare states that exhibit productivism in policy orientation. 
These characteristics of productivism suggest thus that the productivist welfare state should exhibit 
high level of private healthcare spending in Latin American productivist welfare states. 
 
b) Measures of  socioeconomic outcomes 
 
To measure outcomes, I selected the following indicators, which are averages for the period 
1990–1999.53 A principal aim of the welfare state is to promote the security of citizens (Section 2.3). 
                                                
53 The selection of measures was on the basis of empirical relevance of the socioeconomic outcomes in prior research.  
However, they are a sample of the outcomes that must be complemented with other areas of the welfare state intervention.  
Specifically, my approach to the labor market was limited. I have focused only on the informality and female labor force 
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To evaluate the success of welfare state types for security, I considered social risks that hurt a 
particular type of security—income security. Specifically, two types of social risks were analyzed. 
The first was poverty, which is measured as the headcount index given by the percentage of the 
population living in households with a per capita income below the international poverty line of 2.5 
U.S. dollars per day at 2005 international prices (adjusted at purchasing power parity exchange 
rates). This poverty line is an absolute poverty measure and coincides with the median value of 
extreme poverty lines fixed by governments in Latin America (CEDLAS 2011).   
The second type of social risk regards the labor market. In the analysis, I included two 
measures of labor market risks. First, informal work is associated with absence of smoothing 
mechanisms against social risks (e.g., social insurance protection) and, thus, it should reflect 
increasing income insecurity. Then I analyzed informal work, which is measured by the portion of 
workers in informal jobs as a percentage of the labor force.54 For poverty rates and informal work’s 
indicators, the data source was the same: the Socio-Economic Database for Latin America and the 
Caribbean (CEDLAS and World Bank). Second, studies indicate that a large portion of poor 
households in Latin America have a female head (Martínez Franzoni 2008). In such a context, 
female work might contribute to increased income security, as working women might provide 
additional resources in the household. I analyzed this area of the welfare state’s contribution for 
security by using the economically active female population aged 10 years and older as a 
percentage of the total female population aged 10 years and older. This measure in itself is not a 
social risk, but it captures income security’s success. I have taken data on female labor participation 
and the measures of human capital, discussed below, from Huber, Stephens, Mustillo, and Pribble 
(2008). Overall, the connections of welfare state clusters with the measures of poverty and labor 
market risks should be interpreted in terms of better performance of a particular welfare state 
cluster in reducing poverty and informal work, and increasing female work results in the higher 
success of that cluster to provide income security among citizens. 
                                                                                                                                               
because studies indicate that it is a central characteristic of welfare states in Latin America (Barrientos, 2009). In fact, I did 
not find considerable differences in unemployment among the different types of welfare states operating in LACs. 
54 An individual is considered an informal worker if (s)he belongs to any of the following categories: (i) unskilled self-
employed, (ii) salaried worker in a small private firm, and (iii) zero-income worker.   
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Another fundamental aim of the welfare state is equality, either in the sense of the equalization 
of opportunity or in terms of equalization of results (Section 2.3). Provision of equal opportunities is 
most relevant in the field of social services (e.g., health care and education). In this manner, I 
considered the performance of welfare state types in equality of opportunities by considering two 
measures of social service’s outcomes: the number of deaths before the age of 5 per 1,000 live 
births and the average years of education for the population aged 25 and older.  These variables 
measure stocks of healthcare and education capital, respectively. Finally, equalization of results 
regards the redistribution of resources or income. To evaluate the effectiveness of different 
institutional models in this last type of equality, I used the post-transfers Gini index as an indicator 
of income inequality. Welfare states with lower income inequality were interpreted as more 
successful in redistributing income and, in doing so, in providing equal results. The data source is 
the Socio-Economic Database for Latin America and the Caribbean (CEDLAS and World Bank).55   
 
Method 
 
In the welfare state literature, cluster analysis is one of the most widely used techniques to classify 
policy orientations of countries (for an overview, see Barrientos & Powell 2004). Following this 
tendency, I used this technique to determine which Latin American countries can be characterized 
as belonging to which ideal welfare state types. Cluster analysis is a heuristic tool that seeks to 
discern groups showing great internal homogeneity. In this study, these empirical groups or clusters 
were classified into the ideal typology of welfare states and showed how the ideal types operate 
among real Latin American countries. There are many methods of cluster analysis; I used the 
hierarchical-agglomerative cluster technique because it does not predetermine the number of 
clusters.   
Hierarchical cluster analysis proceeds as follows. In the first step, a set of variables is chosen.  
Next, a distance matrix is computed on the basis of calculations of either a measure of similarity or 
a distance measure for all variables and for all units of observation. I applied the squared Euclidean 
                                                
55 Figures for poverty rates, informal work, and Gini index were downloaded in May 2010 from 
http://www.depeco.econo.unlp.edu.ar/cedlas/eng/index.php. Like the poverty rate, the Gini index is calculated from the per 
capita household income. The unit of analysis of the poverty rate and the Gini is individual. With the exception of Argentina 
and Uruguay, the area of coverage of poverty and inequality indicators is national. In Argentina and Uruguay, poverty and 
inequality measures cover only urban areas. 
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distance, which is one of the most common representations of distance (Aldenderfer & Blashfield 
1984). For example, if two cases have the same score for each variable, this measure is zero; that 
is, there is no distance between the cases, and, thus, they are deemed identical. Based on the 
resulting distance matrix, the units of observation are then combined into clusters by using a 
clustering algorithm called a linkage method. Several agglomerative linkage methods exist in cluster 
analysis. In the literature of welfare regimes, the most used linkage algorithm is Ward’s method 
(e.g. Barrientos & Powell 2004, Castles & Obinger 2008, Pribble 2008). Following this literature, I 
used this linkage method. In the first step, Ward’s method considers all N units as N individual 
clusters and joins two given units into a first cluster such that they minimize within-cluster variance, 
producing N-1 total groups. This variance is measured as the error sum of squares of distances 
between all objects in the cluster and the mean of that cluster. Then, the resulting clusters (N-1 
groups, one of size 2 and the rest of size 1) are further combined in successive steps by using the 
same procedure of minimization. The algorithm stops when all sample units have been combined 
into a single large cluster. This process creates a hierarchy of clusters that can be visualized by 
means of a graphic called a dendrogram. In general, the Ward method performs well in recovering 
true clusters (Rudra 2008). However, I tested the robustness of the findings using two additional 
linkage methods: the complete and average linkage procedures.56 
All hierarchical algorithms suffer from several problems. One is that cluster methods are 
sensitive to the scale of variables. Z-standardization is a widely used method for removing the 
disparity of variable scales; nonetheless, this method has the severe disadvantage distorting the 
intrinsic cluster structure of the unstandardized data since this method forces variables to have the 
same variance and, in so doing, eliminates differences in variability among them. Put otherwise, if I 
used Z-standardization, I assumed that the sample of Latin American nations should have the same 
variance in the indicators of the typology’s dimensions. However, I did not have a theoretical reason 
to defend that assumption. Rather, following Moisl (2010), I used an alternative standardization 
method, which is mean-standardization. This technique involves division of the values of variables 
                                                
56 To test the robustness of the findings, I do not use the single linkage method, as this technique tends to form clusters that 
which include a large number of units and to group relatively dissimilar cases (Pribble 2011). 
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by their mean. Moisl has shown that this method eliminates the distorting effect of the disparity of 
variable scales on clustering and preserves original variability.   
After the variables were standardized, they were “winsorized” to moderate the influence of 
extreme scores because the latter have a strong impact on the computation of distance measures 
in cluster analysis. A measure is winsorizing when its most extreme values are recoded to values 
that are less extreme (Ragin 1994). My procedure was to recode a variable at the 20 % level. This 
means that all values above the 80th percentile were recoded to the value of the case at the 80th 
percentile; all values below the 20th percentile were recoded to the value of the case at the 20th 
percentile. Varying the value of winsorizing (15% and 25 %) does not alter the findings of this study. 
One of the most severe problems of cluster analysis is the determination of the number of 
groups. For hierarchical-agglomerative cluster analysis, there is no statistical basis on which to 
prefer a particular clustering solution for the number of clusters over another. Following the 
literature (Ahlquist & Breuning 2009), I determined the appropriate number of clusters by using a 
combination of visual representation of possible grouping in the dendrogram, expert judgment of the 
researcher, and stopping rules. These rules are a more formal way of determining the number of 
clusters. There are more than thirty stopping rules; however, studies suggest that Duda and Hart’s 
(2001) procedure is one of most effective in determining the true number of clusters; thus, I used 
this stopping rules to identify the number of clusters in the following analysis of this chapter (Milligan 
& Cooper 1985, Rudra 2008). The Duda and Hart’s stopping rule uses the Je(2)/Je(1) and a pseudo 
T-squared statistic. To determine the number of clusters that capture the structure of the data, the 
conventional rule is to determine the number of clusters associated with the largest Je(2)/Je(1) that 
corresponds to a low pseudo T-squared value that has a higher value above and below it (see 
Appendix 2).  
 
2.5. Empirical Results 
 
 
Classification of Latin American Welfare States 
 
Can social policy profiles described in the ideal typology be discerned among the welfare states 
existing in Latin American countries? A first attempt to identify to what extent the types of welfare 
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states exist was the correlation matrix presented in Table 2.4. In general terms, strong correlations 
among variables constitute evidence that supports interpreting the variables as measuring the same 
concept, whereas weak correlations support the claim that they capture different concepts (Adcock 
& Collier 2001: 540). As we see in Table 2.4, most correlations are weak, thus suggesting that the 
selected variables measures different aspects of typology’s dimensions. This finding indicates that 
they may discriminate different models of welfare states operating in Latin America. The exception 
was the correlation between the index of segmentation and program universalism (averaged 
coverage rates). As noted above, both variables correlate positively (0.45). However, because of 
the conceptual differences between the corporatist and universalist types (Section 2.3), I did not 
combine these indicators into an overall empirical measure. Moreover, the differences between the 
corporatism and universalism appeared in an indirect way by examining the correlations. The 
distinctiveness of corporatist policy orientations was evident in that the index of status segmentation 
was unrelated to the liberal attribute (correlation was 0.09). By contrast, the universalist measure 
was negatively related to the liberal attribute (correlation was -0.26).   
 
Table 2.4.  Bivariate correlations matrix of welfare states measures for 17 Latin American countries  
 
 Index of status 
segmentation 
Averaged 
coverage rates 
Healthcare private 
expenditure 
Health and 
education public 
spending 
     
Index of status segmentation  1.00    
Averaged coverage rates  0.45 1.00   
Healthcare private expenditure  0.09 -0.26 1.00  
Health and education public spending -0.29 -0.08 -0.10 1 
 
Note: Mean-standardized and winsorized measures. Measures use data for different years of the 1990s. 
 
 
The results of this cluster analysis are shown in Figure 2.1. Here, one must remember that an 
ideal typology can never fit the real world exactly (Weber 1972). We also must recognize the 
existence of hybrid cases, which share features of more than one ideal type. Furthermore, the 
institutional structures of welfare states change over time. Thus, the findings of cluster analysis are 
a guide to classify empirical cases, but they do not provide perfect-cut criteria close to ideal types. 
Figure 2.1 should be interpreted as follows. The more one moves to the right on the x-axis, the 
more dissimilar the clusters are. Thus, the lengths of the horizontal lines linking clusters show how 
dissimilar the clusters are. Five clusters appeared to be distinct from one another based on visual 
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inspection of the dendrogram, the revision of literature, and Duda and Hart’s stopping rules.57 As I 
show below, two clusters regard different empirical realizations of the corporatist welfare state. 
More specifically, there is a cluster consisting of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay—the pioneer 
welfare systems. A second cluster is composed of Colombia, Paraguay, and Peru, which may 
represent a residual version of the corporatist type. The rest of the nations conform three different 
clusters. Costa Rica, the modal example of the universalist welfare state in Latin America, forms a 
joint with Panama to create a quite distinct third cluster. A fourth cluster is composed of Bolivia, 
Honduras, Mexico, and Nicaragua. Finally, Central American nations (Dominican Republic, El 
Salvador, and Guatemala) plus Ecuador make up a fifth cluster of their own.58 
 
Figure 2.1. Classification of Latin American welfare states in the 1990s 
 
Notes: Dendogram using Ward’s method. 
 
                                                
57 Findings of cluster analysis are highly robust compared to alternative linkage methods. The results of cluster analysis 
using complete and average linkage techniques do not substantively differ from the findings of Ward’s method. See the 
Appendix 1. 
58 The results of Duda and Hart’s stopping rule suggest a cluster solution of four clusters. My interpretation of the cluster 
analysis’s findings follows this cluster solution, with the exception of one cluster. Duda and Hart’s procedure includes in the 
same group the productivist and mixed clusters. I split this group into two different groups because the analysis of measures 
of welfare state dimensions suggests that these two groups represent different empirical realizations of the ideal typology of 
welfare states. See Figure 2.2 and Appendix 1 for results of stopping rules. 
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To interpret the findings of cluster analysis, Figure 2.2 reports cluster performance for the four 
measures used in cluster analysis, using all variables to identify the groups. The profile of each 
cluster is identified on the basis of the measures in which the clusters present the highest scores 
and the associations between indicators and ideal models that the measure hypotheses indicate 
(Section 2.4). Moreover, the specific percentages or scores for particular countries or clusters that 
are reported in the following of this section also are available in Appendix 1. 
The findings suggest that the cluster composed of pioneer countries clearly approximate the 
corporatist model, as this cluster has the highest average level in the index of status segmentation. 
However, there is a high index variation among the members of this cluster, ranging from 1.78 
points (Argentina) to the maximum of 6 points (Uruguay). Moreover, the expenditures figures 
indicate that this cluster clearly focuses on social insurance, leaving behind productivist 
orientations. The average percentage of spending within the government budget for the cluster is 
37.20 for public transfers and 22.19 for social services.  
 
Figure 2.2. Measures of typology’s dimensions by clusters 
 
Notes: Measures of typology’s dimensions are mean-standardized and winsorized. Scores of measures for each country are in Table A1.2 in Appendix 1. 
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The figures of program universalism for the pioneer cluster also confirm my hypothesis that 
benefits of corporatist welfare states cover a large portion of the population. I estimated an average 
coverage rate of 56.06 for the pioneers. The hypothesis for healthcare private expenditure is not 
confirmed, as this cluster presents a high score in this indicator. Pioneer countries are in second 
position in the rank-order (52.13 percent) after the productivist cluster (60.53 percent). The 
explanation of this finding might be related to the fact that, although there is large coverage of the 
population, there are still significant segments of the population that do not have access to public 
benefits and, thus, depend on the market as welfare provider. This factor, however, does not 
invalidate the interpretation of pioneer countries as corporatist welfare states. Rather, it reveals that 
the truncated nature of Latin American corporatism yet persists (Section 2.2.1). An alternative 
explanation refers to the shift from corporatism to liberalism in the pioneer clusters. The high score 
on healthcare private expenditure for this group would reflect that shift. However, because these 
reforms were so recently born in the 1990s in many Latin American nations, it is unlikely to clearly 
capture their impact on social policy orientations by using measures for the 1990s.  
In Figure 2.2, the score of the index of status segmentation suggests that the cluster consisting 
of Colombia, Paraguay, and Peru presents a significant corporatism. In spite of this characteristic, 
these countries fit in the corporatist type more poorly than the pioneer systems. The corporatist 
ideal model is defined not only by status segmentation but also by a considerable focus on social 
insurance. However, that is not the case with Colombia, Paraguay, and Peru. The findings indicate 
that the focus of this welfare states’ cluster on social insurance is lower than the priority of social 
insurance in pioneer corporatist welfare states. Public transfers spending as percentage of budget 
is on average 37.20 percent in pioneer nations and only 13.90 in the cluster that form these three 
countries.59 This result suggests that Colombia, Paraguay, and Peru compose a cluster 
characterized by residual corporatist welfare states.  
Contrasting with this last cluster, the cluster formed by Costa Rica and Panama shows the 
highest average coverage rate, the lowest level of privatization of health care, and a low average 
                                                
59 The number of pension programs in Chile is actually underestimated. In addition to the main special programs, the Social 
Security Administration (1993) reports as one category “programs over 35 other occupations.” To avoid problems of outliers 
in the analysis, I considered this category as only one program.   
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level of status segmentation in the sample of LACs. Moreover, although the level of productivism is 
clearly not as high as I expected in the Latin American context, figures of healthcare and education 
spending and the scores of public transfer expenditures suggest that Costa Rica and Panama 
prioritize investment on social services since the provision of public transfer expenditures is lower: 
cluster averages of 23.07 for social services and 14.10 for public transfers. Overall, these results 
provide evidence for the measure hypotheses related to the universalist welfare state and indicate 
significant universalism in the social policy orientations of Costa Rica and Panama.  
Despite the common characteristics of Costa Rica and Panama, scholars indicate that both 
countries differ in the origins of their welfare states. Program universalism in Costa Rica has 
emerged in terms of the expansion of citizens rights during successive democratic governments 
(see Section 2.3). In contrast, the program universalism of Panama might not reflects citizen right’s 
expansion but rather reflect the foreign intervention associated with the Canal Zone (Huber & 
Stephens 2010). Furthermore, the development of the Panamanian welfare system occurred during 
military dictatorships that governed this country from 1968 to 1988. In the 1990s, democratic 
governments came in office (Przeworski et al. 2000). However, it is not clear if social policy in 
democracy reflected demands of citizens or that the old welfare compromises were maintained. 
These characteristics suggest that this country is a special case of social policy development in 
Latin America and cast doubt on putting Costa Rica and Panama together in the same institutional 
contexts.  
The cluster of Central American countries (Dominican Republic, El Salvador, and Guatemala) 
and Ecuador approximate the productivist type of welfare state. The findings highlighted by Figure 
2.2 suggest that the productivism of these nations seems to rely on the fact that, as the measure 
hypotheses suggest, the average coverage rates and status segmentation are low. Furthermore, 
this cluster presents a high score in healthcare private expenditure and, as such, also confirms the 
hypothesis for the association between this indicator and the productivist model. Finally, although 
the levels of health and education public spending are not particularly high in comparison with the 
rest of clusters, we should note that the distinctiveness of the cluster of Central American nations, 
plus Ecuador, seems to rely on the levels of health and education spending that are higher than the 
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levels of public transfer spending. The priorities of both expenditures in the government budget are 
22.26 percent for social services and 7.33 for transfers (see Table A1.2 in Appendix 1). In the vein 
of the productivist ideal model, this finding suggests that this cluster focuses the welfare effort on 
the commodification of the labor force, leaving behind the protection against social risks through 
public transfers.  
The last cluster—the group composed of Bolivia, Honduras, Mexico, and Nicaragua—
approximates neither ideal type. Rather, this cluster is a mix of corporatist and productivist policy 
profiles. Because of this hybrid character, I call the countries in this last group “mixed welfare 
states.” On the one hand, the cluster of mixed welfare states presents the highest level of health 
and education public spending in the sample, indicating the mixed systems’ focus on 
commodification of the labor force. On the other hand, the scores in the measure of status 
segmentation suggest that these welfare states are similar to the residual corporatist systems, as 
the corporatism in both arrangements combines high program segmentation with residual priority of 
public transfers in the government budget.60 In this vein, the scores for the indicators of both 
variables illustrates that the members of the mixed cluster show the highest average number of 
pension programs but the lowest average level of social security spending among LACs.   
Mexico illustrates the mixed policy profile well. This welfare state approximated the corporatist 
model until the debt crisis of the 1980s. A distinctive aspect of the Mexican corporatism was the 
exclusion of the peasantry and the urban poor from the welfare systems (Murai 2004). Mexico 
suffered a set of reforms during the 1990s that attempted to liberalize the economy and transfer a 
significant portion of welfare provision to the market. In such a context, the state made significant 
public investment on education to commodificate the labor force and, in doing so, increase the 
competitiveness of the economy. As a result of this policy orientation, public spending in education 
showed a steep increase during the 1990s. In fact, at 24 percent in 2006, the share of public 
spending invested on education of Mexico was the highest among OECD countries (OECD 2006). 
In this context of strong productivism, the persistence of a considerable corporatism—indicated by 
                                                
60 Scores of universalism also indicate that Mexico is an exception in the mixed clusters in the sense that this country also 
presents high healthcare coverage. Scholars suggest that Mexican universalism is related to the importance of corporatist 
labor relations in this welfare state (Collier & Collier, 1991).   
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the figures of number of programs (see Table A1.2 in Appendix 1)—suggests a shift of welfare state 
model in which corporatism is a legacy of the past.   
From the data, I cannot conclude that a distinctive liberal welfare state exists in Latin America. 
The reason might regard on the measures used in cluster analysis—particularly, the measure of 
characteristics related with pension systems, which were the domain per excellence of liberal 
reforms in the region (Section 2.2.1). In this chapter, characteristics of pension systems are 
considered in the summary index of status segmentation and the indicator of program universalism, 
which include information for the 1990s. However, to capture the emergency of a liberal model in 
Latin America, perhaps it is necessary to analyze information of pensions for the 2000s because, as 
stated above in the discussion of the pioneer cluster, the 1990s is might be too recent to see the 
impact of policy reforms in LACs.    
However, the inexistence of a liberal model operating in Latin America might not reflect a 
measure problem. Rather, the results confirm the view of some scholars (Filgueira et al. 2008, 
Valenzuela 2006), who argue that the claim of a shift of policy profile in Latin America toward a 
liberal model is an overgeneralization (see Section 2.2.1). Further research should discriminate 
between this view and the explanation related with the measurement of liberalism in policy 
orientations among Latin American welfare states. 
 
Connections between the Classification of Welfare States and Socioeconomic Outcomes 
 
Scholars contend that there are significant associations among welfare state models and 
socioeconomic outcomes in advanced OECD countries (Section 2.3). In this section, I evaluate 
these associations in Latin America by analyzing dot plots that show the performance of clusters in 
respect with socioeconomic outcomes. In view of the small number of countries for which 
information is available, statistical analyses have been kept to a minimum.    
Figure 2.3 shows the overall relevance of my classification of Latin American welfare states for 
outcomes associated with income security and equality.61 Note that this classification is particularly 
                                                
61 The horizontal axis of the dot plots is a scale covering the quantitative values of outcome’s measures. The vertical axis 
shows the names of clusters and countries. The outcome score for each country can be determined from the horizontal 
position of the plotted point within that row: The farther to the right, the larger the score of outcome’s measure (i.e., higher 
poverty rate); the farther to the left, the lower the score in the indicator (i.e., lower poverty rate).  
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relevant for poverty and informal labor as the institutional models explain more than 50 percent of 
the variation in both socioeconomic outcomes (see R-squared). This result indicates that the 
connections of the clusters of welfare states with outcomes associated with income security are 
considerable. More specifically, the information in dot plots suggests the following rank-order 
among institutional types and poverty. The lowest levels of this socioeconomic outcome are found 
in the pioneer corporatist categories followed in ascending order by universalist welfare states.   
 
                Income security 
 
              Equality 
 
Figure 2.3. Socioeconomic outcomes by types of welfare states: 17 Latin American countries 
 
Notes: Socioeconomic outcomes are average for the period 1990–1999. R-squared from OLS regressions only with clusters as dummy variables. For details of scores 
for outcome’s measures, see Table A1.3 in Appendix 1. 
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However, some countries (Brazil and Panama) in the pioneer and universalist categories 
present higher poverty rates than the average rates in these two clusters. The highest poverty 
figures occur in some mixed welfare states (Bolivia and Nicaragua). The residual corporatist and 
productivist welfare states occupy intermediate positions. A similar pattern emerges for informal 
labor. The lowest informal labor rates are found in pioneer corporatist and universalist welfare 
states, with Brazil being an outlier. The rest of clusters shares intermediate and top positions. On 
average, the mixed and residual corporatist welfare states show the highest informal labor rates, 
with the figures of these welfare systems similar; that is, 64.33 percent for the residual cluster and 
63.05 percent for the mixed group. The productivist cluster occupies an intermediate position, with 
an averaged percentage of 58.93. 
The unique character of Costa Rica in Latin America can be seen in both income inequality 
and child mortality. This nation has one of the lowest figures for both kinds of socioeconomic 
outcomes in the region: Gini coefficient of 0.45 and child mortality of 15 deaths per 1,000 live. 
Moreover, in respect to income inequality and child mortality, the differences between the Costa 
Rican welfare state and the Panamanian welfare system become clear: Panama shows higher 
figures than Costa Rica, indicating that Panama’s limited success in areas of equality.  
With the exception of Brazil, pioneer corporatist welfare states also present low figures for child 
mortality. Furthermore, these nations plus Costa Rica and Panama have the highest number of 
years of education among LACs. By contrast, countries of mixed, productivist and residual 
corporatist welfare states—with some deviant cases such as Dominican Republic and Mexico—   
present the worst levels in child mortality and years of education. These results suggest that 
universalist and corporatist nations are the most successful welfare states in Latin America in 
achieving equalization of opportunities. With respect to equalization of results, however, the picture 
is different. In Table 2.4, the R-squared for income inequality is the lowest (0.22), which suggests 
that there are not considerable differences among the clusters. Only the universalist welfare state 
(Costa Rica) and Uruguay differ from the rest of the sample, as both of these countries present the 
lowest levels of income inequality, Gini coefficients of 0.45 and 0.43 respectively.   
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Finally, the figures for economically active female populations are similar among the different 
institutional models. However, it is important to take into account that Uruguay and Costa Rica are 
clearly exceptions. While the corporatist welfare state has the highest rate of economically active 
females, Costa Rica has one of the lowest figures in our sample of LACs. This finding suggests 
that, by contrast with social democratic welfare states in Europe, the universal provision in Costa 
Rica is not associated with social services or generous income support for working women. 
 
2.6 Discussion and Open Questions 
 
 
In this study, I classified social policy orientations of Latin American countries on the basis of an 
ideal typology of welfare states and evaluated the connections between the classification and a set 
of socioeconomic outcomes. I started by discussing the main arguments and gaps of the literature 
regarding welfare regimes in developing countries. On the grounds of this discussion, I developed a 
typology of four ideal welfare states, and I identified some LACs that approximate each ideal type. 
To empirically classify nations of Latin America into these institutional models, I used hierarchical-
agglomerative cluster analysis with measures of typology’s dimensions in a sample of seventeen 
Latin American countries during 1990s. Furthermore, I examined the connections between the 
classification of clusters, which were founded in the analysis, and their socioeconomic outcomes. 
Are there different social policy orientations in Latin American countries? Can these policy 
orientations be summarized in a typology of welfare states? My answer to these questions is that 
social policy orientations of Latin American countries form five clusters. While this finding provides 
support for the ideal typology, some countries fit more poorly than others. In respect to the 
supporting evidence, because of marginal segmentation of the pension system and the 
considerable program universalism, Costa Rica made a cluster of its own and appears as the modal 
example of the universalist welfare state in the region. The extension of benefits emerged as the 
expansion of citizen rights during successive democratic periods. Panama also presents program 
universalism, but it is unlikely that this emerged as a result of the development of citizen rights. As 
stated in the discussion of cluster analysis results (Section 2.5), its social policy development did 
not emerge as a result of citizen demand but is marked by the foreign intervention associated with 
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the Canal Zone during military dictatorships. These features of Panama indicate that Panamanian 
universalism is a special case of policy development that presents a poor fit to the universalist 
model; and thus there is doubt about putting Costa Rica and Panama together as examples of the 
same institutional context. To my knowledge, systematic research of program universalism in 
Panama is scarce. The findings of the chapter encourage filling this gap.  
Nations with pioneer welfare systems—Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay—form a quite 
distinct second cluster, and their policy orientations approximate the classical corporatist model of 
welfare provision. This implies a focus of social policy on program segmentation, social insurance, 
and high program coverage. Central American nations (Dominican Republic, El Salvador, and 
Guatemala) plus Ecuador form a third cluster, clearly oriented to human capital spending. This 
result indicates the existence of the productivist welfare state among these nations. However, as 
the case of El Salvador illustrates (Section 2.3) and the analysis of connections between this cluster 
and socioeconomic outcomes confirms, Latin American productivism is characterized by scope’s 
limitation of public interventions into the economy and absence of employers in the bargaining 
between workers and the state. This absence suggests that productivism of this cluster is lacking in 
some elements of the productivist ideal type. It is quite relevant for the scientific community 
interested in commodification of labor force in Latin America conduct further research that 
systematically examines these characteristics of productivism in countries that compose the 
productivist cluster. 
The findings of this chapter also suggest two additional clusters that fit poorly in any of the five 
ideal types of welfare states. The results of the analysis suggest a second version of the corporatist 
type in Latin America, consisting of the fourth cluster of Colombia, Paraguay, and Peru. In 
comparison with pioneer welfare systems, the distinctiveness of these countries is evident in the 
fusion of a strong segmentation of the pension system with a residual welfare state. Finally, the 
policy orientations in a fifth cluster of nations – Bolivia, Honduras, Mexico, and Nicaragua – cannot 
be clearly classified into a single ideal type. Rather, the policy orientations of these last countries 
are a mix of corporatism and productivism.     
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Does the existence of ambiguous cases in the empirical classification indicate that the entire 
ideal typology of welfare states is problematic? The results suggest that the policy orientations of 
ambiguous cases do not warrant additional ideal types, as residual corporatist and mixed clusters 
are variations within some models of the ideal typology. That is clear in mixed welfare states. There 
is nothing unique in these welfare systems that suggests the foundation of wholly new ideal type. 
Following Esping-Andersen (1999), mixed cases are examples of type-shifting. In respect to 
residual corporatist welfare states, the combination of residual corporatist welfare state with status 
segmentation might indicate a strong weight of family in the welfare mix and, thus, these welfare 
systems maintain the essence of corporatism. The weight of family may reflect certain low-level 
economic development in the residual corporatist welfare states that has not strongly dislocated the 
traditional welfare support from family members.  
Regarding mixed welfare states, the type-shifting raises questions about the transitory nature 
of this cluster. Mixed welfare states perhaps remain corporatist, or they could move incrementally 
toward commodification of the labor force. In the current discussion, many scholars would suggest 
that both scenarios are invalid, as the regime-shifting in Latin America reflects a third direction: 
liberal welfare provision (see Section 2.1). The findings of this study help qualify this expectation. 
Cluster analysis suggests that a distinctive liberal welfare state does not exist among Latin 
American nations. As stated above, this result can be explained on the grounds of 
overgeneralization or on the basis of the measurement of market’s importance in the public-private 
mix in the sense that the measure used in this chapter does not capture the privatization of pension 
systems that was one of the pillars of liberal reforms in Latin American (Section 2.2.1). Two 
important implications for future research will be important to examine the liberal social policy 
orientations operating in LACs. First, future research would greatly benefit from more extensive 
measures of liberalism, capturing not only privatization of healthcare but also means-tested 
government interventions. By doing so, we can evaluate the extent to which liberalism coexists or 
replaces other policy orientations. Second, the coexistence of a strong market-oriented provision in 
the healthcare sector with other social policy orientations in many countries analyzed in this study— 
particularly, pioneer and mixed welfare states—raises questions about the continuity of non-liberal 
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welfare state models among Latin American nations in the 2000s, especially in the face of rising 
international market competition. To shed light on this question, a recent study indicates that 
corporatist and universalist strategies have received a significant revival in the region in the 2000s 
(Calvo et al. 2010). However, the evidence is scarce in Latin America regarding self-reinforcement 
mechanisms that explain path dependence of institutions. I think that the study of these 
mechanisms would be a central avenue for future research on institutional arrangements in the 
region.   
Are the types of welfare state operating in Latin America connected with socioeconomic 
outcomes? In answering this question, bivariate relationship were analyzed. Outcomes, of course, 
depend on many other things than the welfare state that cannot be controlled in bivariate analysis. 
However, although this was a limitation of analysis, the study provides substantial evidence of the 
classification’s socioeconomic relevance to explain two measures of income security: poverty and 
informal work. With a few exceptions, pioneer corporatist states tend to have the lowest levels of 
both socioeconomic outcomes. These results indicate that by providing occupational-related 
benefits for a large portion of the population, corporatist institutions reduce poverty and informality 
more efficiently than do productivist policy interventions. By contrast with pioneer corporatist 
countries (with the exception of Uruguay), the universalist Latin American welfare state, Costa Rica, 
has a superior capacity in the Latin American context to reduce not only poverty but also inequality 
and child mortality by combining social services with program universalism. This finding suggests 
that universalism is the more successful welfare state model in Latin America to achieve security 
and equality for its citizens. The analysis of this study thus confirms the evidence of research in 
Western advanced nations about the role of corporatist and universalist welfare state institutions in 
providing security and equality (Korpi & Palme 1998).   
The results also indicate that there are not strong differences among residual corporatist, 
productivist, and mixed welfare states in respect to most socioeconomic outcomes examined in this 
study. As shown in the analysis, countries of these welfare state models exhibit poor performance 
in income security and equality. However, this lack of strong differences in the connections of these 
three clusters with income security and equality does not suggest that it makes no sense to 
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distinguish among these three clusters. Lack of differences might be related with the period under 
analysis in this study. This is particularly relevant for the performance of productivist welfare states. 
Investment of human capital needs, at minimum, a couple of decades to produce clear effects on 
social structure (Chapter 3). It follows that the analysis of the 1990s does not completely capture 
the socioeconomic consequences of efforts to commodificate the labor force. Thus, countries that 
have oriented their social policies to the productivist model in the last decades should exhibit better 
performance in socioeconomic outcomes in the next decades—particularly in the equality of 
opportunities among citizens. By doing so, productivist cluster might distinguish itself from the least 
successful welfare states model in Latin America.    
The findings of this study challenge the view of distributive processes that concentrate on 
economic growth. The results indicate the important role of institutional factors. However, future 
research should examine the impact of welfare state institutions on socioeconomic outcomes by 
controlling additional factors that could not be considered here, such as economic development 
and, especially, labor relations. One of the fundamental challenges ahead is to determine and 
measure how the models of welfare states and the pressure to liberalize them result from different 
models of collective bargaining. Another relevant area of future research is to develop theoretical 
explanations that help us reach a deep understanding of the connections of institutional contexts to 
socioeconomic outcomes indicated in this study. The following chapter is an attempt in this 
direction. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Public Transfers, Public Provision of Social 
Services, and Poverty in Latin America: A Cross-
National Analysis, 1980–2000  
 
 
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
 
Existing cross-national studies of poverty in Latin America rely on aggregate social spending as a 
unique measure for comparing the effectiveness of different types of social policy programs in 
reducing poverty (Perry et al. 2006, Ros 2009). However, these studies are open to question in at 
least two respects. First, not all public benefits are equivalent. Expenditure aggregation involves 
bringing together types of government benefits that are not comparable in terms of particular 
dimensions such as eligibility criteria and generosity. In fact, scholars suggest that the effectiveness 
for poverty reduction may vary among benefits of particular types, as each category of benefits 
represent itself a particular combination of both dimensions (Castles 2009). Secondly, comparative 
analyses consider Latin America a homogeneous arrangement; nonetheless, the impact of social 
benefits on poverty is perhaps not the same across different institutional contexts of this region 
(Huber & Stephens 2010). 
This study’s purpose is to build on critical aspects of the aggregate benefit approach and, by 
disaggregating government benefits into particular types of public programs, present an evaluation 
of the impact of social policies on poverty in different institutional contexts in Latin America.62 
Specifically, I differentiate between cash payments or “public transfers” and benefits in kind or 
                                                
62 I mean “absolute poverty” when I use the term “poverty” in the rest of this chapter. If I speak about another type of poverty 
(e.g., relative deprivation), I will explicitly define the type of poverty to which I refer. For a justification of my focus on absolute 
poverty, see Chapter 1. 
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“public provision of social services.” There are different categories of social services, such as public 
housing, food programs, and medical services. The present study focuses on public provision of 
education and health care. Furthermore, as stated above, each one of these benefits differs in 
terms of particular dimensions. To understand the impact of public transfers and public provision of 
social services, two dimensions are particularly relevant: targeting, which refers to the eligibility 
criteria by which individuals qualify as beneficiaries, and generosity, or the size of the redistributive 
budget that the state subjects to public transfers and social services.63 In this study, I discuss how 
both dimensions determine the effectiveness of public transfers and public provision of social 
services in reducing poverty. Moreover, I derive testable hypotheses for the impact of the size of 
both instruments of the welfare state that were tested in a sample of Latin American countries. Lack 
of data precludes an empirical analysis of targeting.  
The leading questions are how the size of government budget allocated to public transfers and 
public provision of social services contribute to poverty reduction and how the institutional context 
shapes the impact of the public transfer’s size on poverty. By providing answers to these inquiries, 
the contribution of this research to the study of social policy and poverty is twofold. First, I prove 
that the effects on poverty differ between benefits in kind and cash payments. This suggests that 
aggregate measures of social policy are not sufficient to analyze the impact of welfare programs on 
socioeconomic outcomes. Second, I show that the effects of public transfers vary among different 
institutional contexts in Latin America. Thus, this study moves beyond the aggregate policy analysis 
by illustrating the fruitfulness of adopting a contextualized, disaggregated approach to analyze the 
redistributive effectiveness of the welfare state in less developed countries, such as Latin American 
nations. 
A core hypothesis is that the size of government budget allocated to public provision of social 
services (education and health care) reduces poverty levels because this instrument of the welfare 
state increases the economic output of the nation, which in turn reduces the level of poverty.64 
Health and educational services are granted universally as rights of citizens; thus, increasing the 
                                                
63 In this second study of the dissertation, generosity and size are used as synonyms. Both concepts denote the size of 
government budget assigned to public transfers or social services.  
64 Economic output concerns the average income of a country. As said in Section 3.4, the standard measure of the economic 
output is per capita gross domestic product. 
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size of the redistributive budget allocated by the state to these social services should lead to an 
increase in investment opportunities of different social classes in both education and health capital, 
thereby fostering the economic output of a country in the long run. Consequently, by raising 
demand for workers, increasing the economic output grows the earnings of the poor and lifts 
households out of poverty.  
Furthermore, with respect to public transfers, I argue that the effect of the size of the 
government budget assigned to public transfers on poverty varies systematically between clusters 
of Latin American welfare states. On the basis of my classification of welfare states in Latin America 
(Chapter 2), a second hypothesis holds that the size of public transfers should decrease poverty in 
pioneer corporatist and universalist welfare states, as public support for public transfers might be 
high in both institutional arrangements. This hypothesis will be further elaborated with the 
contention that, because of different entitlement criteria, the reduction of poverty associated with the 
public transfer’s generosity should be higher in the universalist welfare states than in pioneer 
corporatist systems. Finally, a last hypothesis will contend that the size of the government budget 
allocated to public transfers should increase poverty in residual corporatist, productivist, and mixed 
welfare states because public support for public transfers in these welfare systems is low, and 
targeting of public transfers results in benefits that go only to middle- and high-income groups.   
I estimated pooled OLS equations with an unbalanced panel of fifteen Latin American 
countries for the period between 1980 and 2000 to test my hypotheses. To my knowledge, this 
study is among the first to estimate the impact of social policies on poverty levels across LACs 
during this period (Pribble et al. 2009). Poverty was measured in terms of the headcount index 
given by the percentage of the population living on less than 2 U.S. dollars per day at 2005 
international prices (adjusted at purchasing power parity exchange rates). To capture the size of 
government budget allocated to public transfers and benefits in kind, I used government spending 
as a percentage of GDP for both instruments of the welfare state. The findings supporting the 
evidence for the expectations related to public transfers, indicating that the institutional context 
matters. In contrast to public transfers, the size of public provision of social services does not have 
a statistically significant impact on poverty levels in the long run. Although this result falsifies my 
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hypotheses, it does not mean that investment in human capital is an insignificant mechanism to 
reduce the level of poverty. In fact, the analysis also suggests that an outcome of such 
investment—years of education—has a robust negative impact on poverty. I will suggest two factors 
that might explain the findings related with social service spending and years of education. First, a 
considerable lag exists between public investment in social services and socioeconomic outcomes 
(e.g. poverty). This means that public investment in education needs time (at least one generation) 
to produce results. It follows that the measure of benefits in kind used in this study perhaps does 
not completely capture the lag between the public investment in social services and a change in   
poverty levels. Second, the negative effect of years of education on poverty indicates that this 
variable might capture not only public investment but also other factors, such as private investment 
in education. Overall, the analysis carries implications for what can be expected from a 
disaggregated policy approach and institutional contexts more generally. 
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. The first section discusses the main 
arguments and gaps in cross-national studies on social policy and poverty in Latin America. The 
second section provides an explanation for why public transfers and public provision of social 
services should influence poverty in Latin America. The third section discusses the research design 
of this second study of the dissertation. The fourth section presents the results; the final section 
features my conclusions.  
 
3.2 Review of Previous Arguments and Evidence 
 
Perspectives about the poverty effect of transfer payments and benefits in kind among Latin 
American countries diverge. In short, one can identify three views in the literature. Focusing on 
social services, proponents of the first perspective, the human capital view, argue that social 
policies focused on services—that is, education and healthcare—do help to reduce poverty in Latin 
America. According to the human capital position, the public provision of social services works to 
reduce poverty because increasing the commitment of the state to this instrument of the welfare 
state will stimulate economic growth over the long run, which is the key to poverty reduction 
110 
 
(Battiston et al. 2009, De Janvry & Sadoulet 2000, Psacharaopoulos et al. 1995). In the human 
capital view, economic prosperity is expected to benefit all citizens generally. 
The human capital perspective was extremely popular in the 1990s and prevalent in the 2000s. 
However, there is a second view that is skeptical of the impact of social policies on poverty in Latin 
America. At first glance, the skeptical view is an opponent of the human capital view. However, both 
perspectives consider different instruments of the welfare state. The skeptical position focuses on 
public transfers, not services. Moreover, following the analysis of the distributive impact of transfers 
in advanced nations (Aberg 1989, Palme 2006), skeptics evaluate the impact of transfer payments 
on poverty by considering different dimensions of this type of public program. They particularly 
focus on two dimensions. The first is the size of transfers that the state subjects to redistribution. 
More specifically, the size regards the portion of the government budget that the state uses to 
provide benefits in cash or in kind. The second dimension regards the targeting of the programs. 
Targeting refers to eligibility criteria used to identify which social group is eligible to receive the 
benefits of a social policy. 
Defenders of the skeptical position use both size and targeting dimensions to examine the 
poverty effects of two types of benefits in cash (Chapter 1). One of these concerns social insurance 
transfers, which are provided on the basis of contributions and belongingness to specific 
occupational groups. According to the skeptical position, the most important social insurance 
programs, such as pensions and unemployment insurance, do not, in fact, reduce poverty because 
of a targeting that does not entitle poor households. Social insurance transfers are accessible only 
through employment in the formal labor market, and poor households in Latin America tend to work 
in the informal labor market (Lindert et al. 2006). 
The second type of public transfers refers to social assistance transfers. Contrasting with 
social insurance benefits, the entitlement for social assistance transfers is not based on the 
payment of contributions, but there may typically be a means test that is used as an eligibility 
criterion. The means test results in flat rate transfers that benefit mostly low-income groups. Thus, 
social assistance transfers would reduce poverty. Nonetheless, the proponents of the skeptical view 
call into question this prognosis. Despite a targeting in favor of low-income segments, skeptics 
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contend that social assistance transfers do not help to reduce poverty because the size of this 
public benefit is small in Latin American nations. Perry et al. (2006) point out, for example, that the 
size of social security transfers within the redistributive budget of the welfare state in Peru is about 
10 times higher than the size of social assistance benefits. Furthermore, the size of transfers has 
been procyclical in the region, with the poor hurt during macroeconomic shocks through cuts in 
spending for targeted social assistance programs (Wodon 2000). 
As the skeptics and proponents of human capital view dominate the discussion of the effects of 
social policies and poverty in Latin America, in the 2000s, a third view that has been analyzed in 
depth in industrialized nations appeared in the debate—the incentive view. In comparison to the 
skeptical position, this perspective also focuses on public transfers but introduces an additional 
element to the discussion. According to the incentive view, scholars evaluate the poverty impact of 
public transfers by considering government programs in the context of behavioral responses 
associated with investment and work effort.  
Focusing on investment in human capital, the incentive view argues that transfer payments 
may reduce poverty among Latin American countries because they combine an efficient means-
testing with incentives for curbing child labor and fostering the accumulation of human capital. In the 
2000s, this last position strongly emerged in the discussion about conditional cash transfer 
programs in Latin America (for an overview, see Hanlon et al. 2010). However, with regard to the 
impact of transfer payments on work effort, the prognosis of the incentive view varies. Scholars 
argue that public transfers might have the perverse effect of increasing the poverty rate in the long 
run as they reduce work incentives. In this vein, Perry et al. (2007) contend that the increase of 
social assistance programs over the last 15 years has led to increasing fragmentation in the social 
protection systems in Latin America, with the poor receiving similar benefits for free, just as formal 
sector workers receive by virtue of their payroll contributions. Such well-intended efforts to make 
social benefits available to those outside the formal sector might—due to the lack of an incentive 
compatible with contributory programs—create disincentives to the formalization of the workforce 
and, in doing so, might increase poverty (see Chapter 4).  
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Until now, only a handful of macro-level cross-national studies of Latin American countries 
examine the hypotheses of different views about the poverty impact of public transfers and social 
services.65 Most studies do not separate analyses of public provision of social services and public 
transfers; they use aggregate indicators of the budget size. The targeting of benefits is not 
examined (Perry et al. 2006, Rudra 2008). For example, Ros (2009) analyzes a sample of twelve 
Latin American nations for the period between 1990 and 2006 by using social spending as a 
measure of welfare generosity, and his findings suggest that social spending as a share of GDP 
does help reduce poverty.  
To overcome some gaps in these last studies, scholars have separately explored the impacts 
of social services and public transfers on poverty. However, most investigate a large sample of 
developing countries, including some Latin American nations (Dollar & Kraay 2002, Lustig & 
McCleod 1997). The findings are not robust among these studies. An exception in this panorama is 
the study by Pribble et al. (2009), who analyze the association of government expenditures and 
poverty with panel data only for Latin American and Caribbean countries for the period between 
1968 and 2001. The findings of this research suggest that public investment in education decrease 
poverty in the long run. The results also indicate that the effect of public transfers varies among 
different political arrangements. Public transfers may reduce poverty only in democratic regimes.  
To summarize the literature review, there is divergence among perspectives of the effect of 
public transfers and social services on poverty in Latin America. At first glance, only public provision 
of social services should decrease poverty levels. Regarding public transfers, scholars derive 
contradictory hypotheses. Furthermore, existing evidence suggests that the poverty effect of public 
transfers varies by type of political regime in Latin America. This finding indicates that an important 
source for cross-national variation in poverty levels is found in the design of institutions. In this vein, 
studies of advanced nations suggest that poverty levels vary among different models of welfare 
states. The reduction in inequality and poverty may be higher in a welfare system with a high level 
of program universalism than in a welfare state that targets benefits to the poor (Bergh 2005, Korpi 
                                                
65 Past cross-national analyses of social policies and poverty are overwhelmingly limited to a cross-section of Latin American 
nations at one point in time (e.g. Linder et al., 2006). Microanalyses commonly examine the poverty impact of particular 
social assistance programs within a small number of countries and over a short period of time. For example, see Raczynski 
(1995) and ECLAC (2009). 
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& Palme 1998, Palme 2006). To date, however, there has been no careful multivariate cross-
national analysis of the impact of different types of welfare states on the association between public 
transfers and poverty in developing countries—particularly in Latin America. Moreover, scarce 
cross-national studies have intended to estimate the poverty effects of social policy by 
disaggregating spending into benefits in kind and public transfers. Finally, studies focus on the size 
dimension but do not examine the targeting of welfare state’s instruments. This study attempts to fill 
in some of these gaps through an analysis of disaggregated expenditures that measure the size of 
redistributive budget that is focused on public transfers and public provision of social services and 
the consideration of the institutional context for the impact of public transfer’s size on poverty levels. 
Due to lack of data, the analysis of the targeting dimension of benefits is left for future research. 
 
3.3 The Argument and Hypotheses 
 
 
In this section, I identify and explain the effects of the size of government budget allocated to public 
transfers and public provision of social services on poverty as well as the role of the institutional 
context in the relationship between the public transfer’s size and poverty. Following, I provide 
precise definitions of the instruments of the welfare states considered by my theory and 
assumptions that support the argument, and I then develop the argument.  
Public transfers include all state payments in cash that aim to improve the standard of living of 
individuals who have already fallen victim to the full range of social risks, including sickness, 
maternity, unemployment, retirement, and poverty. As stated above (Section 3.2), there are two 
types of transfer payments: social insurance and social assistance transfer. In this study, I analyze 
an aggregate measure of both types of benefits in cash. In contrast with transfers, the public 
provision of social services pertains to welfare payments made by the government in a form other 
than cash, such as public housing, education, and medical services. My theory focuses on 
government investment in education and health care.66 Furthermore, public transfers and public 
provision of social services can be characterized by their targeting and the size of the redistributive 
budget that the state assigns to both welfare state instruments. In the following, I discuss how each 
                                                
66 See Chapter 1 for a more extensive discussion of the conceptualizations of public transfers and public provision of social 
services. 
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dimension should impact poverty levels across Latin American nations, but I formulate testable 
hypotheses only for the size dimension.  
I assume that both social policies affect poverty levels through two different channels (see 
Figure 3.1). The first channel, the “growth” effect, concerns the contribution of a given social policy 
to economic output or average income and from average income to poverty. According to standard 
models of economic development (e.g. Bourguignon 2003, Moller et al. 2003), the higher the 
economic output of a country, the lower the poverty levels because an increase in economic output 
raises the demand for workers, thereby increasing the earnings of the poor; this results in lower 
poverty at the macro level (Section 1.6 in Chapter 1). In other words, the poor must be better off 
when the economic output of a given country increases. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Growth and distributional channels 
 
The second channel is called the “distributional” effect and refers to the impact of public 
programs on inequality of income distribution and from inequality of income distribution to poverty 
levels.67 The poverty rate is higher in countries with a more unequal income distribution, as these 
nations have larger shares of citizens working in low-paying jobs and higher unemployment rates. 
Each of these factors can be expected to produce more households with income below the poverty 
line, resulting in a higher poverty rate (Kenworthy 1999). By contrast, redistributing income from the 
                                                
67 Economic output, inequality of income distribution, and poverty level refer to different aspects of income distribution. While 
the economic output or average income is the mean of this distribution, inequality refers to the dispersion or variance. 
Poverty level regards one particular sector of the income distribution (Bourguignon 2003).   
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rich to the poor can greatly decrease the inequality of the income distribution because this type of 
redistribution increases the income of the poor and, in doing so, reduces income differences 
between the income classes. Reductions of the inequality of income distribution, in turn, should 
result in lower poverty levels. Thus, it is expected that a progressive distributional change is likely to 
reduce poverty levels (Lopez 2009). This association between income distribution and poverty level 
is direct – that is, it is not mediated by a third variable—as progressive distributional changes entails 
income’s increases of the bottom of distribution, thus lowering poverty (Naschold 2002).68    
Finally, the total effect of a social policy on poverty levels is the sum of its growth and 
distributional effects. My argument will explain the associations between social policies and poverty 
levels in terms of both effects in two steps. First, I develop theoretical growth and distributional 
effects of the size of public provision of social services in Latin America. Next, I suggest how the 
size of public transfers contributes to poverty reduction among countries of this region.  
 
The Social Services Effect 
 
Social services affect the economic output or average income of nations. According to an 
augmented neoclassical growth model (e.g. Bassanini & Scarpetta 2001), human capital—that is, 
education and skills (for a definition of human capital, see Section 1.4)—contributes to productivity 
in existing tasks. It follows that public interventions aimed at increasing the education of workforce 
might have a positive effect on income per capita because some part of the earnings of labor are 
rewards to accumulated human capital. Furthermore, a work force educated at secondary and 
higher levels instigates economic output through the effect of education on economic output 
mediated by technology adoption. Education facilitates the rate of technological innovation and 
                                                
68 Modern welfare states redistribute income not only across income groups (inter-individual redistribution) but also across 
generations (intra-individual redistribution). Unfortunately, it is difficult to study the latter type of redistribution in Latin 
America. To my knowledge, cross-national studies of intra-individual redistribution in Latin America do not exist; thus, there 
are no references that can help in the formulation of arguments from which clear hypotheses could be derived. Furthermore, 
the analysis of intra-individual redistribution needs survey data that allow distinguishing among the welfare beneficiaries from 
different generations (Garfinkel et al. 2010). That type of data, however, is available for scientific research only in a small 
sample of LACs (see Lindert et al. 2006). Due to these problems, my theoretical argument and discussion of the analysis of 
this study focus on inter-individual redistribution; nonetheless, it is important to say that the focus on this type of redistribution 
does not rest relevance to the findings of this study (see following). In fact, intra-individual redistribution is the standard type 
of distributional effects that are considered in pooled time series cross-section analysis of distributional patterns such as this 
study. Furthermore, studies that consider both types of redistribution are scarce in the literature in general (for an overview of 
the literature, see Bergh 2005).  
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absorption of technologies from more advanced foreign countries; the implementation of technology 
in the production process then impulses the output (Acemoglu 2009).  
Public health care might also contribute to the positive effect of education on a nation’s 
economic wealth. As Barro (1996) points out, an improvement in the health of the population lowers 
mortality and disease rates, and thereby decreasing the effective rate of depreciation on 
educational capital. Through this channel, an increase in health raises the demand for educational 
capital, which has a further indirect—but positive—impact on productivity. Of course, both effects of 
health care and education on economic output are most discernible over long-run horizons because 
investments in the health and education of children require that they move through successive 
tracks of the educational system to impel the productivity of the economy. 
The relationship between social services and income inequality can be explained by 
contradictory effects. One viewpoint holds that public investment in human capital decreases the 
inequality of income distribution. As Pribble et al. (2009) point out, health and educational services 
are granted universally as rights of citizenship; thus human capital programs effectively redistribute 
resources across the entire income distribution. However, evidence indicates that a relatively equal 
distribution of social services, especially education, across the population is no guarantee of equal 
income (Torche 2005, 2010). Latin American countries are examples of this pattern. In comparison 
with other developing regions of the world, Latin America has, on average,  low-level education 
inequality but high-level income inequality (de Ferranti et al. 2004). For example, Castello and 
Domenech (2002) examine educational and income data for 108 countries from 1960 to 2000 and 
find that Latin America presents an educational Gini coefficient of 0.37; this index was estimated by 
using schooling years of the population ages 15 years and older, which is one of the lowest levels 
of educational inequality in the sample under analysis. In contrast with this characteristic of LACs, 
however, these nations exhibit the highest levels of income inequality with an income Gini 
coefficient of 0.49. This finding suggests that education disparities are not an important reason for 
high-income inequality in Latin America. It follows that—insofar as public provision of social services 
contributes to reduce educational inequality—the effect of social services policy on income 
distribution would be marginal among Latin American countries.  
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With no significant distributional effects, it is no wonder that the public investment in education 
and health help reduce poverty levels only through growth effects. Due the citizenship right status of 
education and health, an increase of budget size allocated to the public provision of social services 
should universalize access to education and health care and, in doing so, should lead to an 
increase in the investment opportunities in education and health capital for individuals from different 
social classes. In turn, this stimulates economic development over the long run. Consecutively, the 
higher the economic output, the lower the poverty levels.69 Thus, I expect that: 
 
H1: The size of government budget allocated to public provision of social services has a negative 
impact on the level of poverty. 
 
The Public Transfer Effect 
 
My theoretical account of the effect of public transfer’s size on level of poverty emphasizes the role 
of the institutional context. I use the term “institutional context” to designate clusters of welfare 
states in Latin America and to contend the idea that the impact of public transfers on poverty levels 
varies across different clusters (Chapter 1). My prognosis of the association between public 
transfers and poverty among different institutional context builds on the classification of Latin 
American welfare states, as elaborated in Chapter 2. Furthermore, hypotheses about the effect of 
the size of government budget allocated to public transfer on poverty levels proceed from the 
proposition that the time horizon for this effect is short in different institutional contexts. In contrast 
to social services, the effect of public transfers on citizens’ income is immediate because they 
involve a cash payment.70 
                                                
69 See Section 1.6 in Chapter 1 for an illustration of this argument in terms of micro-macro modeling. 
70 Public transfers might also affect poverty in the long run. As proponents of the incentive view contend (Kenworthy 1999), 
public transfers might stimulate behavioral responses that take some time to work themselves out to generate substantive 
poverty effects. In this vein, one of the most studied arguments in advanced Western democracies is that public transfers 
might increase poverty over the long run, as transfer payments reduce investment and work effort, therefore impairing 
economic growth. Unfortunately, a set of problems makes it difficult to conduct an empirical examination of long-term growth 
effects for public transfers such as this in Latin America.  For example, the formulation of prognoses for Latin American 
countries is difficult because theoretical references, which take into account the particular characteristics of these nations, 
are scarce (for an exception, see Perry et al. 2007). Furthermore, studies suggest a feedback of both variables and thus the 
existence of simultaneous causality effects between public transfers and economic growth (Barrientos 1998). However, 
current data of poverty in Latin America make it impossible to apply robust statistical techniques of causal analysis and, in 
doing so, determine unbiased long-term growth effects of public transfers. Due to these problems, I do not analyze long-term 
growth effects of public transfers on poverty in this study.  
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The implications of different Latin American institutional contexts for the impact of public 
transfer on the level of poverty depend on a specific explanatory mechanism. This is public support 
of cross-class political coalitions and interest groups for redistributive policies in general. The 
redistributive role of this explanatory mechanism has two aspects, which can be derived from a 
power-resource perspective (Korpi 1983, Korpi & Palme 1998).71 In respect to the first aspect, 
according to the power-resource theory, the specific combination of size and targeting that 
characterizes public transfers in a given country is a result of public support for redistributive 
policies in general among the citizens. In this way, how do the size and targeting of public transfers 
contribute to reduce poverty? The power-resource theory suggests that the government’s 
possibilities of providing benefits in cash for the poor reflect the level of public support for 
redistribution among members of the middle and working classes. It is expected that as more 
citizens of both social classes speak out in favor of redistributive policies in general, the higher the 
possibilities of government also allocating resources in the lower-income segments.  
To redistribute income, governments do not use only social assistance transfers—which mostly 
benefit low-income groups—but also social insurance benefits. In the context of high support, the 
social insurance system might cover not only the needs of wealthier citizens but benefits individuals 
with very low wages, who are seen to gain from earning-related compensations. Furthermore, as 
Nelson (2003) points out, earnings-related pensions foster the development of social assistance 
transfers. A high level of support among citizens for redistributive policies might imply a gain in 
legitimacy by which a government can increase not only social insurance transfers but also cash 
benefits outside social insurance programs. In other words, the higher the public support for 
redistributive policies in general, the higher the budget size that the government assigns to public 
transfers and, thereby, the larger the number of target income groups that become eligible as 
beneficiaries. 
The second aspect regards the institutional context. The way in which each cluster of welfare 
states is structured is also relevant to the level of public support for redistributive policies in general. 
                                                
71 According to the power-resource theory, public support pertains to policies in general in the sense that citizens are in favor 
of welfare programs that do not benefit particular groups. Because means-tested transfers benefit only low-income groups, 
this theory suggests that members of the middle class might not support this last type of transfers. 
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In the power-resource approach, scholars call this aspect of the welfare state “policy feedbacks”; 
that is, the shape of institutional contexts is affected by the actions of different socioeconomic 
classes, but we also expect that institutional structures affect the preferences of these groups (see 
Section 1.6 in Chapter 1.72 Moreover, policy feedbacks differ by institutional contexts, generating 
differences in the extent to which citizens are likely to support redistributive policies (Korpi & Palme 
2003). To explain these differences, the pivotal theoretical assumption in power-resource theory is 
that people might be more willing to support increases of redistributive budget’s size if they receive 
something in return. This indicates that the more universal the social insurance system is, the more 
people are in favor of redistributive policies in general. As Korpi (1983) argues, universalist 
schemes provide the middle class with a vested interest in maintenance of welfare programs and, 
thus, provide the poor with strong alliance partners in their lobbying for high benefits levels. Hence, 
universalist programs might reduce differences between rich and poor people by increasing the size 
of the sum of transfers available for redistribution. This also suggests that the channel by which 
program universalism might decrease poverty includes reductions of the inequality of income 
distribution.73  
Following the power-resource perspective, scholars derive these implications of public support 
in favor of redistributive policies for the association between public transfers and poverty in 
advanced Western democracies, especially Scandinavian countries (Esping-Andersen 1990, 
Esping-Andersen & Korpi 1984). I argue that this perspective is also relevant in explaining the 
connections between redistributive policies and socio-economic outcomes in Latin America. 
However, it is necessary to make some adjustments to apply a power-resource approach in the 
Latin American reality. These adaptations pertain to the historical origins and development of the 
welfare state in this region. 
                                                
72 In power-resources approach, the welfare state is the dependent variable in many studies that have focused on the 
significance of socioeconomic groups and political parties for the emergency and development of the welfare state (Korpi 
1983, Huber & Stephens 2001, Esping-Andersen and Korpi 1984). In this study, the welfare state is an independent variable; 
thus, I do not empirically analyze the effect of distributive conflicts partisan politics on welfare state institutions and how 
partisan politics and the public support for redistributive policies are connected among different social classes. 
73 My theory does not consider the growth effects of public transfers in the short term. Although these effects are logically 
plausible, to our knowledge, welfare state theories derive expectations about the growth effect only for long-run horizons. 
See note 70. 
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With respect to the historic origins of the welfare state, power-resource scholars argue that 
political alliances of middle and working classes are a core causal factor of the welfare state. In 
Scandinavian countries, political alliances involve “positive sum” bargaining situations based on 
long-term mutual recognition among all organized actors. This presumes a centralized organization 
of interests as well as institutionalized support by the state (Ebbinghaus 2006: 70). In Latin 
America, however, this mode of interest intermediation was not the basis of the emergence and 
expansion of social insurance systems during the twentieth century. Rather, such social basis is 
based on a bargaining system characterized by fragmentation of associational life, clientelistic 
relations, and, most importantly, absence of a long-term “positive sum” conceptions of mutual 
recognition among collective actors (Kaufman 1977).74 In such a context, the introduction of social 
insurance benefits was the response of political elites to the pressures of the middle class and the 
urban labor movement for particularistic benefits—but without a political alliance in the sense of a 
power-resource perspective (Huber 1996). The support of these interest groups for redistributive 
policies appeared later, as a result of the provision of social insurance benefits. Once the public 
support of middle and urban working classes was present, as the power-resource perspective 
indicates, some Latin American governments used it to expand public transfers systems to other 
groups (for example, indigents) and, in doing so, increased the size of transfers and provided a 
more universalist targeting.  
In universalist and pioneer corporatist welfare states, the emergency and expansion of public 
transfers occurred mostly in democracy, which offered electoral incentives for interest groups—
principally middle- and high-income groups—that appeal to low-income segments (Collier & Collier 
1979, Segura-Ubiergo 2007). Social insurance benefits were one of the strategies used to reach 
this goal. Governments dominated by middle- and high-income segments used this instrument of 
the welfare state for the incorporation of the urban labor movement into the political and economic 
systems – not only to control the political radicalization of the working class but also to obtain a new 
base of support (Collier & Collier 1991, Pribble 2008).75  
                                                
74 See Chapter 2 for historical description of the welfare state in LACs. 
75 The time of emergence and expansion of public transfers programs in universalist and pioneer corporatist welfare states 
ranges from 1900 to 1980. In this period, Chile, Costa Rica, and Uruguay were the Latin American countries with the longest 
experience of democratic rule. Argentina and Brazil were characterized by recurrent restrictions on democracy during these 
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From 1900 to 1940, pioneer corporatist and universalist welfare states began increasing the 
size and expanding the targeting of social insurance benefits in favor of public employees and 
unions of formal workers. Social insurance programs were then extended to a broad range of 
occupational segments, reducing the inequality of income distribution in both clusters of welfare 
states. As a result of this process, in Argentina, Uruguay, Chile, and Costa Rica, pension programs’ 
coverage of the economically active population ranged from 60 percent to more than 80 percent at 
the onset of the 1980s. Furthermore, as stated above, where coverage was wider—as in Uruguay 
and Costa Rica—governments used public support for redistributive policies among middle and 
working classes to establish non-contributory old-age pensions for indigents, one of the first social 
assistance programs in Latin America (Kaufman & Haggard 2008).  
In the 1970s and the 1980s, military dictatorships in pioneer corporatist welfare states inherited 
the political legacy of prior social policy commitments, which was established in democracy, and 
with the exception of Chile,76 they did not attempt radical changes of the welfare legacy in pioneer 
corporatist welfare states. In the 1990s, most democratic governments in pioneer welfare states 
introduced changes in the pension systems that were conducive to the liberalization of welfare 
states. However, because pension reforms require at least a generation to see distributional effects, 
the poverty impact of the liberal reform of pensions system in Latin America needs more time to 
emerge (Chapter 1). Furthermore, as said in Chapter 2, there is a significant heterogeneity in the 
response of pioneer countries to the liberal impulse for reforms.  
In addition to historical evidence, survey data of opinions in Latin American nations provide 
some confirmative evidence for my power-resource argument. Figure 3.2 shows the preference for 
income equality in several LACs in 1996 and 2006.77 The data are taken from the World Values 
                                                                                                                                               
years. However, these countries’ governments also used public transfers to control the working class and obtain the support 
of this group. In this sense, it is not a surprise that Argentina and Brazil rank with Chile, Costa Rica, and Uruguay in the 
program universalism of the welfare state (see Chapter 2).  
76 Chile is an exception because the dictatorship of Pinochet drastically changed the corporatist pension system in 1981 for 
one inspired on liberal principles (individual contributions and administrations of these private firms). However, pension 
reform also permitted the possibility of staying in the old corporatist systems for workers already under old programs. As said 
in Chapter 2, this implies that two pension systems have coexisted in practice since 1981 in Chile: One is liberal and the 
other is corporatist. 
77 Data for some countries are taken in others years. Regarding the panel on the left in Figure 3.1, the counties and years 
are: 1995 for Argentina, 1997 for Brazil, 1999 for El Salvador. In respect with the panel on the right, figure shows data of 
2004 for Guatemala and information of 2005 for Mexico. Due to missing data, the sample of countries is not exactly the 
same in the two years under examination. Finally, it is important to say that there is an unfortunate lack of data for Costa 
Rica (the unique example of the universalist welfare state in Latin America) in the data of World Values Survey project.  
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Survey, and the universe regards adult persons of both genders who are 18 years or older.78 
Preferences for income equality are measured as the percentage of the respondents that reporting 
values lower or equal to 4 in a 1-10 agreement scale in which 1 regards the phrase “Incomes 
should be more equal” and 10 represents the phrase “We need larger income differences as 
incentives.” This measure should be interpreted in the sense that the higher the percentage, the 
higher the support that income equality receives among citizens. 
 
Figure 3.2 Preferences for income equality in Latin American welfare states, 1996 and 2006 
 
Source: World Values Survey. See Table A2.1. 
 
The results in Figure 3.2 indicate that the preference for income equality varies among 
institutional contexts. In 1996, public support for income equality is generally greater in countries 
with pioneer corporatist welfare systems than in countries with residual corporatism (Peru), 
productivism (El Salvador and Dominican Republic), and a mixed welfare state (Mexico). The only 
exception is Argentina, which is below Mexico. In 2006, this exception disappears. In spite of the 
changes of the rank-order within the pioneer corporatist welfare states, ten years after all corporatist 
welfare states again present the highest support. Although the indicator of redistributive preferences 
in Figure 3.2 directly does not provide information of public support for redistributive policies, it is 
likely that such support should be high among countries in which the preference for income equality 
                                                
78 In 2006, the universe includes both genders, 15 to 64 years, in the case of Brazil, Guatemala, and Uruguay. Data 
downloaded in October 2011 from http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/ 
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is high. Thus, the findings in this figure indicate that, as my argument suggest, pioneer corporatist 
countries might present significant public support for redistributive policies, such as public transfers.   
In conclusion, I argue that public support for public transfers might be high in pioneer 
corporatist and universalist welfare states. This high level of public support could increase the 
possibilities of governments boosting the size of public budget assigned to public transfers. 
Furthermore, the high support also might expand the targeting of this policy instrument into lower 
income groups in the sense that not only social insurance’s entitlement principle is fomented by the 
welfare states but also means-testing. By doing so, higher public transfers should yield lower 
degrees of inequality of income distribution, which, in turn, is assumed to decrease poverty rates. 
This leads to Hypothesis 2: 
 
H2: The size of government budget allocated to public transfers has a negative impact on the 
level of poverty in pioneer corporatist and universalist welfare states. 
 
Pioneer corporatist arrangements do not differ from the universalist variety in their willingness 
to grant income protection. In both types of welfare states, the provision of income protection to 
lower-income segments reflects the political support of among citizens—particularly middle and 
working classes—for redistributive policies. However, the size and the targeting of public transfers 
differ between pioneer corporatist and universalist models, as these two models bring the citizens 
into very different contexts. In the corporatist model, the insured are included as several separate 
occupational categories in social insurance programs with conditions and benefits differing from 
those of others. Following Korpi and Palme (1998), the corporatist model generates separate 
organized interest groups that act in their specific interests. This might restrict the possibilities of 
expanding the size and targeting of public transfers. By contrast, entitlements based on citizenship 
tend to encourage the formation of collective interest among different socioeconomic interest 
groups and, thus, stimulate public support for public transfers expansion. With these consequences 
of the difference between pioneer corporatist and universalist welfare states in mind, I formulate the 
following expectation that further elaborates the second hypothesis:   
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H2a: The negative effect of the size of government budget allocated to of public transfers on 
poverty is larger for the universalist welfare state compared to pioneer corporatist welfare 
states. 
 
Finally, the implications of residual corporatist and productivist type of welfare states for the 
association between public transfers and poverty are derived from two characteristics of both 
institutional contexts. Firstly, residual corporatist and productivist welfare states present a 
corporatist targeting of social insurance benefits that entitles specific interest groups; namely high- 
and middle-income segments. For example, this is the case of a residual corporatist welfare state 
such as Peru. As Mesa-Lago (1978) documents, until the 1990s, the beneficiaries of the Peruvian 
social insurance system were the armed forces, political-administrative functionaries that worked in 
the state, economic elite, and member of unions related to key sectors of the economy (see also 
Pribble 2011). We find a similar pattern in productivist welfare states. In El Salvador, for instance, 
until the liberal reforms in the 1990s, social insurance covered only employees in industry and 
commerce, excluding a significant segment of the labor force. This kind of targeting does not 
substantively vary in the rest of member of the residual corporatist and productivist clusters (SSA 
1993).79  
The social insurance entitlement principle of residual corporatist and productivist welfare states 
results in a very small portion of the population receiving social insurance transfers. Data of pension 
coverage confirms this assumption for both clusters. In Chapter 2, I show that averaged pension 
coverage in the 1990s was around 25 percent in both clusters of Latin American countries, with a 
minimum of 15 percent in Paraguay and a maximum of 32 percent in Colombia. This finding and the 
type of targeting—which is on the basis of such pension coverage levels—indicate that pension 
systems in residual corporatist and productivist arrangements might increase the inequality of 
income distribution as they cover a small segment of population, which represents the wealthier 
citizens. 
                                                
79 Many residual corporatist and productivist welfare states, such as El Salvador, introduced reforms of social insurance 
systems that attempted to change the system from pay-as-you-go schemes to mandatory individual retirement account such 
(Chapter 2). However, as said in Chapter 1, scholarly community has to expect a couple of decades to clearly see the 
distributive impacts of reforms. Data of the 1990s should reflect pre-reform social insurance systems. 
125 
 
Secondly, the focus of public transfers in favor of specific income groups works in the opposite 
direction of program universalism, decreasing the number of citizens in favor of redistributive 
policies in general, thus reducing the possibilities of increasing the size of the total sum of cash 
available for redistribution from the rich to the poor as well as the chance of a transfer’s targeting in 
favor of lower-income segments. Figure 3.1 provides some confirmative evidence for this 
expectation about public support for redistributive policy. As shown, public support in productivist 
and residual corporatist welfare states for income equality is at the bottom of the rank-order. The 
percentage is lower than 30 percent in these countries (Dominican Republic, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, and Peru) in 1996 and 2006. The mixed welfare state (Mexico) occupies intermediate 
position. 
According to this second characteristic (low public support for redistributive policies in general) 
and targeting, which results in a pension coverage that results in benefits only for the wealthier 
income segments, the generosity of public transfers should reproduce the inequality of the income 
distribution or make it worse among residual corporatist and productivist welfare states. 
Furthermore, because mixed welfare states are hybrids of both models, I also expect this 
distributional effect in the mixed cluster. Hence, I state a third hypothesis:   
 
H3: The size of government budget allocated to public transfers has a positive impact on the level 
of poverty in residual corporatist welfare states, productivist welfare states, and mixed welfare 
states. 
 
3.4 Research Design 
 
The effect of the size of government budget allocated to public transfers and benefits in kind on 
poverty levels was estimated with a sample of fifteen Latin American countries, which provide an 
unbalanced panel. This means that different countries contribute different numbers of observations, 
ranging from one to seventeen. The countries include Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, 
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Uruguay, and Venezuela.80 These nations represent each one of the existing clusters of welfare 
states in Latin America. The panel yielded 67 observations after subtracting missing values in the 
dependent variable and regressors.  
Lack of data availability on poverty and social policy measures meant that I analyzed the time 
period of 1980 to 2000. In spite of this data limitation, it is important to say that I employ one the 
largest periods of existing information of social insurance and human capital expenditures in the 
developing world (Lopez 2011, Pribble et al. 2009).81 Next, I will first introduce the data, and then I 
will discuss the estimation problems and the remedies in greater detail. The following sections 
present the results of the analyses and conclusions. 
 
Measures of Dependent and Independent Variables 
 
The measure of poverty is the headcount index given by the percentage of the population living on 
less than 2 U.S. dollars per day at 2005 international prices (adjusted at purchasing power parity 
rates). This measure has been regularly updated by the World Bank.82 According to Chen and 
Ravallion (2008), the World Bank’s $2-a-day line is the median of the national poverty line found 
amongt developing countries as a whole and is relevant in middle-income countries, such as are 
most Latin American nations. 
                                                
80 In comparison with the analysis in the first study of the dissertation, in this study, I consider a smaller sample because 
some countries present missing values in the dependent and independent variables. More specifically, Ecuador does not 
present data for the measure of size of government budget assigned to public transfers. For Honduras, information of this 
measure exists to estimate only one component (distributional path) of the modeling strategy that I used to test the 
hypotheses (see below section about estimation procedures). However, the inclusion of this country in the analysis of 
transfer impact on poverty, which goes through the distributional path, does not substantively modify the results. Due to the 
unique character of social policy in Panama in the Latin American context (Chapter 2), I dropped this country from the 
analysis. Finally, for Venezuela, some measures that are used in cluster analysis of Chapter 2 are missing; thus, this 
analysis does not include Venezuela. In the present study, however, Venezuela presents information for all relevant 
variables used in regression analysis. To maximize the size of sample, I include this nation in the regressions. Social 
expenditures figures of public transfers and social services indicates that Venezuela approximate productivist welfare states 
as the countries presents a clear focus on social services, at least, before the first government of Hugo Chavez (1999–
2001).  
81 Huber et al. (2009) analyzes the impact of social spending on poverty levels in Latin America for the period 1968 and 
2001. To measure poverty, they occupy country-specific poverty lines. However, this poverty measurement presents a set of 
problem for cross-national comparison (see below in this section). Measures of poverty levels based on World Bank 
international poverty line, which I use in this study, exist only from the 1980s, thus preventing analysis of information from the 
1970s. Lopez (2011) analyzes social insurance spending of LACs for the period 1981-2009. He takes the spending 
information from the statistical datasets of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which includes only information about 
central governments. This prevent to use this data sources to recollect information for social services spending because, as I 
explain in this chapter, several Latin American welfare states administrate education and health programs at sub-national 
levels and, thus, IMF figures for education and health spending underestimate the effort of the state.   
82 The estimations were downloaded in September 2010 from http://databank.worldbank.org/ddp/home.do 
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I use the estimations of the World Bank based on the $2-a-day line because it permits reliable 
cross-national comparisons. However, notwithstanding of this advantage, several authors criticize 
the estimations of poverty from the World Bank. For example, Helwege and Birch (2007) point out 
that the poverty rates are estimated from indicators of well-being that do not share the same 
concept or definition. The estimations of poverty are obtained either from consumption or from 
income. Furthermore, both indicators of well-being consider public transfers and adjustments for 
household size only in some countries and only in some surveys. Finally, the surveys do not share 
the same units of analysis: It is either the household or the individual. 
Pribble, Huber, and Stephens (2009) contend that, in comparison with the World Bank poverty 
line, it is more useful to use country-specific poverty lines that respond to common goals. Because 
of these common ends, estimations based on national poverty lines can be compared across time 
and space. These scholars suggest that the poverty measurements of the Economic Commission 
for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) come closest to this goal because ECLAC uses 
common standards to form country-specific poverty lines. This measure reports the percentage of 
households living below the ECLAC-generated country-specific poverty line. However, it is not clear 
how these common standards can guarantee reliability of cross-country comparisons without a 
poverty line with the same real value. Thus, I present the results of analysis using the World Bank’s 
poverty estimations. 
My argument suggests that the association between poverty and the size of government 
budget allocated to public transfers varies among different institutional contexts. Following the 
standard approach in the OECD (for example, Korpi & Palme 1998), I measure the size of this type 
of benefit by using public transfers spending as a percentage of GDP.83 This measure captures the 
size of the redistributive budget, which a state uses to provide public transfers, in relation to the 
total resources of a country.84 Furthermore, my theory considers the immediate effect of transfers. I 
capture this time horizon by using spending figures of public transfers on a yearly basis.85 However, 
                                                
83 I present the measurement of institutional contexts in the discussion about econometric modeling. 
84 An alternative is to measure spending as a share of total government spending (Chapter 2). To my knowledge, the only 
existing source of this measure for LACs that includes information of public transfers and social services in the period under 
analysis in this study is Avelino et al. (2005). However, I did not use this data source because it contains missing information 
for several of countries analyzed in this chapter.   
85 Data of expenditures that cover a shorter time horizon are not available for macro-comparative analysis in Latin America. 
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to estimate short-term dynamics, the data contain a measurement problem that has no 
methodological solution. For the unbalanced panel on which I rely, the data capture different time 
intervals. In such a case, data on a yearly basis capture short-term dynamics for countries with 
scores in several time points but long-term dynamics for countries with time series that have long-
term intervals between time points (for example, one score for 1985 and another for 1997). 
Unfortunately, this problem of unbalanced panels for the estimation of short-term effects cannot be 
solved by econometric techniques for time series.86 My solution is to recognize the limits of the data 
and measure public transfers spending on a yearly basis, ignoring time intervals. This implies that 
the parameter estimates in the statistical models might not only reflect immediate dynamics but also 
longer-term horizons. 
Figures of public transfers spending are taken from Huber et al (2008), who collected the data 
from the Government Finance Statistics Yearbook and the International Financial Statistics 
Yearbook of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). However, the missing values are filled by using 
data from Cominetti (1996) and ECLAC’s Social Panorama (various years). IMF figures include only 
information about central governments. To estimate the effect of public transfer’s size, the exclusion 
of the local administration is not a problem because the central governments typically finance and 
administer these cash payments in Latin America.87 
The measure of public provision’s size of social services is spending on health and education 
as a percentage of GDP. This indicator captures the size of the state’s commitment to the provision 
of both services in relation to the resources of the economy as a whole. To estimate the effect of 
this indicator of benefits in kind on poverty in the long run, I use cumulative human capital spending 
from the largest period for which there are high-quality comparative data of spending. This period 
                                                
86 A common econometric strategy to identify in a unique panel model, including both long- and short-term effects, is to 
include in the set of independent variables that are measured on the original time scale of the data (e.g., yearly basis), a new 
regressor that should be the lagged effect either of the dependent variable or of the causal factor for which we formulate a 
hypothesis. Unfortunately, this strategy does not work well with data in this study, given that the panel is strongly 
unbalanced; that is, the amount of information available for each country varies. This means that time lags are not uniform 
and, thus, we would have a serious problem identifying the effect of social policy measures. This characteristic of the dataset 
also rules out the use of averages over short time periods (e.g. five years), as there are countries with large-time intervals. 
Furthermore, the procedure of averaging the data introduces an additional serial correlation, making the inference more 
difficult.  
87 Social security and welfare spending specifically includes retirement pensions, disability and survivor transfers payments, 
unemployment benefits, family allowances, and social assistance grants. Unfortunately, it is not possible to disaggregate 
public transfers spending figures in social insurance and social assistance components. Huber et al. (2006) point out that 
pensions account for 83 percent of transfer spending in IMF sources. 
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goes from 1970 to 2000.88 The cumulative figures estimate the long-term effect by capturing not 
only the state’s commitment for a particular year but also the history of welfare generosity.89 This is 
a standard procedure in capturing long-term effect in the literature about the welfare state (Huber & 
Stephens 2001, Podesta 2006, Pribble et al. 2009).  
Similar to the measure of public transfers, the source of the data of human capital spending is 
Huber et al. (2008). These authors contend that the exclusion of the local government is a major 
problem in this type of spending because several Latin American states manage human capital 
programs at sub-national levels. To deal with this problem, the data of human capital spending used 
in this study cover state and local spending by combining information from four different sources: 
Cominetti (1996), ECLAC’s Social Panorama (various years), ECLAC’ Badeinso online dataset, and 
the IMF sources cited above. ECLAC series cover state and local policy and, thus, the author used 
this series for the countries in which state and local spending is relevant. For the rest of countries, 
they also used the ECLAC series and filled the missing data with the others sources. 
I have examined the impact of a large number of control variables, which were selected on the 
basis of the explanatory framework of poverty in Latin America developed by Pribble, Huber, and 
Stephens (2009). Some of these were excluded from the final model to avoid problems of 
multicollinearity and enhance the clarity of the presentation. It should be emphasized, however, that 
none of the controls excluded from the final model changed my substantive results.90  
Table 3.1 shows the control variables incorporated into the final specification. My theory 
assumes that the effect of social policies on poverty is channeled through the economic output and 
the inequality of the income distribution (Section 3). A key information in determining the antipoverty 
effectiveness of economic output is the elasticity of poverty with respect to income per capita of a 
                                                
88 I obtained cumulative values by adding the figures of each particular year. For example, if figures of human capital 
spending are 1.3 and 0.6 in 1970 and in 1971, respectively, the cumulative values are 0.6 for 1970 and 1.9 (1.3 plus 0.6) for 
1971.  
89 Following the standard approach in literature about welfare state (Huber and Stephens 2001), my measure of long-term 
welfare state’s commitment to the provision of social services does not consider the depreciation of earlier investments. 
There is a set of problems, however, that preclude the examination of human capital investment’s depreciation with spending 
data. First, as Arrazola et al (2005) point out, depreciation rates might be heterogeneous across education levels (e.g., the 
higher the education, the lower the depreciation) and it is difficult to capture such heterogeneity with macro data such as 
expenditures. Second, it is not entirely clear how to capture depreciation with expenditure data. One approach, at first 
glance, is to attach to earlier investment higher weights. Nonetheless, there is not a clear approach to how should the weight 
exactly be estimated. Finally, the evidence of human capital depreciation is mixed and sparse (Weber 2010).         
90 The excluded control variables are urbanization, inflation, various indicators of globalization (foreign direct investment 
inflows, and external debt), infant mortality rate, female labor force participation, unemployment, a demographic indicator 
(percentage of population younger than 15), and cumulative years of democracy from 1945 to the year of observation.  
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country (Besley & Burgess 2003). In fact, GDP per capita is the most-used indicator of a country’s 
economic output in comparative analysis (Kenworthy 2011). Following this tendency, I control 
national economic output by using the real GDP per capita in constant dollars in 1996 international 
prices. This variable is taken from the Penn World Tables (Heston et al. 2001).  
Different causal factors impact poverty through the growth channel. At first glance, there are 
many determinants of economic growth, but one could say that overall empirical studies emphasize 
industrialization and productivity of the labor force as two variables that might contribute to poverty 
reduction through the growth path (Moller et al. 2003). To control both causal factors, I include a 
measure of industrialization by using the percentage of the labor force in industry. The source for 
this variable is the World Development Indicators (2007). Productivity of the labor force is controlled 
by the average year of total education for the population age 25 and older. The data are taken from 
Barro and Lee (2000).   
 
Table 3.1. Summary statistics of the dependent and independent variables. 1980–2000 
 
 Observations Mean Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
      
Poverty ($ 2 a day, logged) 67 2.867 0.717 0.693 4.021 
      
GDP per capita (logged) 67 8.672 0.334 7.553 9.362 
      
Gini coefficient (logged) 67 3.977 0.104 3.726 4.142 
      
Industry employment 67 24.132 3.545 13.200 34.100 
      
Ethnic heterogeneity (dummy) 67 0.463 0.502 0 1 
      
Informal sector 67 47.192 11.054 27.933 69.300 
      
Years of education 67 5.123 1.470 2.390 8.127 
      
Trade 67 48.351 26.823 13.243 130.675 
      
Health & Education spending 67 122.395 55.662 32.300 284.758 
      
Public transfers spending 67 5.495 4.217 0.143 19.156 
      
Pioneer corporatist welfare states (dummy) 67 0.448 0.501 0 1 
      
Pioneer*public transfers spending 67 4.093 5.119 0 19.156 
      
Universalist welfare states (dummy) 67 0.134 0.344 0 1 
      
Universalist*public transfers spending 67 0.537 1.468 0 5.504 
      
Note: Health & Education spending scores are cumulative averages for the period 1970–2000. “*” means interaction terms in 
regressions. 
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Scholars consider years of education as a measure of public provision of social services on the 
grounds that outcome variables might reflect past policies (Pribble et al. 2009). However, a 
significant portion of human capital expenditure is private in Latin America (Wolf & Gurria 2005).91 
This suggests that, in addition to government spending, in this region other factors might determine 
outcomes. Put otherwise, years of education and public education/health expenditures do not 
capture the same phenomena. Thus, the validity of years of education as an indicator of public 
investment is suspect.  
The second path by which the effect of social policies is channeled involves inequality of 
income distribution. Following empirical studies of the link between poverty and income distribution 
(Kalwij & Verschoor 2007), the measure of this latter concept in this study is the Gini index of 
income inequality from the United Nation’s University World Income Inequality Database (WIID).92 
This database includes several indicators of quality of the Gini’s estimations. To select the 
observations of the WIID, I followed the procedure of Huber et al. (2006). The observations with the 
highest quality were selected, and then I used estimations that were generated with post-transfer 
income. In the case of multiple observations per year, the selected observation was one that used 
an adjustment for household size and the individual as a unit of analysis. In some cases, multiple 
observations persisted, and then the mean of the observations was used. Following the advice of 
Huber and collaborators, I added 2.98 to the Gini indexes estimated from surveys without adjusting 
household size. 
The differences in inequality of income distribution among the countries are associated with a 
set of inequality sources. The cross-national studies suggest that ethnic diversity and the informal 
sector increase the levels of inequality and, in turn, poverty in Latin America (e.g. Ros 2009). 
Measures of these causal factors are included in the statistical multivariate models. To control for 
ethnic diversity, I included a dichotomous variable in which one indicates ethnic diversity; this is 
when the percentage of indigenous and descendants of Africans in the population of a country is 
between 20% and 80%. This measure of ethnic diversity is based on information about the ethnic 
                                                
91 Figures of spending indicate the relevance of private sector for the provision of social services in Latin America. Public 
expenditures on educational institution in Latin America averaged 3.9 percent of GDP in 2000. Private expenditures were 
1.06 percent of GDP (Wolff & Gurria 2005). Furthermore, in Chapter 2, I show that the private expenditure on health as a 
percentage of total health expenditure in Latin America for the period 1990–1999 was 49 percent. 
92 Figures were downloaded in August 2010 from http://www.wider.unu.edu/research/Database/en_GB/wiid/ 
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and racial composition of Latin America nations for around the year 2000, taken from de Ferranti et 
al. (2004). 
The measure of the informal sector considered in the statistical model is the percentage of 
workers classified as informal from the non-agricultural labor force. The source of this indicator is 
Huber et al. (2008), who compiled information from several publications of the International Labor 
Organization (ILO). The ILO sources have a high number of missing values, especially in the 
1990s. To overcome this problem, I found two solutions. Firstly, some missing values in the 1990s 
were filled with data of informal work from Socio-Economic Database for Latin America and the 
Caribbean (SEDLAC) compiled by the Center for Distributive, Labor and Social Studies of 
Universidad Nacional de la Plata, Argentina. However, the interpretation of the effect of the informal 
sector on poverty must be made carefully because the concepts of SEDLAC and ILO regarding 
figures of informal work are not the same.93 Secondly, due to the high number of missing values in 
the series, I used averages for the periods from 1980 to 1989 and from 1990 to 2000.  
Finally, the statistical models use an additional control variable. A current discussion in the 
literature surrounds the impact of globalization on poverty (Nissanke & Thorbecke 2010). Scholars 
argue that globalization might indirectly affect poverty through the impact of international factors on 
state commitment to the provision of social service and public transfers (Rudra 2008). I test the 
effect of globalization on poverty by using total exports and imports as a percentage of GDP as a 
measure of globalization. This variable is taken from Huber et al. (2008).  
 
Estimation Procedure 
 
Mirroring my theoretical expectations, I am particularly interested in the distributional and growth 
effects of benefits in cash and in kind on poverty levels. The effects were estimated by using pooled 
OLS regressions, in which the logged version of poverty rates is a function of social policy 
measures and a set of covariates. Poverty rates appear in the natural logarithm because the 
original distribution of this variable is highly skewed, with a long tail to the left. More specifically, I 
employed the following two equations: 
                                                
93 SEDLAC figures cover the agricultural labor force. I took these observations in August 2010 from 
http://sedlac.econo.unlp.edu.ar 
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In Equations (3.1) and (3.2), the βs are the parameter estimates and ε is the error term. In 
each β, the first subscript represents the number of the equation and the second subscript identifies 
the parameter in the equation. The subscripts i and t represent the country and year of 
observations, respectively. Finally, X (k=1…p) represents a set of control variables that change over 
time, and Z (j=1…q) refers to a set of control variables, which vary only between countries but not 
within them.  
Basically, the models have two particular specifications. First, my theoretical explanations 
assume that the size of government budget allocated to benefits in kind (services) and cash 
payments (transfers) impact poverty through either economic output or inequality of income 
distribution. Following Dollar and Kraay (2002), I identify both channels by using measures of 
economic wealth and inequality of income distribution as control variables in the econometric 
models. Equation (3.1) includes the logarithmic transformation of GDP per capita.94 By doing so, 
this model eliminates the path that connects social policy variables with the level of poverty through 
economic output. Thus, Equation (3.1) provides distributional effects for the size of public transfers 
and the size of public provision of socials services. Furthermore, the inclusion of control variables 
additionally removes the correlations between these variables and the measures of social policies.  
                                                
94 Following standard specifications in developmental economics (e.g., Lopez, 2009), poverty models include the logged 
transformations of GDP and the Gini index to directly estimate elasticities. Furthermore, the distribution of variables is 
normalized by using logarithmic transformations and, in doing so, improves the efficiency of OLS models.  
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The theoretical discussion considers growth effects only for the generosity of public provision 
of social services but not for public transfers. In respect of total impact, however, growth effects 
perhaps cancel out distribution effects; in this way, to test the robustness of my prognoses, the 
modeling strategy also considers the growth path for both measures of social services and public 
transfers. More specifically, I formulate a second model (Equation (3.2)), which has a similar 
specification as Equation 3.1, with the exception of the inclusion of the logarithmic transformation of 
the Gini coefficient. Because of this specification, this model estimates the growth effect since the 
path from public policies to inequality of income distribution to poverty is ruled out by controlling the 
measure of income distribution.95 By estimating growth and distribution effects, the modeling 
strategy of this study provides a complete picture of the paths, in which the effect of the budget size 
assigned to public transfers and public provision of social services on poverty is channeled. 
The second specification of the modeling strategy in this chapter pertains to the role of the 
institutional context on the association between the size of public transfers and poverty. Equations 
(1) and (2) include interaction effects between the public transfer spending and dummy variables for 
pioneer corporatist and universalist welfare states—the rest of the clusters are in the reference 
category—to evaluate how transfers payments contribute to reducing poverty in different 
institutional contexts.96 More specifically, the hypotheses of this study are formalized by using the 
coefficients of interaction terms and the principal effect of public transfers spending. Moreover, 
because these hypotheses involve combinations of parameters, I used Wald tests to evaluate the 
prognoses.97  
An unbiased and efficient estimation must resolve a set of econometric complications. I will 
discuss the most important problems in the two pooled OLS models in turn. To start, panel data 
analyses suffer the problem of serially correlated errors. As a consequence, OLS estimates 
incorrect standard errors. Broadly speaking, the literature provides two ways to deal with 
                                                
95 In the Appendix 2, a formal illustration of the modeling strategy is provided. 
96 Following the findings of cluster analysis (Chapter 2), Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay are pioneer corporatist welfare 
states. The universalist welfare state is Costa Rica. The rest of the Latin American countries in the sample are classified as 
productivist, residual corporatist, or mixed systems, forming the reference category of dummy variables According to 
institutional theory, institutional arrangements exhibit a high stability over time (Ebbinghaus 2006). Following this 
assumption, although the results of cluster analysis refer to the 1990s, I assume that the classification is also valid for the 
1980s and, thus, the membership of each country does not vary in the period 1980–2000. It follows that the classification of 
countries in the dummy varies is the same in the 1990s and in the 1980s. 
97 In the Appendix 2, I use Models 3.1 and 3.2 to provide a formalization of hypotheses.  
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autocorrelation. The first approach models the dynamics of all variables by exploiting the within 
variance over time. This approach requires that the time series of cross-sections dominate the data; 
that is, long time-series for a few units observed over many equally spaced time points. However, 
the data used in this study do not present these characteristics. The panel is unbalanced, and the 
average number of time points (five) is much smaller that the number of units (fifteen). Therefore, I 
use a second approach, which treats autocorrelation as a nuisance. The use of the robust-cluster 
estimator of the standard errors, on which I rely, is one of the most prominent examples of the 
second group. This estimator provides unbiased standard errors in the presence of any pattern of 
correlation among the errors within units. It also assumes that the errors are not correlated between 
the clusters.98 
A second econometric problem involves the presence of unobserved heterogeneity. A fixed-
effects model is required if time-constant omitted variables exist that are correlated with at least one 
explanatory variable. As Beck and Katz (2001) argue, fixed effects might “throw the baby out with 
the bathwater” because they completely remove the between variance. By doing so, the estimation 
of the time-constant effect is impossible in fixed effects models, and the estimation of rarely 
changing variables becomes highly inefficient—so inefficient that fixed effects models can, in fact, 
produce extremely biased point estimates (Plümper & Troeger 2007). In this study, this is important 
because the Gini coefficient must be classified as a rarely changing variable.99 This suggests that 
we cannot expect to obtain unbiased estimates of growth effects using a fixed effects approach. In 
this study, therefore, I follow another approach. In pooled OLS models, unobserved heterogeneity is 
controlled by conditioning relevant poverty determinants, which the literature suggests.100 
Nevertheless, it is important to say that our pooled OLS estimations do not totally rule out the 
existence of unobserved variables that are correlated with the error term.101  
                                                
98 An international economic shock such as the debt crisis in the 1980s in Latin America perhaps is a cause of cross-
sectional correlation in the error term. To control this problem, I included a dummy variable in all models for the period from 
1980 to 1989. The coefficient of this variable was not significant and, thus, I did not add this to the final specifications. 
99 Eighty-eight percent of the total variance of Gini coefficient includes differences between the countries. The between and 
within variances of Gini coefficient are 0.00826 and 0.00112, respectively. 
100 Another approach to control for unobserved heterogeneity is the random effects method. The Breusch-Pagan Lagrange 
multiplier (LM) test indicates the pooled OLS models are appropriate but at the cost of assuming independent unobserved 
heterogeneity. 
101 A possible source of endogeneity seems to rely on the fact that poverty might be a cause of public transfers and public 
provision of social services. In fact, my theory contends that the poor increase the demand for redistribution. In the case of 
social services, the cumulative nature of human capital spending rules out the problem of endogeneity. This measures the 
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3.5 Empirical Results 
 
Table 3.2 presents estimation results. I report findings from two sets of models that represent the 
distributional (Models 1 and 2) and growth (Models 3 and 4) impacts of public transfers and public 
provision of social services on poverty rates. Models 1 and 3 are the baseline estimations that 
include only social policy variables and measures that identify different paths. In the next two 
models, the effects of the control variables are also estimated. Finally, for all models, Table 3.2 
shows the tests of the hypotheses. 
Consider first tests of the hypotheses related with social services. We find no robust effect of 
cumulative health and education spending across the models. Despite the statistical significance, 
the small sizes of the coefficients in Models 1 and 3 indicate that the substantive effect of this 
variable is marginal. For Model 1, for example, for a one-unit increase in cumulative human capital 
spending, we expect to see approximately a 0.3 percent decrease in the poverty rate. Moreover, 
when control variables are included in Models 2 and 4, the coefficients are insignificant.102 In other 
words, human capital spending has no direct effect; the indirect effect, which perhaps is mediated 
by some control variable, is marginal. This result, however, should not be interpreted in the sense 
that investment in human capital does not help to reduce poverty. In fact, the growth and 
distributional effects of years of education are quite large and significant, indicating that human 
capital contributes to reducing poverty. Rather, the findings suggest that investment in human 
capital related with reductions of poverty in Latin America may not come from the state. Put 
otherwise, poverty decreases by improving the human capital of citizens that is not a result of 
government spending but it reflects other factors that determine years of education. 
The findings of public transfer spending are in line with my hypotheses. For Models 1 and 2, 
public transfer spending has a significant distributional impact on poverty levels in the three groups 
of welfare states. The signs of the parameter estimates suggest that while the size of public 
transfers reduces poverty in pioneer corporatist and universalist clusters, the size of this instrument 
                                                                                                                                               
history of social spending, and current poverty rates cannot affect past welfare efforts. However, this problem might persist 
for public transfers. The size of the sample (67) precludes statistical methods (e.g., instrumental variables), by which we can 
obtain unbiased estimations for this independent variable. I leave the solution of this problem for future research. 
102 Because years of education might be an intervening variable between health & education spending and poverty, I 
excluded years of education as a control variable in additional analyses, which are not shown here. The coefficients of the 
public provision of social services were insignificant in the additional analyses. 
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of the welfare state increases poverty levels in residual corporatist, productivist, and mixed welfare 
arrangements. Furthermore, the difference between the coefficients of pioneer corporatist and 
universalist arrangements is negative and insignificant in Model 1. However, as the prognosis 
(Hypothesis 2a) suggests, in model 2, the estimation turns significant and positive when the control 
variables are entered into the analysis.  
 
Table 3.2. Determinants of poverty rates. Pooled OLS regressions,1980–2000 
 
 Distributional Effect  Growth Effect  
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
     
GDP per capita (logged) -0.887** -0.061   
      (0.358)  (0.356)   
Gini coefficient (logged)       4.718***     2.079*** 
     (1.178) (0.536) 
Control variables     
     
Industrial employment     -0.067***     -0.055*** 
  (0.020)  (0.013) 
Ethnic heterogeneity  0.058      -0.073 
  (0.181)  (0.082) 
Informal sector  0.002      -0.003 
  (0.006)      (0.601) 
Years of Education     -0.239***      -0.189*** 
  (0.066)  (0.041) 
Trade    -0.006**     -0.007*** 
  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Social policy variables     
     
Pioneer welfare states 1.078**    0.718***     -0.154 0.171 
     (0.504)      (0.213) (0.294) (0.223) 
Pioneer welfare states*Public transfers spending     -0.196*  -0.226***     -0.108    -0.169*** 
     (0.095)      (0.039) (0.073) (0.031) 
Universalist welfare state      0.535**   0.981***     1.095***     1.029*** 
     (0.247)      (0.197) (0.209) (0.082) 
Universalist welfare state*Public transfers spending     -0.152*  -0.312***     -0.113    -0.257*** 
     (0.083)      (0.049)     (0.711) (0.034) 
Constant    10.869***       6.325* -15.236***     -2.452 
     (3.085)      (3.143)     (4.673) (2.012) 
     
Test of hypothesesa     
     
Health & Education spending (H1)     -0.003*       0.001  -0.005**     -0.000 
     (0.002)      (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Public transfers for pioneer welfare states (H2)     -0.120**  -0.117***     -0.041   -0.081*** 
     (0.054)      (0.014) (0.031) (0.012) 
Public transfers for universalist welfare states (H2)     -0.078**  -0.204***     -0.046    -0.169*** 
     (0.045)      (0.038) (0.052) (0.031) 
Differences between pioneer and universalist (H2a)     -0.043 0.087** 0.005   0.089** 
     (0.038)      (0.039) (0.036) (0.032) 
Effect of public transfers for rest of welfare states (H3)b      0.075    0.108*** 0.066     0.088*** 
     (0.086)      (0.041) (0.068) (0.026) 
   
Adjusted R squared      0.490       0.865 0.705 0.891 
N 67 67 67 67 
 
Note: Robust-cluster standard errors in parentheses. (a) Hypothesis testing uses the Wald Method. (b) The category “Rest” 
includes residual corporatist, productivist, and mixed welfare states.*significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 
1%. One-tailed tests of coefficient related with substantive hypotheses, two-tailed test for rest of coefficients. 
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Comparing distributional and growth effects, I also find that growth effects do not cancel out 
distributional impacts. In fact, in Model 4, parameter estimates of public transfer spending reinforce 
the distribution effects. As stated above (Section 3.4), this finding suggests that pooled OLS 
regressions capture not only immediate dynamics because the main sources of economic wealth 
should work in the long run.  
In sum, the results for public transfers spending conform to my expectations and have some 
interesting implications. First, all else being equal, the contribution of public transfer’s size to 
poverty reduction is higher in universalist welfare states than in pioneer corporatist welfare systems. 
However, public transfers might have the perverse effect of increasing poverty in remaining Latin 
American welfare states. Second, the great shift of the parameters that the introduction of control 
variables suggests that these factors are of great importance for the development of poverty rates.   
To present quantities of direct substantive interest for public transfer spending, I made a series 
of counterfactual estimates of poverty rates under different constellations of the public transfer 
generosity and the clusters of welfare states. This was done by making all the other variables in the 
regression equations of Table 3.2 equal to their mean levels and then estimating 1,000 simulations 
of the counterfactual impact on the poverty rates of low and high levels of cumulative public transfer 
generosity for the clusters of welfare states. The 20th and 80th percentiles represented the low and 
high levels of public transfers spending, respectively.103 The advantage of simulations is that these 
not only provide the expected poverty rate under the different combinations of public transfer 
generosity and clusters of welfare states, but also account for the uncertainty of the estimations by 
providing confidence intervals. 
Table 3.3 shows the counterfactual estimates of poverty by channel. The results for both 
inequality and growth paths can be interpreted in a number of ways. From the standpoint of my 
argument, the most important information is contained moving from left to right for the distributional 
path in each cluster. This moving indicates that the counterfactual estimates strongly support my 
argument about the impact of public transfer’s size on poverty. For pioneer corporatist and 
universalist welfare states, poverty rates were always smaller when the size of redistributive budget 
                                                
103 See King, Tomz, and Wittenberg (2000) for details about the statistical procedure.    
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assigned to public transfers was “high” (80th percentile) than when it was “low” (20th percentile). 
More specifically, simulations for the distributional channel reported that, under the constellation of 
low public transfers spending, the expected poverty rate on average is 32.468 for pioneer nations 
and 37.065 for universalist welfare states. Under the counterfactual scenario of high public transfers 
spending, the poverty rates decrease to 14.487 for pioneer welfare nations and 10.043 for the 
universalist welfare state. Moreover, the reductions of poverty rates resulting from increases in 
public transfers are higher in universalist welfare states than in pioneer corporatist systems. These 
reductions are 17.981 (32.668 minus 14.487) percentage points for the latter and 27.022 for 
universalist welfare states (37.065 minus 10.043). In contrast with these two clusters, as expected, 
the movement from left to right results in an increase of poverty rates from 23.363 to 47.799 
percentage points for residual corporatist, productivist, and mixed welfare states. These findings are 
exactly as my argument predicts. Finally, estimations for the growth channel follow the same line of 
the inequality path and, thus, reinforce the inequality effects. 
 
Table 3.3. Counterfactual estimates of poverty rates 
 
  Distributional Path   Growth Path  
 
 
Type of welfare state 
Low 
public transfers 
High 
public transfers 
Low 
public transfers 
High 
Public transfers 
     
Pioneer corporatist 32.468 14.487 21.729 12.326 
 (24.699-42.123) (12.439-16.930) (15.341-30.108) (10.526-14.398) 
     
Universalist 37.065 10.043 44.523 15.234 
 (24.607-54.313) (4.346-19.217) (30.650-62.610) (7.212-27.897) 
     
Resta 23.363 47.799 24.437 43.587 
 (20.259-26.748) (28.877-75.276) (21.444-27.516) (29.123-65.597) 
     
Note: Estimations based on 1,000 simulations of Models 2 and 4 of Table 3.2 by using the software CLARIFY (King, Tomz, 
and Wittenberg 2000). Low and high regard the 20th and 80th percentile scores on public transfers measure. Control 
variables were hold in their mean levels. 95 percent confidence intervals in parentheses. (a) The category “Rest” includes 
residual corporatist, productivist, and mixed welfare states. 
 
Before we explore the robustness of the above findings, I will briefly discuss the estimated 
effects of the control variables. Firstly, as the literature suggests (Section 3), the effects of GDP per 
capita and Gini index have the expected sign. However, the measure of economic output becomes 
insignificant when additional control variables are included in Model 2, indicating that the GDP per 
capita, per se, does not explain poverty. In this way, the results of Models 2 and 4 suggest some 
mechanisms that contribute to reducing poverty through growth and distributional effects. The 
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coefficient of industrial employment is negative and significant at the 0.01 level in Model 4. As 
Moller et al. (2003) point out, the manufacturing sector is typically characterized by higher average 
wages, which in turn might increase the income per capita. Furthermore, trade does help reduce 
poverty, and this effect operates though mean income and income distribution. As said above, 
years of education also contribute to poverty reduction.  
 
Robustness Checks 
 
The results of the regression models are highly robust with respect to two important problems with 
OLS in small samples. First, for this type of sample, the asymptotic error terms of the pooled OLS 
models might not be normal. If so, t-statistics for significance testing would be uninterpretable (Fox 
1991). Second, in small samples, OLS regression coefficients are sensitive to observations with 
high residuals (outliers) and high leverage points (Andersen 2008). In this study, I applied a set of 
regression diagnostics to identify outliers and leverage cases.104 Findings indicate that parameter 
estimates in pooled OLS models might be driven by Argentina, Nicaragua, Chile, and Uruguay.  
One solution to both problems is a robust estimation that handles outliers and high-leverage 
observations, giving more efficient estimations than OLS in the face of non-normal errors (Hamilton 
2007). One class of robust estimators, known as M-estimators, works by downweighing 
observations with large residuals (outliers). Different M estimators are defined by how much weight 
they give to residuals of various sizes. I used a least absolute value regression (LAR), which is a 
type of M-estimator that gives observations with larger residuals less weight than OLS by 
minimizing the absolute value of residuals (Berk 1990). In my sensitivity analysis, LAR regressions 
model the conditional 0.5 quantile, thus providing “median” regressions (see Table 3.4).  
LAR estimator presents two problems. First, LAR regression takes into account only outliers 
but not high-leverage points with small residuals. However, this is not a problem for the findings of a 
robust estimator in this study because the regression diagnostic does not indicate the presence of 
this last type of points in the sample of Latin American countries. Second, LAR and other robust 
estimators share with OLS the assumption that errors are independent and identically distributed. 
                                                
104 I used the hat-matrix, studentized residuals, and Cook’s distance measure in the diagnostics. 
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Thus, standard errors are not valid in the presence of heteroscedasticity or correlated errors. 
Because both problems are a disadvantage when handling panel data, I primarily used LAR 
regressions to test the sensitivity of coefficients, leaving the uncertainty of estimations in a 
secondary position.  
 
Table 3.4. Determinants of poverty rates. Least absolute value regressions.1980–2000 
 
 Distributional Effect  Growth Effect  
 
  Model 2a  Model 4a 
     
GDP per capita (logged)  -0.767   
   (0.234)   
Gini coefficient (logged)     1.263* 
    (0.656) 
Control variables     
     
Industrial employment     -0.059***     -0.034*** 
  (0.016)  (0.012) 
Ethnic heterogeneity             -0.038                 -0.104 
             (0.153)                 (0.114) 
Informal sector              0.009                  0.004 
  (0.006)                 (0.005) 
Years of Education     -0.266***    -0.236*** 
  (0.061)                 (0.044) 
Trade     -0.007***    -0.007*** 
  (0.003)                 (0.002) 
Social policy variables     
     
Pioneer welfare states     0.819***                 0.284 
             (0.240)                (0.238) 
Pioneer welfare states*Public transfers spending   -0.234**  -0.186*** 
             (0.048)                (0.043) 
Universalist welfare state    0.847**   0.872*** 
             (0.371)                (0.273) 
Universalist welfare state*Public transfers spending     -0.246***  -0.216*** 
             (0.093)                (0.723) 
Constant      6.324***                -0.302 
  (2.136)                (2.676) 
     
Test of hypothesesb     
     
Health & Education spending (H1)             -0.001                -0.002* 
  (0.001)                (0.001) 
Public transfers for pioneer welfare states (H2)     -0.121***  -0.075*** 
  (0.018)                (0.017) 
Public transfers for universalist welfare states (H2)  -0.134*                -0.105* 
             (0.083)                (0.063) 
Differences between pioneer and universalist (H2a)              0.013                 0.030 
             (0.085)                (0.064) 
Effect of public transfers for rest of welfare states (H3)c    0.113**  0.111** 
             (0.046)                (0.038) 
   
Pseudo R squared              0.687                 0.687 
N  67  67 
 
Note: (a) Specifications regards Models 2 and 4 in Table 3.2. (b) Hypothesis testing uses the Wald Method. (c) The 
category “Rest” includes residual corporatist, productivist, and mixed welfare states.*significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, 
***significant at 1%. One-tailed tests of coefficient related with substantive hypotheses, two-tailed test for rest of 
coefficients. 
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Table 3.4 shows robust regression estimates. I present only Models 2 and 4 of Table 3.3, as 
they consider the effects of benefits on poverty under the control of socio-economic variables. In 
comparison with pooled OLS estimates, the coefficients of benefits measures differ by little, with the 
exception of the effect of public transfer spending in the universalist welfare state, which is reduced 
in the robust estimates from -0.204 to -0.134 for the distributional path and from -0.169 to -0.105 for 
the growth path. However, the impact of public transfer spending in the universalist welfare state is 
still statistically significant. Furthermore, as a result of the reduction of the coefficient of public 
transfers in the universalist welfare state, the difference between pioneer corporatist and 
universalist arrangements is lower than in pooled OLS models and insignificant. It follows that the 
uncertainty of difference between public transfer’s impacts for both clusters of welfare states is high. 
These results of the sensitivity analysis suggest that most findings of this study are not an artifact of 
outliers and non-normal errors. The only significant deviation is the effect of public transfer 
spending in universalist welfare states, which might be overestimated in pooled OLS regressions.  
 
3.6 Conclusion 
 
In this study, I have attempted to evaluate the impact of size of redistributive budget allocated to 
public transfers and social services on poverty in Latin America and the influence of the overall 
national policy profile (type of welfare state) on the effects of public transfer’s size. I started by 
discussing the arguments and findings in the literature. In the following section, I offered a 
theoretical discussion of the effects of public transfer generosity and the size of benefits in kind on 
poverty across Latin American countries. An unbalanced panel of fifteen Latin American countries 
for the period from 1980 to 2000 was used to test my hypotheses. 
Regarding social services, I contended that increasing budget size allocated to social services 
—particularly, education and healthcare—should lead to a decrease of poverty levels in Latin 
America. My findings falsify this hypothesis. The statistical analyses have demonstrated that 
cumulative health and education spending does not have a significant impact on poverty rates over 
the long run. Contrasting with this result, years of education do clearly help to poverty reduction. 
Two factors might explain these findings. First, there is a considerable lag between the public 
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investment in social services and the outcomes of this investment—years of education and poverty. 
In fact, scholars suggest that the return of investment in human capital needs, at least, a generation 
to see results (Huber et al. 2006). Thus, in spite of the consideration of cumulative scores for the 
period from 1970 to 2000, the measure of benefits in kind used in this study perhaps does not 
completely capture this lag. Second, the significant and negative impact of the measure of the 
productivity of the labor force (years of education) on poverty suggests that, as stated above 
(Section 3.4), years of education captures not only government effort but other factors. In fact, 
because of the insignificant effect of health and education spending, I can conclude that others 
sources of human capital (e.g., private investment) has been more effective than public investment 
in reducing poverty in Latin America, insofar as these additional sources increase the years of 
education among citizens. That said, one important avenue for future research is to more clearly 
identify the effect of these additional sources of human capital on poverty among Latin American 
welfare states. 
The results reported in this study provide supportive evidence for hypotheses about 
associations between the size of redistributive budget assigned to public transfers and poverty. I 
argued that the effect of public transfer’s size on poverty varies systematically between clusters of 
Latin American welfare states. In this way, by distinguishing five clusters, my contention was that 
public transfer generosity should decrease poverty in pioneer corporatist and universalist welfare 
states in Latin America, with higher poverty reductions in the latter. In contrast to both welfare 
systems, I also claimed that public transfer’s size should increase poverty in residual corporatist, 
productivist, and mixed welfare states.  These contentions are exactly what I find in my estimations 
of public transfer spending among Latin American countries over the period from 1980 to 2000. In 
line with the power-resources theory, thus, I conclude that the institutional context matters in 
understanding the association between the size of public transfers and poverty. In particular, 
institutional contexts characterized by program universalism shape this association so that public 
transfer generosity reduces poverty. This finding corroborates evidence in advanced Western 
democracies that suggests the importance of universalism in decreasing poverty (Korpi & Palme 
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1998). More importantly, my analysis then indicates the patterns of welfare provision that emerged 
in some advanced democracies can also be extended to some regions of the developing world. 
Although my argument focuses on the distributional effect of public transfers, I examined the 
growth effect to rule out the chance that the latter effect might cancel the impact of public transfers 
channeled through income distribution. Regression estimates indicate that such is not the case; in 
fact, growth effects reinforce the distribution effects. This finding suggests that public transfers 
might affect the economic output and, in doing so, influence the level of poverty within Latin 
American countries. However, we have to consider this implication of the findings with caution. 
More particularly, to evaluate the estimated growth effects, two critical points are relevant. First, 
economic theories of the welfare state suggest feedback effects between public transfers and 
economic growth (Section 3.3). It follows that the findings perhaps do not reflect a genuine effect of 
public transfers on economic output. Rather, the growth impact of public transfers might be a result 
of the effect of economic output on public transfers. The econometric method used in the study 
does not eliminate this possibility. Second, for pioneer corporatist and universalist welfare states the 
analysis indicates a negative growth effect. Put otherwise, in both systems public transfers impel 
economic output that, in turn, reduces poverty. To explain this growth effect, studies suggest that 
greater equality, which is a result of redistribution, might increase and stabilize consumer demand, 
in turn, boosting investment (Kenworthy 2004). However, scholars are skeptical of the validity of 
such arguments for Latin America. Indeed, an hegemonic position in the continent associates public 
transfers, particularly for corporatist systems, with strongly negative effects on the productivity of 
Latin American economies (Barrientos 1998, Edwards 2009). Most of these arguments consider 
dynamics that cannot be tested with the data of this study. Overall, on the grounds of these two 
critical aspects, further research is necessary to evaluate my findings of the effect of public transfers 
on poverty that is channeled through economic output. This research must work with rich panel 
data. 
The results of robustness checks also suggest that differences are highly uncertain between 
universalist and pioneer corporatist welfare states with regard to the impact of benefits in cash. This 
finding is not necessarily inconsistent with my theory because the negative impact of these 
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programs is actually higher in the universalist welfare state. Rather, the analysis fails to reach 
statistical significance because of the limited number of units that represent this type of welfare 
state in Latin America. Further research should evaluate the robustness of the findings for the 
universalist welfare state in Latin America by including countries of world whose social policy is 
oriented to the universalism. By doing so, the number of units that form the universalist cluster will 
be increased. 
Overall, the findings of this study suggest that to understand the connection between social 
policy and poverty in Latin American nations (and in other developing countries), one must 
disaggregate social policy in particular types of benefits and conceptualize the types as 
multidimensional constructs. Furthermore, it is necessary to analyze welfare benefits in different 
institutional contexts—not consider a unique homogenous political economy that represents the 
countries under study. The study of these conclusions of the analysis is an important avenue for 
future research in developing countries opened by this study. Specifically, it is necessary to produce 
more research about the mechanism that links institutional contexts with poverty (public support for 
redistributive policy) and further a disaggregated expenditure approach by distinguishing types of 
spending that are more particular than the categories of public transfers and benefits in kind (e.g. 
social insurance and social assistance transfers).  
In emphasizing the disaggregation of social policy and the importance of institutional contexts, 
my study suggests one important policy implication. The transfer programs have to be designed to 
distinguish between different institutional contexts. On one hand, the policy makers might have to 
concentrate on the size and targeting of the benefits in small and recent welfare states. On the 
other hand, the pioneer corporatist and universalist welfare states have reached substantive levels 
in both dimensions of a given social policy. This suggests that the design of social policy must 
include other elements to minimize disincentive effects associated with generous welfare programs, 
such as work requirements and clear time limits on benefits. 
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Chapter 4 
 
The Impact of Social Assistance Transfers on 
Chronic and Transitory Poverty in Chile: 2001–2006  
 
 
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The impact of government programs on poverty is generally measured by comparing pre-transfer 
and post-transfer poverty. In such a framework, any increase in the size of transfers of the income 
package of poor households will reduce poverty, keeping other sources of income constant. 
However, there are good theoretical reasons to presume that indirect effects of government 
programs through the labor supply or productive investment may be associated with an increase in 
poverty persistence over time.  
An area of the welfare state that is particularly inclined to produce these undesired 
consequences of government programs is social assistance, which typically provides non-
contributory cash payments to low-income groups on the basis of a means test; that is, an 
examination that is applied as a condition of the receipt of some benefit. The present study focuses 
on this type of public transfer and evaluates the indirect effect perspective or disincentive view of 
public transfers with regard to absolute chronic and transitory poverty in Chile. The leading question 
of this third study is how social assistance transfers contribute to reducing both types of poverty. 
The examination of this question carries implications for what can be expected for poverty 
alleviation from government benefits that are provided on the basis of a particular target criterion in 
developing countries such as Chile. This criterion is means-testing. 
In this study, the essence of chronic poverty regards low level of capital. Such a level of capital 
is the result of a permanent failure to accumulate capital which characterizes this type of poverty 
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status. Capital accumulation is captured by inter-temporal mean income and chronic poverty is 
defined as a condition characterized by mean income over time that is below the absolute poverty 
line. All poverty that is not chronic is defined as transitory, as arising because of inter-temporal 
variability around the mean income over time, rather than to the level of the mean income over time 
itself. The inter-temporal deviations from the inter-temporal mean income over time cause transitory 
poverty, insofar as deviations cause household income to fall below the poverty line (Jalan & 
Ravallion 1998, Naschold & Barret 2011).  
Drawing upon these concepts of chronic and transitory poverty, I will formulate a set of 
hypotheses about the impact of social assistance transfers on both poverty statuses over time. 
More particularly, I will show that the size of transfers assigned to recipient households is small in 
the Chilean welfare state and, thus, does not guarantee minimum subsistence. In spite of low 
generosity, I will argue that Chilean social assistance transfers have a positive impact on chronic 
poverty. In this chapter, I will suggest that cash payments may be associated with incentives to 
apply for benefits and to work in the informal sector. These incentives might be particularly relevant 
for chronic poor, insofar as they suffer from scant opportunities to get a job in the formal labor and, 
thus, low chances to receive benefits that must be paid for via individual contributions. To derive the 
impact of social assistance on chronic poverty, the incentive associated with informality is 
particularly relevant. In the informal sector, chronic poor might find a source of subsistence, which is 
not guaranteed by cash payments of social assistance. However, informal workers are often 
trapped in low-pay occupations. It follows that a positive effect of social assistance transfers on 
chronic poor may arise through increasing informal work effort.  In contrast with chronic poverty, I 
expect that social assistance transfers do not affect transitory poverty since individuals who 
experience this type of deprivation have lower incentives to qualify for benefits and work in the 
informal sector than the chronic poor. Furthermore, and most importantly, the size or generosity of 
the benefits to recipient households is too small to smooth the inter-temporal variability introduced 
by unexpected events or shocks, whether they affect the income of the chronic or transitory poor.  
The hypothesis for chronic poverty finds support in an empirical test carried out on a sample of 
working-age individuals taken from the Chilean Household Panel (Encuesta Panel CASEN) for 
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2001 and 2006. However, the expected effect for transitory poverty is rejected. More specifically, 
following Jalan and Ravallion (1998), I measure the concepts of chronic and transitory poverty by 
using continuous indexes of chronic and transitory poverty, which are used as dependent variables 
in regression models. To estimate the causal effect of benefits, social assistance transfers are 
included in such models as a dummy variable, which 1 indicates whether the person lives in a 
household that receives any type of social assistance transfers. My estimation results show that 
social assistance transfers increase absolute chronic and transitory poverty, the impact being 
stronger in the case of the chronically poor. The findings can be interpreted as support for the 
theoretical explanation, from which I derive the hypothesis for the chronic poor. However, due to a 
lack of data, this study did not strenuously test the particular components of such explanation (e.g., 
informal work) and, thus, I encourage the evaluation of these mechanisms through further empirical 
research. In the case of transitory poverty, the positive effect of social assistance transfers may 
reflect the behavior of particular types of the poor.  
The disincentive effects of transfer programs on the productive investment and work effort of 
low-income groups have been the subject of intense scrutiny, primarily in the United States and 
Europe (for an overview, see Fouarge 2004). The standard static leisure-income model, which is on 
the basis of most research about the effects of welfare benefits on work effort in developed 
countries, suggests that social assistance produces persistence in poverty, as social assistance 
provides people with an incentive to avoid work (Grogger & Karoly 2005). By contrast, in developing 
countries, the evidence regarding responses of the poor to transfer programs over time is quite 
scarce (Dercon 2005). The reason is probably the truncated character of welfare programs in these 
nations (Lindert et al. 2006). However, in recent years, there has been a growing recognition of the 
need for government programs to improve the socio-economic status of the poor. Consistent with 
this, many developing countries have introduced transfer programs that consider behavioral effects, 
especially incentives to invest in human capital (e.g. Alzúa et al. 2010). In such a context, this third 
study of the dissertation contributes to the literature of social policy and poverty in developing 
countries in two important ways. First, it provides evidence of the responses of the poor to 
government programs over time in developing nations by analyzing the case of Chile. In doing so, 
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this study helps to qualify in a new context the generality of standard economic model with respect 
to indirect effects of benefits on work effort. Second, to understand such behavioral responses, in 
this study I develop a theoretical framework, in which I also provide information that would likely 
improve the design of Chile’s antipoverty programs. 
To study the impact of social assistance transfers on chronic and transitory poverty, the 
selection of Chilean social assistance is based on its substantive relevance and pragmatic 
advantages (see also Chapter 1). After the dictatorship of Pinochet, the new democratic 
government immediately put poverty and social equity at the top of the agenda. The governments of 
the first democratic president and his successors maintained trust regarding the focus of social 
policy on low socio-economic groups that was employed by Pinochet’s military regime, but they 
introduced a new style that had greater complexity in the design of interventions (Fernández Gatica 
2005). This design includes the development of various social assistance programs and the 
collection of high-quality cross-sectional and longitudinal data to evaluate them. In such a context, 
the study of Chilean social assistance is of substantive relevance because it is important for Chilean 
policy makers to evaluate the results of public investment on social assistance. Furthermore, as 
stated above, the evidence related to the disincentive effects of public programs on work effort are 
scarce in developing countries. Under a methodological point of view, this is somewhat 
understandable because the study of disincentives effects requires longitudinal data, which are 
expensive and demand a complex administrative organization.105 However, in such a panorama, 
because of the availability of panel household surveys with information about social assistance 
programs, Chile is an exception. It follows that this country provides good pragmatic conditions to 
conduct an empirical evaluation of the effect of social assistance transfers on chronic and transitory 
poverty.  
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. The first section discusses the findings of 
studies on the impact of public benefits on absolute and relative poverty. The second section 
presents a theoretical framework whereby I conceptualize the notions of absolute chronic and 
                                                
105 However, the number of developing countries undertaking panel household surveys the recent years is increasing. See 
Baulch (2011).  
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transitory poverty and the disincentive effects of government programs.106 The third section 
provides a description of Chilean social assistance programs. Drawing upon the theoretical 
framework, I use this information to derive the hypotheses of this study. The fourth section explains 
the data and method that is used in the analyses. The fifth section shows the results of descriptive 
and multivariate analyses. Finally, I conclude with a return to general theoretical and policy issues.  
 
4.2 Review of Literature 
 
 
The field of poverty measurement over time is not one of great consensus among scholars. In fact, 
there is a widespread disagreement about most relevant issues, including the weighting of poverty 
spells and the incorporation of risk into the measure (Addition et al. 2009, Baulch 2011). Whatever 
the exact measurement, it is important to distinguish the concept of the poverty dynamics, which 
involves the persistence of the poverty status of individuals or households or their movements into 
and/or out of poverty over time, from the measurement of them (Bane & Ellwood 1986). 
This study relates to one important strand of literature about the effects of social policy on 
poverty dynamics. My analysis is located in a strand within this literature that distinguishes the 
effects of several dimensions of social policy. With respect to the impact of cash benefits on poverty 
at the micro level, at least we can distinguish a priori three dimensions: the size or unit value of 
benefits to individual or household recipients, the targeting, and the duration of the intervention 
(Chapter 1). In the rest of this section, I will discuss the findings of studies that have addressed the 
associations between these dimensions of social policy and poverty status over time. 
Studies of advanced nations have suggested that there is no evidence of a robust association 
between the size of benefits and poverty status over time.107 Regarding the effect of the duration of 
benefits on poverty dynamics, theoretical models and empirical studies that include this dimension 
are scarce (Saez 2006). Leisering and Leibfried (1999) pointed out that this characteristic of the 
design of public intervention is associated with disincentive effects on the work efforts of the poor. 
These authors argued that the probability of leaving social assistance falls over time because the 
                                                
106 Although my framework can be used to understand poverty in general terms, I refer to absolute poverty when I use the 
term “poverty” in the rest of the chapter. If I speak about another type of poverty, I will specify what type is denoted. See 
Chapter 1 for arguments for the use of the concept of absolute poverty in the dissertation. 
107 See Kenworthy (2004) for an overview of these studies. 
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longer the poor receive benefits, the more difficult it is for them to escape from social assistance. In 
fact, these scholars provided evidence from Germany that reveals a diminishing hazard rate as 
duration increases.  
The empirical evidence regarding the effect of the targeting on poverty dynamics is also 
scarce. In fact, most of the evidence for this dimension of social policy comes from macro-data 
(Korpi & Palme 1998, Moller et al. 2003, Pedersen 1999). The idea is that one can identify some 
types of transfers that ought to reduce poverty because they tend to benefit lower-income groups 
disproportionately by using some type of means test. This is the case for social assistance benefits, 
which have the explicit objective of reducing poverty. Barret et al. (2008) analyzed the impact of the 
distributive profile of benefits on the poverty dynamic by using simulations for developing countries. 
The findings suggest that the design of social protection, which includes targeting the chronic poor 
and a clause to terminate the safety net program after a period of years, promotes incentives for 
productive investment and, in turn, decreases chronic poverty.  
Cross-sectional studies of Latin American countries have suggested a low redistributive impact 
of taxes and transfers in Latin America (Perry et al. 2006). Scholars have argued that this is 
because of the small size of social benefits. Studies of the effect of transfers on poverty status in 
Chile have shown evidence in favor of this argument. These studies have focused on the impact of 
one public program, Chile Solidario, which attempts to lift families out of poverty through a 
coordinated set of stimuli to the demand and supply of social services and through the provision of 
psycho-social support to beneficiary families. The evidence suggests that these studies were not 
able to detect any positive impact of Chile Solidario on household income on average (Galasso 
2006, Larrañaga et al. 2009). Carneiro et al. (2009) also pointed out that Chile Solidario may have a 
positive impact on poverty for particular groups. The results of this study indicate a negative effect 
on the probability of staying in poverty for rural households and households with less educated 
heads.  
Most studies about the impact of government programs on poverty and economic inequality in 
Latin America do not really explain why public benefits should affect poverty. They focus on the 
estimation of the causal effects of the intervention rather than on the explanatory mechanisms. 
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Furthermore, for Latin American welfare states, evidence of the impact of government programs on 
poverty status over time is scarce. To fill these gaps in the literature, in the following, I develop a 
theoretical framework that explains the impact of social assistance benefits on chronic and 
transitory poverty. I also derive and empirically examine hypotheses of such effects in Chile. 
 
4.3 A Theoretical Explanation of the Impact of Social Policy on Chronic and Transitory 
Poverty 
  
In this section, I develop an explanation of the effect of public programs on chronic and transitory 
poverty. I will present my theory in two steps. First, I will present the concept of chronic and 
transitory poverty that is used in this study. Second, I will explain the effect of social assistance 
transfers on chronic and transitory poverty in terms of the social mechanisms associated with 
productive investment and the work effort of poor households.  
 
4.3.1 Conceptualization of Chronic and Transitory Poverty 
 
Following Barret et al. (2008), absolute chronic poverty is a condition characterized by severe 
deprivation of basic physical subsistence needs such that the individuals do not permanently 
engage in productive investment. Because of the permanent failure of investment, the chronically 
poor cannot accumulate capital, so these people cannot increase their income over time. As Jalan 
and Ravallion (2000) pointed out, these permanent failures in the allocation of endowments would 
be associated with insufficient welfare-generating assets that persist over time (i.e., land or human 
capital). Transitory poverty may be associated only with temporary allocation failures, frequently 
associated with short-term financial shocks (e.g., losing a partner or a job), which have a negative 
impact on the accumulation of capital but do not permanently annul the accumulation process.108  
To empirically identify chronic and transitory poverty, one of the most often-used approaches 
focuses on permanent allocation failures. Yaqub (2003) called it the “component” approach.109 This 
                                                
108 Shocks are events outside the direct control of the household and may have either negative or positive impacts on the 
well-being of the household. 
109 This author identified a second approach, which he called the “spell” approach. This approach focuses directly on the 
period-by-period experiences of poor families and especially on the time spent in poverty. See Bane and Ellwood (1986) for 
an application of this approach. 
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approach defines chronic and transitory poverty in the following way. At time t, ity  is the measure 
of income for household i. Let P  be the poverty measure (e.g., the headcount ratio), and I denote 
the vector of income for household i by ),...,,( 21 iTii yyyy =  with Tt ,...,1= . Once I used a 
poverty line to identify the poor, the poverty measure that aggregates the poor at any given point in 
time is )( ityP . Following Jalan and Ravallion (2000), I define inter-temporal total poverty iP , 
chronic poverty iC , and transitory poverty iT  as 
 
∑
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As we note, the component approach defines a household’s permanent welfare as the inter-
temporal average of its income ( iy ), which can be interpreted as an indicator of capital 
accumulation over time in the sense that a higher average indicates greater accumulation. Total 
poverty is simply the average of the poverty measures obtained at each time with the respective 
yearly income. Chronic poverty is then identified when a household’s inter-temporal average 
income lies below the absolute poverty line, and transitory poverty is defined as the difference 
between chronic poverty and total poverty. Put differently, chronic poverty persists in inter-temporal 
mean income, which is lower than the absolute poverty line. Transitory poverty can be attributed to 
inter-temporal variability in income of individuals that experience poverty in some time point. As 
Ravallion and Jalan pointed out (1998: 339), a household whose mean income is above the poverty 
line cannot be chronically poor under this definition but may still experience transitory poverty. 
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In this study I use the component approach to identify chronic and transitory poverty. The 
reason is that this approach provides a framework to study factors associated with chronic and 
transitory poverty. As stated above, chronic poverty may be associated with low capital and 
transitory poverty may be related to shocks. Furthermore, this distinction makes it possible to 
compare my results with those of other studies about chronic and transitory poverty in Latin 
America and the Caribbean (Cruces & Wodon 2004).  
Drawing upon the aforementioned concepts, a typology of chronic and transitory poor can be 
developed (Jalan & Ravallion 2000). The first group concerns people who are never poor. 
Furthermore, households that are poor at some point in time can be divided into three mutually 
exclusive groups. First, there are the persistent poor, who are poor at every time point; these 
households have positive chronic poverty by definition. Second, there are those that are not poor at 
every time point but are still chronically poor in the sense that their mean income is below the 
poverty line. For example, in the case of a panel with two waves, such as the data of this study, this 
second group is composed of individuals with mean income below the poverty line that are poor in 
wave 1 or in wave 2, but not in both time points. Third, there are those that are the transitory poor. 
The mean income of this group is above the poverty line, but they are sometimes poor. My 
estimation with the Chilean panel indicates that 76% of working-age population is never poor, 5% is 
chronic/persistent poor, 4% is chronic/not always poor, and 15% regards only transitory poor.110  
To measure the concepts of chronic and transitory poverty formulated in (4.2) and (4.3), the 
headcount ratio and the squared poverty gap are the aggregate poverty indexes used in the 
literature (Goebel & Kuchler 2003, Jenkins & Hill 2001). On the basis of these indexes, scholars use 
two measures of chronic and transitory poverty. Using the squared poverty gap, studies develop 
indexes of chronic and transitory poverty that are typically used as dependent variables in 
regression analysis (Cruces & Wodon 2004, Jalan & Ravallion 2000, Muller 2003). These indexes 
are continuous variables with zero for people who are never poor. A second measure is a 
categorical variable, in which the categories refer to the groups of the typology above described. To 
measure the typology, however, the headcount ratio is used. More specifically, the individuals are 
                                                
110 For details of the construction of these groups, see Appendix 3. 
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classified into the typology using the poverty line and the mean income of each person. Moreover, 
to estimate the portion of members in each category of the typology, scholars apply the headcount 
ratio. In this study, I use the indexes to analyze the impact of transfers on chronic and transitory 
poverty because the continuous scale of these measures makes the analysis of causal effect 
easier. The typology is used only in descriptive analysis.111  
Regardless of the differences between indexes and the measure of typology, both kinds of 
indicators are connected in some respects. The chronic poor (i.e., always poor and not always 
poor) have scores in the index of chronic poverty by definition. They should also present scores in 
the index of transitory poverty if their income varies over time. The transitory poor, however, must 
show scores only in the index of transitory poverty.  
 
4.3.2. The Effect of Social Assistance Transfers on Chronic and Transitory Poverty 
 
To understand the effect of social policy on poverty, it is useful to distinguish between the different 
kinds of social policy that exist. The reason relies on the fact that different social policies may have 
different impacts on poverty status. A standard distinction in the literature regards the classification 
of social policies between services (e.g., public education and health) and transfers. In this study, I 
focus on social assistance transfers as a particular kind of social policy, namely cash payments 
provided on the basis of a means test that help households cope with social risks, with financing 
based on non-contributory funding (Chapter 1). The reason behind this research decision is that 
social assistance is the type of public transfer with the strongest focus on poverty reduction. 
Moreover, this is typically associated with disincentive effects in the literature (for an overview, 
Fouarge 2004). Finally, in this study, I use data collected from household surveys, and this type of 
source does not typically provide accurate information on services. 
In such a context, the explanation of the effects of social assistance transfers on chronic and 
transitory poverty includes two aspects. First, as stated above, the size, targeting, and duration of 
social assistance transfers may have different effects on poverty status over time. Second, the 
impact of each of these dimensions on chronic and transitory poverty works through the change of 
                                                
111 I discuss other methodological advantages of indexes in the methodological section of this study (Section 4.5.1). 
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the productive investment and the work effort of the actors. Standard models in the economics 
literature typically focus on the effect of transfer size and targeting, and they state that social 
transfers may be associated with disincentives regarding the productive investment and work effort 
of the poor. Although these models discuss transfers in general terms, they are useful in explaining 
the effect of social assistance transfers on both actions. In this vein, I will explain these standard 
economic models in the rest of the section, focusing on the roles of the three dimensions of social 
assistance transfers. Furthermore, I will use this theoretical explanation to derive a prognosis for the 
case of Chile. 
 
(a) Productive Investment  
 
The theoretical effect of transfers on productive investment is ambiguous. One of the standard 
explanations of transfers’ effect on the investment behavior of the poor concerns, so to say, the 
“obvious” model (Danziger et al. 1981: 982). This model focuses on savings as a mechanism that 
explains the causal effect of transfers on productive investment. Following Engel’s law, this model 
assumes that the poor tend to allocate a greater percentage of their resources to consumption.112 
Thus, the poor may use the transfers for consumption, not for savings. 
Productive investment is a form that the savings can take in the sense that the saved 
resources can be invested by being used to produce capital. In other words, a lower savings rate is 
assumed to yield a lower investment rate. The “obvious” model states that the poor do not use 
transfers for productive investment because they do not save them. Mookherjee (2006) extended 
this hypothetical effect of transfers on productive investment in a dynamic context. He stated that 
chronic poverty is self-perpetuating because all of the current resources of individuals who live in 
this situation are consumed and that there are no resources to save and to invest in capital. In this 
situation, the transfers would not improve the economic status of the chronic poor. 
In spite of this model does not assume a clear entitlement principle in providing benefits, we 
can note that the model considers lower-income segment as target of welfare programs. 
Furthermore, because it works in a static context, the duration of transfers does not play any role in 
                                                
112 Engel’s law points out that, with a given set of tastes and preferences, as income rises, the proportion of income spent on 
food falls.  
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the “obvious” model. By contrast, the size of transfers is relevant because, without size, there are 
no transfers. However, the “obvious” model does not state a size threshold. It only says that any 
additional sources of income may be used by the poor for their consumption, holding their unit value 
constant. However, using the logic of the subjective expected utility theory, I can show that this 
aspect is a failure of the “obvious” model because a larger transfer may be an incentive to invest. 
Following sociological versions of this theory (Esser 1999), the decision to invest in the 
acquisition of capital is determined by three basic factors: investment motivation, investment 
opportunities (i.e., the probability of success of the investment), and investment cost. We can 
explain the impact of transfer size on productive investment in terms of how benefits are associated 
with these three factors. The most obvious impact regards cost, which should decline with the 
monetary size of benefits. The relevance of the size threshold also concerns opportunities in the 
sense that increases in the size of transfers will increase the probability of success of the 
investment. In other words, small transfers may be not related to the decision to invest because it 
does not improve the opportunities to invest in a new resource.113  
To predict the effect of transfers on poverty, which works through this mechanism, it is 
necessary to distinguish between different types of capital. The effect would be associated with 
lower poverty when the transfers improve access to financial or human capital. This effect of 
transfer size on productive investment is relevant for chronic and transitory poverty. Regarding 
chronic poverty, any public program that sufficiently increases the poor’s access to economic or 
human capital breaks the trap and allows productive opportunities to emerge from poverty. 
Regarding transitory poverty, transfers may decrease this type of poverty because the social 
benefits mitigate the consumption shortfalls caused by the worst events. Thus, shock does not force 
households to focus on avoiding risk and the transitory poor can make an effort to accumulate 
capital.  
However, the effect of transfers via improvement of opportunities would be also associated 
with a higher level of poverty in the case of poor women. As Kearney (2004) pointed out, programs 
                                                
113 Esser (1999) made a theoretical distinction by which we can understand in detail the relationship between transfers and 
opportunities of investment. The author argued that opportunities involve both access to the kind of capital in which we want 
to invest and the efficiency. Holding this last factor constant, the theory says that the more access there is, the higher the 
probability of success of the investment is. As becomes evident, transfers may have a positive impact on investment as long 
as the transfers improve the access.  
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will raise poverty and welfare dependency because they promote social assistance as a “lifestyle” in 
which women have multiple births, both to increase their income and to prolong their stay in social 
assistance and, in turn, to live in poverty. This last explanatory mechanism finds a theoretical 
foundation in Becker’s (1981) model of the family. Becker (1981) used the cost of having children 
and real income to explain the effect of government programs on the demand for children. Using 
the example of welfare programs, such as Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) in the 
U.S.A., this author argued that a program providing aid to mothers with dependent children may 
provide incentives to fertility if the intervention reduces the cost of having an additional child.  
To explain the impact of transfers on productive investment, the last relevant determinant is the 
poor’s motivation to invest. In spite of the effect that transfer size may have on costs and 
opportunities, the overall impact on investment may be negative on the grounds of this last 
component. A collection of cultural models typically emphasizes that distinct values, aspirations and 
psychological characteristics of the poor inhibit their achievement and produce behavioral 
deviances that are likely to reproduce poverty. These cultural models are known in the literature of 
poverty as the culture of poverty or underclass theory (Auletta 1982, Lewis 1968, Wilson 1990). In 
the vein of these cultural models, some economic models relate the poor’s distinctive motivation 
and productive investment. These models suggest that the poor are more risk-averse than the other 
income segments (Banerjee 2004, Lipton 1968, Ravallion 1988, Sorensen 2000). If individuals are 
extremely averse to risk, they will choose low risk/return activities such as remaining in persistent 
poverty even though lower costs and increasing opportunities are associated with the provision of 
transfers. The findings of much empirical studies are, however, inconsistent with these models. 
There is little evidence that distinctive motivational characteristics inhibit productive investment 
among poor individuals (Banerjee & Newman 1994, Corcoran et al. 1985).  
 
(b) Work Effort 
 
As argued above, scholars define chronic and transitory poverty in terms of productive investment 
failures. However, scholars in advanced nations also have argued that work effort is a mechanism 
that may generate poverty persistence over time (Vobruba 2004). To explain this mechanism, 
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studies have used the standard static leisure-income diagram (e.g. Grogger & Karoly 2005). This 
economic model assumes a targeting of transfers in favor of low-income groups because it 
considers a threshold of earning that defines the eligibility for programs. Above this “break-even 
income,” individuals become ineligible. Furthermore, the leisure-income diagram is static, so it does 
not consider duration or time limits on benefits.114  
Regarding the size of transfers, the static leisure-income diagram states that the effect of a 
welfare program on work effort operates through two effects. The first is the income effect of 
transfer size; that is, an increase in transfer size operates like an increase in unearned income, 
which might reduce hours of work. The second effect pertains to tax earnings, which are typically 
used in the design of welfare programs in developed countries. To illustrate this second effect, the 
classic example in the literature is the AFDC program in the U.S.A. (Friedman 2002). In its original 
formulation, this social assistance program considered an earnings tax of 100 percent. Following 
the standard economic model and assuming that the size of transfers guarantees a subsistence 
level, beneficiaries of AFDC will choose social assistance as way of life even if they are capable of 
work because the difference between social assistance and wages at this rate is insignificant. Thus, 
welfare programs may produce a “poverty trap” or chronic poverty. Further reforms of American 
social assistance decreased the earning tax to progressively cut the benefits as earnings go up 
(Gruber 2007). 
Perry et al. (2007) posited a possible and particular disincentive effect on work effort 
associated with social assistance transfers that is particularly relevant in Latin American nations. In 
these welfare states, social assistance provides cash payments to the poor without requirements 
related to contributory charges. In such a context, these authors have argued that benefits may be 
creating disincentives to formalization of the workforce as the beneficiaries face excessive transfer 
burdens of contributory programs when they find formal employment. Put differently, increasing 
social assistance generosity would be associated not with long-term unemployment, as in advanced 
nations, but with informal labor spells. 
                                                
114 The standard static leisure-income model depends on others assumptions such as utility maximization and absence of 
information asymmetry. See Grogger and Karoly (2005) for an excellent discussion of these assumptions in the context of 
reforms of the American welfare state.  
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To sum up my theoretical explanation of the effect of cash payments on poverty, a social 
assistance program can be described using three dimensions: size, targeting, and duration. Each of 
these dimensions may affect poverty indirectly through two explanatory mechanisms: productive 
investment and work effort. While the theoretical predictions are ambiguous with respect to the 
effect of government programs on productive investment, the standard economic model suggests a 
negative impact of transfers on the work effort of the beneficiaries which, in turn, may increase 
poverty persistence. Furthermore, in spite of the particular mechanism that is affected by the 
government transfers, the size of the benefits and their targeting appear to be pivotal dimensions of 
benefits in cash that must be taken into account. Evidence for the influence of benefit’s duration on 
poverty is scarce. Theoretical models assume that the benefits are targeted to the poor—
particularly the economic model of work effort, which explicitly considers means-testing in favor of 
the lower-income segment. Regarding the effect of transfer size on work effort, beneficiaries would 
prefer not to work and, thus, to live on social assistance only when the transfer size guarantees a 
subsistence level. Scholars have suggested that this subsistence level could represent a poverty 
line and, thus, individuals may reduce their labor supply to become poor or to persist in poverty and 
qualify for cash welfare (Gruber 2007).  
As becomes evident from my theoretical framework, transfers affect not poverty per se but also 
poverty over time, particularly persistence and, thus, chronic poverty. In the following section, I 
study these benefit effects in Chile. More specifically, to derive a prognosis for chronic and 
transitory poverty in this welfare state, I will apply the theoretical framework developed above to 
describe Chilean social assistance on the dimensions of size, targeting, and duration of benefits. 
Drawing on this information, I will discuss the impact of social assistance transfers on chronic and 
transitory poverty in Chile, and then hypotheses will be formulated.   
 
4.4 Social Assistance Programs in Chile and Hypotheses 
 
In Latin America and the Caribbean, the Chilean welfare state was characterized as pioneer in 
providing welfare to the citizens, which results in significant social policy development in the 20th 
century (Chapter 2). This picture persisted over the period from 2000–2006. Moreover, most social 
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expenditures are associated with services and social insurance transfers. More specifically, in 2003, 
the public spending of the Chilean welfare state on education, health, and social insurance 
accounted for about 14% of the GDP, whereas social assistance spending comprised 0.7% (Lindert 
et al. 2006). 
 
Table 4.1.  Social assistance programs of the Chilean welfare state 
 
Program Size Target Duration 
    
Family Subsidy (SUF) Between 6 and 12 US 
dollars per month per 
recipient in 2003, and it is 
indexed to inflation(a) 
Low income households 
which cannot satisfy basic 
needs of child. The 
beneficiaries are not 
covered by social insurance. 
Eligibility is determined by 
CAS card. 
The benefit lasts until the 
recipients are 18 years 
old. 
    
Assistance Pensions 
(PASIS)(b) 
Because the number of 
subsidies available to each 
region is fixed by the Social 
Security Commission, the 
cut-off score varies by 
region (and, potentially, by 
county). In 2003, the benefit 
totalled 65 US dollars per 
month for the physically 
disabled and twice that 
amount for the mentally 
disabled; it is indexed to 
inflation. 
Pensions for adults aged 65 
and over, physically- 
disabled adults, and 
mentally disabled-individuals 
regardless of age who have 
a total income below half of 
the minimum pension 
allowance. Eligibility is 
determined by CAS card. 
The benefit lasts until the 
death of the recipient. 
However, there are 
causes to stop the 
benefit even if the 
recipient lives, which are 
determined by law 
number 20255. 
    
Chile Solidario During the first phase of the 
program, beneficiaries 
receive a monthly payment 
that decreases from 15 to 6 
US dollars over 24 months 
(2003 rates).  
Indigent and high-risk 
households, particularly 
those with female heads. 
Eligibility is determined by 
the CAS card. 
After two years, 
beneficiaries who have 
successfully completed 
the counselling program 
are automatically 
enrolled in the SUF 
program for up to 36 
months. 
    
Water and Sewage Subsidy 
(SAP) 
This subsidy covers 
between 20% and 85% of 
the cost of water for up to 15 
cubic meters per month. It is 
a monthly discount that 
appears on the water’s bill. 
Poor households, which are 
identified by the CAS card. 
Three years, if 
requirements persist. 
    
Unemployment In 2003, the benefit was 25 
US dollars the first 3 
months, decreasing to 17 for 
the next three months and to 
13 the last 6 months of 
eligibility. 
Unemployed that had formal 
employment for at least 52 
weeks during the previous 
two years(c) and not having 
rejected job opportunities 
offered by the National 
Training and Employment 
Service or the county 
government. 
A decreasing monthly 
payment for up to 12 
months for individuals 
who lost work through no 
fault of their own. 
 
Note: The proxy means test “CAS card” was replaced in 2006 by a new means test, which is called Ficha de Proteccion 
Social. 
    (a): In 2003, US$ 1 = 691.41 Chilean currency on average. 
    (b): Changes in the type of benefits were introduced in 2009. 
    (c): For self-employed workers, eligibility is based on 12 consecutive months of contributions to social security in the 
previous two years. 
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Table 4.1 shows most of the programs, which include the Chilean system of social assistance 
transfers, by the size of benefits to individual recipients, targeting, and duration.115 The Chilean 
social assistance programs aim to alleviate poverty through monetary benefits. The main programs 
are pensions (PASIS) for old and disabled adults and the Family Subsidy (SUF), which is a per-
child transfer for households without social insurance.116 The other benefits include unemployment 
payments, subsidies for water consumption, and income transfers that are paid to the beneficiaries 
of the Chile Solidario program. 
Most of the programs are currently targeted through a “proxy means test” called the Ficha de 
Proteccion Social.117 First implemented in 2006, it is the successor of the Ficha de Caracterizacion 
Socioeconomica (CAS card). Both proxy means tests are forms that benefit applicants have to fill 
out asking about the socioeconomic characteristics of the household. In these instruments, the 
household is treated as unit of analysis.118 The CAS card measured the socioeconomic 
characteristics by 13 variables, which were then reduced to four components: housing, education, 
occupation, and income/patrimony (Larrañaga 2005). The means test is applied by municipal civil 
servants, who are the administrative units of the Chilean welfare state at the level of communes. On 
the basis of this test, an index of unsatisfied basic needs is developed as a result of the weighted 
sum of components. All households whose scores in that index are below a predetermined 
threshold are considered beneficiaries.119 The threshold varies across communes and regions with 
the goal of reflecting differences in the poverty levels across different geographic areas. As a result 
of this targeting strategy, the main programs target low-income groups, especially individuals who 
cannot work due to age (i.e., a child or senior citizen) or disability.120  
                                                
115 There are other small social assistance programs that are not systematically provided by the Chilean welfare state over 
time. Furthermore, I have not included information on the Asignacion Familiar family benefit because it is a social insurance 
program, and I am analyzing social assistance benefits. Only workers—who are affiliated with the Chilean social insurance 
system—can get this benefit.  
116 Social insurance coverage in Chile is limited to individuals who participate in the formal labor market. 
117 A proxy means test does not measure income itself. Rather, it is an instrument that captures the socioeconomic status of 
applicants by generating a score based on fairly easy to observe characteristics of households, such as the location and 
quality of its dwelling or ownership of durable goods. Contrasting with a proxy means test, a means test directly evaluates 
the income of applicants (Larrañaga 2005).  
118 The proxy means test of Chilean social assistance defines a household as a person or a group of people who: 1) lives in 
the same residence, 2) recognizes itself as a family, and 3) presents monetary income (Larrañaga 2005).  
119 The threshold is not the official poverty line in Chile, which is measured in Chilean currency, the peso. The threshold is 
measured in terms of the scale of the index obtained on the basis of the means test. However, the threshold should also 
identify individuals who cannot meet basic subsistence needs.  
120 A beneficiary actualized the scores that he obtains in for the proxy means test “CAS card” every two years. For the new 
proxy means test, “Ficha de Proteccion Social,” the actualization is conducted each month. 
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The targeting of Chilean social assistance transfers makes it clear that, in comparison with 
welfare programs in advanced nations, earned labor income does not progressively reduce the size 
of the transfer through benefit reductions.121 Rather, Chilean social assistance benefits are cut if the 
score on the proxy means test rises above the threshold that defines eligibility for benefits. Because 
the proxy means test targets the poor households, this means that, if a household leaves poverty, 
this also leaves social assistance. Moreover, to evaluate the generosity of the transfer size, we can 
use the urban Chilean poverty line or minimum salary!as a criterion of minimum subsistence. The 
poverty line was approximately US$68 in 2001, and the minimum salary was US$167 in 2003. The 
information in Table 4.1 suggests that the unit value of each social assistance program in Chile is 
below both thresholds.  
Information of Chilean social assistance about the proportion of social assistance benefits in 
the total household income sheds additional light on the size of social assistance benefits. For the 
lowest income decile (tenth of income distribution), social assistance transfers represents 26.3% of 
the total household income in 2006. The proportion decreases to 8.1% and 5.0% for the next two 
deciles (MIDEPLAN 2007b). In advanced nations, empirical studies define welfare dependency as 
counting on welfare income to make up more than one-half of a household’s total income (Duncan 
1984, Fouarge 2004). Thus, the findings for Chile suggest that the generosity of social assistance in 
this welfare state is away from standard criteria to define welfare dependency. Overall, the size of 
the benefits indicates that social assistance transfers per se do not guarantee minimum subsistence 
in Chile. 
Finally, there is a high level of heterogeneity in the duration of the programs. They cover large 
periods in the cases of SUF and PASIS benefits, but the duration is more restricted in the other 
cases.  
 
Hypotheses 
 
Drawing upon the description of Chilean social assistance, I derive hypotheses about the indirect 
impact of social assistance transfers on chronic and transitory poverty in Chile. In order to derive 
                                                
121 In 2011, the Chilean government implemented a new type of social assistance transfer called “Ingreso Etico Familiar.” 
This government program considers the disincentive effect in its design. 
164 
 
the hypotheses, I formulate a set of assumptions whose validity I attempt to document by 
discussing references in the literature and, in doing so, to show their plausibility. However, it is 
important to say that, due to lack of data, they cannot be thoroughly tested in Chile. Instead of 
dropping these assumptions, I include them, though, because they seem relevant for the theoretical 
derivation of hypotheses. Moreover, evidence in the literature confirms the plausibility of some 
assumptions. 
A beneficiary of Chilean social assistance is a person who lives in a household that receives 
any type of social assistance transfers. Drawing on this definition, my argument particularly 
discusses the size of benefits to recipient households and the targeting that characterizes cash 
benefits of Chilean social assistance. The deduction of hypotheses depends on two key 
assumptions. First is the cost of capital decline as income increases. It follows that capital is 
expensive for the poor. For physical capital, this is evident. Machines and technology require a high 
level of monetary investment. However, this is also the case for human capital in Chile, where 
households finance a large portion of education, particularly post-secondary education, which is the 
most important barrier to social mobility in this country (Torche 2005). This suggests that the 
Chilean poor have less incentive to invest in this type of education than do the wealthy because the 
costs are higher for the poor than for high-income segments.  
Social assistance transfers do not substantively modify this situation because, as stated above, 
the size of benefits for recipients is small, at least to guarantee minimum subsistence. Low 
generosity cannot do very much to improve the opportunities and costs of investing in physical and 
human capital by the poor.122 The impact of transfers on motivation should also be marginal. 
Overall, the effect of social assistance transfers on the productive investment of the beneficiaries 
should be insignificant in the Chilean welfare state, regardless of poverty status over time. 
In contrast with productive investment, social assistance transfers may affect work effort, but 
only for the chronic poor. More specifically, for this type of deprivation, being the beneficiary of 
social assistance may create incentives to work in the informal sector.123 By doing so, social 
                                                
122 The small size of benefits also suggests a marginal impact of transfers on the cost of having a child as social assistance 
transfers per se do not guarantee minimum subsistence (Section 4.3.2). 
123 In this study, I stress a legalistic or social protection notion of informality. In this vein, following Gasparini and Tornarolli 
(2007: 4), an informal worker is one “whose labor relationship is not subject to labor legislation and tax rules, and has no 
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assistance should increase chronic poverty. This effect should be particularly relevant for two 
groups, the persistent poor and chronic poor, who do not originally live in poverty but may change 
their labor supply to become poor and qualify for cash benefits.124 According to Gruber (2007), this 
latter group includes individuals with income in proximity to the poverty line. In the case of Chile, 
Larrañaga and Herrera (2008) show that an increase of the poverty line by 44 percent in 2006 
results in an increase of the percentage of poor by nearly 100 percent, from 14.3 to 28 percent. This 
finding suggests that a significant portion of the Chilean population lives in proximity to the poverty 
line.   
The explanation of the effect of social assistance transfers on work effort regards a second key 
assumption in my argument. This assumption refers to incentives associated with cash benefits in 
the sense that beneficiaries do not pay contributions and do not lose cash benefits provided by the 
state if they work in the informal sector. This assumption makes sense in Chile, where the payment 
of individual contributions is mandatory for workers with labor contracts. In fact, the welfare system 
requires employees to make a 10% contribution towards pensions and 7% towards a health 
program (Cox 2002). Moreover, working in the informal sector is not a targeting requirement to 
apply for benefits of Chilean social assistance. As previously mentioned, entitlement is determined 
on the basis of a summary index of household’s socioeconomic characteristics.125 
As becomes evident, the second assumption entails two incentives. One regards the 
application for benefits. In applying for cash welfare, the chronic poor get benefits which, despite 
the small size, are free. By contrast, if members of chronic poor households search for jobs in the 
formal sector, they can also receive a bundle of benefits that must be paid for via individual 
contributions. The second incentive refers to the informal work effort. Beneficiaries of social 
assistance can get or maintain informal jobs without losing the benefits. This second incentive 
associated with the cash payments thus means that social assistance rewards informal work effort. 
                                                                                                                                               
access to social protection or right to certain labor benefits”. On the basis of this definition, studies of Chilean labor market 
generally measure informality in terms of the proportion of workers without a formal labor contract (Contreras et al. 2008).  
124 In a panel with two waves, such as the instrument that I analyze in this study, a third group also comprises a part of 
chronic poverty: chronic poor living in poverty at the first time point but not at the second time point. Because I consider a 
transfer effect that raises incentives for individuals to become poor or to persist in poverty, my argument does not take into 
account this type of the chronic poor. For a discussion of the relevance of this latter group in the empirical analysis of this 
study, see Section 4.5.1.  
125 In CAS proxy means test, the weight of occupation in summary index is estimated by a scale of nine occupations. This 
scale does not measure informality.    
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Although these two incentives are theoretically different, they are strongly connected as incentives 
of benefits to work in the informal sector cannot emerge without the presence of incentives to 
qualify for cash welfare.    
Both incentives associated with social assistance should be particularly relevant for the chronic 
poor. The reason is that they face limited opportunities of getting a job in the formal sector. This 
association between chronic poverty and opportunities in the formal sector regards the human 
capital of this kind of poor. To obtain a formal job, human capital is a relevant source of 
opportunities in the sense that the higher the education level, the higher of individual’s productivity 
and, thus, the higher the chances of employment in the formal labor market. However, chronic 
poverty is associated with low levels of education (Addition et al. 2009, Barret et al. 2008, Cruces & 
Wodon 2004; see 4.6 for empirical evidence in Chile). It follows that the opportunities for the chronic 
poor in the formal sector may direct them toward the informal sector, insofar as the chronic poor 
have low human capital.  
Studies present some confirmative evidence of the association between human capital and 
informal work in Latin American countries (Gasparini & Tornarolli 2007, Perry et al. 2007). For Chile, 
Contreras et al. (2008) estimate that the informality rate in 2003, which defined as the share in 
employment of full-time workers without a labor contract, is 28.55 percent for workers with at least 
seven years of education. By contrast, it is only 8.05 percent for workers with twelve or more years 
of education. This finding lends more plausibility to the assumption about the opportunities of 
chronic poverty in the formal sector and their likelihood to get a job in the informal labor market.  
More specifically, for the chronically impoverished, limited opportunities may accentuate the 
incentive to apply for benefits since the scant opportunities in the formal sector may contribute to 
the value of social assistance benefits—although their low generosity—as a gain. To put it another 
way, due to low chances of getting a formal job and, thus, little opportunity to receive benefits based 
on personal contributions, the chronic poor may highly value free benefits. Furthermore, for the 
chronic poor, the limited alternatives in the formal sector also may accentuate the incentive effect of 
social assistance on informal work effort because the search costs associated with informal work 
are lower. This means that the chronic poor may already be in the informal sector during the 
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application for benefits or they already worked in such a segment of the labor market. Therefore, 
the time and energy that they spent on searching an informal job are low. Such a context should 
then accentuate the reward of informality associated with social assistance, insofar as it should be 
easier for the chronic poor to get or maintain informal jobs without losing the benefits. 
To understand the impact of social assistance transfers on chronic poverty, the incentive to 
work in the informal sector associated with social transfers is particularly relevant. By getting or 
maintaining an informal job, the chronic poor will find a source of resources, which may play a role 
as a subsistence strategy. In this way, informal work is relevant because it explains how can survive 
a beneficiary of social assistance when the size of benefits per se does not guarantee minimum 
subsistence. Furthermore, informal work explains how the effect of social assistance transfers on 
chronic poverty arises. Informality is a reflection of mechanisms that exclude individuals from social 
services and from economic opportunities through a segmented labor market that is characterized 
by unstable jobs and low coverage of many social insurance schemes. As a result of both kind of 
exclusions, informal-sector workers are often trapped in low-pay occupations (Perry et al. 2007). 
The empirical evidence supports this latter association. Contreras et al. (2008) show that the 
percentage of workers without labor contracts in Chile in 2003 clearly increased when the 
household income declined; such a rate was 50.7 percent in the lowest income decile (i.e., a tenth 
of the income distribution). Overall, exclusion associated with informal work thus suggests that 
informality would increase the risk of remaining in poverty.126 
In spite of the impact of social assistance benefits on poverty persistence through informal 
work efforts, it is important to say that this type of transfer has directly affected this type of poverty. 
To apply for cash payments, applicants have to declare low resources. It follows that if a beneficiary 
wants to maintain the benefits over time, he has to persist in low income.  
A similar effect of social assistance transfers on poverty status is expected for individuals with 
low capital—meaning an average income below the poverty line and, thus, chronically poor—who 
                                                
126 In Chile, studies indicate that the principal earner in the household is the head. Larrañaga (2005) shows that, in 2002, the 
principal earner in 70.9% of the low-income households was the head of household. It suggests that the positive impact of 
social assistance transfers on chronic poverty may arise through increasing the informal work effort of heads of household. 
Although social assistance transfers might affect only the labor supply of principal earners in the households, the effect of 
social assistance programs on the labor supply of principal earners should affect the welfare of any household member (e.g., 
children) because the household shares and uses common resources (Andress et al. 2006). 
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originally were not poor. For example, we assume two time points, 1 and 2. These consumers are 
not poor at time 1. However, such individuals are in the proximity of the benefit’s threshold. Due to 
the low level of capital, the risk of falling under such a threshold by time 2, however, should be high. 
In such a situation, transfers may raise incentives to apply for benefits. Following Gruber (2007), 
there are not big differences between the incomes of these individuals before and after poverty. Put 
differently, being poor does not mean a substantive change in socioeconomic status. In such a 
context, transfers incentive to become poor because, by applying for benefits, the applicants get 
cash payments that are free and thus gain income. It follows that this type of chronic poor may 
become poor to insure transfers as an additional source of income. Furthermore, they may go into 
the informal sector which, in turn, increases the likelihood that they may fall into the poverty trap.  
In sum, and recalling the main propositions of my argument, social assistance transfers in the 
Chilean welfare state are targeted to the poor and are characterized by small size of benefits for 
individual recipients. In spite of this latter aspect, I expect that cash payments of Chilean social 
assistance may be associated with incentives for the chronic poor to apply for benefits and to work 
in the informal sector. Doing so causes them to remain in poverty or to become poor. This 
observation leads to my first hypothesis: 
 
H1: Receiving social assistance transfers will increase chronic poverty. 
 
Members of households that experience poverty at some time point but whose capital is 
moderate—that is, they have an average income above the poverty line—are classified as the 
transitory poor. In contrast to the chronic poor, this type of poor may have better opportunities to 
invest and to obtain a formal job, insofar as, in comparison with chronic deprivation, transitory 
poverty is associated with higher capital—particularly human capital (Sections 4.3.1 and 4.6). It 
follows that social assistance transfers should not affect productive investment and work effort of 
transitory poor. 
More specifically, in respect to productive investment, better opportunities may imply that the 
transitory poor may profit from the alternatives to invest; they then become entrepreneurs and, in 
doing so, rise out poverty by increasing capital. Studies have confirmed that the transitory poor may 
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present productive investments. Dercon and Clarke (2009) suggested that the transitory poor may 
accumulate capital if the impact of shocks on their consumption is reduced by external aid, 
particularly government programs. This finding indicates, however, an additional point. Transfers 
may help to reduce transitory poverty. As stated above, the size of social assistance transfers 
assigned to individual beneficiaries is small in the Chilean welfare state. Hence, the role of benefits 
as external aid during shocks for the transitory poor should be marginal in this country.  
Regarding work effort, higher opportunities in the formal sector indicate that persons living in 
transitory poverty have less incentive to modify their behavior to qualify for cash benefits than do 
the chronic poor. Put differently, given the opportunities to get a formal job, they will recover even 
though they lose government benefits because the opportunity costs associated with social 
assistance and informality are high. For informality, the studies are clear on this point. The income 
that a worker would have earned if he gets a formal job instead is higher. Perry et al. (2007) shows, 
for instance, with data from Argentina, Bolivia, and the Dominican Republic, that informal salaried 
workers earned between 40 to 66 percent less than formal salaried employees in 2005. 
Furthermore, high opportunity costs associated with social assistance for the transitory poor rely on 
the fact that this type of poor can obtain greater benefits in the formal sector than as beneficiaries of 
social assistance, particularly when the generosity of social assistance transfers is low. This is of 
relevance in Chilean social insurance system, where benefits are a function of the accumulation of 
individual contributions of workers in the formal labor market (Cox 2002). Overall, the opportunities 
in the formal labor market and the associated opportunities costs for transitory poverty suggests 
that the elimination of this kind of deprivation is not crippled by incentive of social assistance to 
apply for cash welfare and to work in the informal sector.  
In spite of the focus of this study on the indirect effects of public transfers, transitory poverty 
may capture not only such impacts but also a direct effect. The concept of transitory poverty refers 
to inter-temporal variability in the consumption of any household, whether chronically or transitorily 
poor (Section 4.3.1). It follows that transfers may have a direct positive impact on the resources of 
the household by increasing the income and, in doing so, to smooth the effect of shocks that 
introduce income variations. Transfers may contribute to stabilize the income by replacing the 
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diminished income that is associated with some negative shock. As previously stated in the 
discussion about productive investments within transitory poverty, in Chile, the direct positive 
impact of public transfers on household resources should also be marginal because the size of the 
benefits is small. In sum, in line with this last expectation and my argument about the effect of social 
assistance transfers on the productive investment and work of the transitory poor, I state a second 
hypothesis:   
 
H2: Receiving social assistance transfers will not affect transitory poverty. 
 
I will include in the empirical models socioeconomic individual and household characteristics 
as control variables. Following the standard practice in the literature (e.g. Layte & Whelan 2003), I 
classify the socioeconomic variables as factors related to “needs” and “resources.” In general terms, 
it is assumed that individuals who live in households with severe needs will show a high level of 
chronic and transitory poverty. By contrast, I expect that the increase in resources will decrease 
both types of poverty.  
 
4.5. Research Design 
 
 
Variables and Data Sources 
 
 
The analyses of this study are based on data from waves of the Panel Survey of Households in 
Chile (“Encuesta Panel CASEN” or EPCASEN) for 1996, 2001, and 2006. This survey is based on 
the Encuesta de Caracterización Socioeconómica Nacional (CASEN) for 1996. EPCASEN identifies 
and surveys a sub-group of households of CASEN that were already surveyed in 1996 and 
interviewed again in 2001 and 2006 in the third, seventh, eighth, and metropolitan regions. These 
four regions represent close to 60% of the Chilean population.  
All descriptive statistics presented in this study are based on weighted data by using 
longitudinal enumerated individual weights, which correct for the attrition in 2001 and 2006 
(Bendezú et al. 2007). By contrast, following the norm in microeconometrics, I show only 
estimations of the effect of social assistance transfers, which are fitted without sample weights. 
However, the use of weights does not modify the conclusions of this study. 
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The evidence in advanced nations indicates that poverty and the role of government policies 
differ between working-age and older families (Valleta 2006). This picture is no different in the case 
of Chile.127 Given the well-targeted poverty in Chile, it is expected that the role of public transfers in 
the income package may be more important in the case of the older population because this social 
group is typically inactive. Due to this characteristic of older people, the implications of these 
government programs for poverty and income dynamics among the older population merit a 
separate study. In this study, I focus on poverty dynamics and policy among the working-age 
population, who are the sample members between 15 and 64 years old.  
Concerning the variables that are used in this study, to identify chronic and transitory poverty, I 
follow the component approach and work with monthly total household income after government 
transfers. I construct post-transfer household income as the sum of income from labor, assets, and 
private transfers plus public transfers.128 All incomes are measured in Chilean currency and in 2001 
prices using the official consumer price indexes provided by the Chilean government. Following the 
standard approach in studies of poverty dynamics, although the household is the unit of 
measurement of income, I examine chronic and transitory poverty for individuals.129 Regarding 
economies of scale in intra-household consumption, I use per-capita adjustment, which is the most 
frequently used method in Chile.130 Finally, non-response and missing incomes are alleviated by 
imputation procedures (Bendezú et al. 2007). 
To construct the indicators of chronic and transitory poverty, I use the Chilean national poverty 
line as defined by the Ministry of Planning and Cooperation—MIDEPLAN—(2007a). The Chilean 
government calculates an extreme poverty line that is based on the cost of a basic food bundle and 
a moderate poverty line computed from the extreme line by using the Engel/Orchansky ratio of food 
expenditures. The national poverty line refers to the moderate poverty threshold. As becomes 
evident, this is an absolute measure of poverty. Specifically, a person is poor when his/her per-
capita household income is lower than twice the value of a basic food bundle in urban areas and 
                                                
127  See MIDEPLAN (2007a). 
128 In comparison with the procedure of income construction in industrialized, Western OECD countries, taxes are not 
extracted from disposable income, which is obtained through socioeconomic surveys, in the case of Chile because the 
survey asks respondents for their net income.  
129  See OECD (2001) and the sources cited there. 
130 I discuss, in the analysis section, the results using equivalence scales. 
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1.75 times the value in rural areas. The poverty lines were calculated in 1987. In the following 
years, they were only adjusted with the inflation factor. In 2006, the values of the national poverty 
lines were 47,099 and 31,756 Chilean pesos per capita in urban and rural areas, respectively. 
Following the component approach, I analyze two indicators of chronic and transitory poverty: 
continuous indexes of both types of poverty and a categorical variable that measures the typology 
of chronic and transitory poor (Section 4.3.1). Regarding continuous indexes, following Jalan and 
Ravallion (2000), I estimate definitions (4.1), (4.2), and (4.3) of Section 4.3.1 with the squared 
poverty gap.131 These authors suggest using this latter measure because it takes inequality among 
the poor into account. Other measures, particularly the headcount ratio and poverty gap, ignore this 
inequality. To put it simply, the squared poverty gap ensures that the poverty measure decreases 
when there is a transfer from a poor person to an even poorer person and increases when there is 
a transfer from a very poor person to a less-poor person. The headcount ratio and poverty gap are 
insensitive to transfers among the poor (Foster et al. 1984). A disadvantage of the squared poverty 
gap is, however, that this index is very difficult to read and interpret.  
To estimate the continuous indexes of chronic and transitory poverty, I calculate the squared 
poverty gap for each household in 2001 and 2006. Because the incomes of households differ 
between the two years, the squared poverty gaps also vary from 2001 to 2006. While the index of 
chronic poverty focuses on the average of the squared poverty gaps for both years, the index of 
transitory poverty captures this variation of the squared poverty gap over time. This means that all 
households that experienced poverty in 2001 and/or 2006 may have a positive value for transitory 
poverty, even though they are chronically poor, as the incomes of households and their squared 
poverty gaps vary between 2001 and 2006. Thus, I can make an estimate regarding households 
that may have a positive value for both types of poverty.  
The measure scale of the indexes is continuous. The scale assigns values between zero and 
one, where 1 indicates the maximal level of poverty. A value of zero indicates that the individual 
does not contribute to either chronic or transitory poverty. These measures are useful in 
                                                
131 For incomes normalized by the poverty lines, the squared poverty gap is defined as P(yit) = (1-yit)*(1-yit) if yit < 1 and P(yit) 
= 0 otherwise. P(yit) is the squared poverty gap and yit is the income for household i in time t. In Appendix 3, I provide an 
illustration of the way in which I obtained chronic and transitory poverty measures for concrete cases of the Chilean panel.  
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decomposing poverty into both components. However, because the squared poverty gap is used to 
calculate the indexes, particular numbers of chronic and transitory poverty measures are very 
difficult to interpret. Further research about measures of poverty over time should solve this 
problem. 
Regarding regression analysis, one of the advantages of the component approach using 
continuous indexes of chronic and transitory poverty is that the estimation of causal effect avoids 
the problem associated with the comparison across groups within samples associated with models 
of categorical dependent variables (Allison 1999).132 Further, given the use of the squared poverty 
gap, the scale of the variables for chronic and transitory poverty is the same; it is between one and 
zero. Thus, the method makes it possible to compare the effects of an independent variable for both 
poverty statuses. 
One of the disadvantages of numeric indexes, such as continuous measures of chronic and 
transitory poverty, concerns the presentation of descriptive information, such as proportions. To 
overcome this problem, I show in the following section descriptive information using the typology of 
the chronic and transitory poor of Jalan and Ravallion (2000), which is explained in Section 4.3.1, 
as a second indicator of chronic and transitory poverty. In contrast with the continuous measures of 
chronic and transitory poverty, to identify the portions of individuals in these four groups, the 
headcount ratio should be used.133  
Indexes and typology are related. These relations are of particular relevance for analysis 
involving the index of chronic poverty. Two groups of the typology are considered in this index: 
persistent poor—including individuals living in poverty in 2001 and 2006—and those who were poor 
in 2001 or in 2006 and their mean incomes over time is below the poverty line.134 My argument 
derivates an effect of social assistance transfers only for the persistent poor and the chronically 
                                                
132 Allison (1999) argued that the comparisons of logit and probit coefficients across groups can be invalid. Logit and probit 
models force the residual part of the variance to be fixed. This has a largely unnoticed implication in the literature. 
Differences in the degree of residual variation across groups can produce differences in the coefficients that are biased. I 
discuss this problem of models for categorical dependent variables in detail in Appendix 3.    
133 It is important to say that I use this typology only for descriptive analysis. In comparison with the continuous measures of 
chronic and transitory poverty, the typology has the following disadvantages. First, the typology ignores inequality among the 
poor, as this statistic is estimated on the basis of the headcount ratio. Furthermore, because of its categorical nature, the use 
of typology as a dependent variable implies that we have to compare the effects of transfers across the categories of the 
typology by using a logit or probit model. As stated in note 132, this may produce biased estimates.      
134 For the chronic poor themselves, the estimates with the Chilean panel indicate that fifty-eight percent are regarded as 
persistent poor, twelve percent were poor only in 2006, and thirty percent were poor only in 2001. 
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deprived who become poor (i.e., the chronic poor that experience poverty only in 2006). In spite of 
my theoretical argument considering only these two groups, the index of chronic poverty that is 
used in the analysis of this study also considers the chronic poor with poverty information in 2001 
who left poverty by 2006. I included this group to avoid the problem of selection bias that may have 
emerged as a result of the exclusion of the group from the analysis. Furthermore, I improved the 
efficiency of the estimations by using more information. Besides the advantages of the analysis with 
the complete sample, most of the chronic poor are persistent or became poor in 2006 and, thus, 
excluding them should not modify the substantive findings.135 With respect to transitory poverty, I 
also use the complete sample to examine the impact of benefits because my theoretical argument 
considers not only the group of typology composed of only transitory poor but also inter-temporal 
variability, which may come from either the chronic or transitory poor (Hypothesis 2). 
Table 4.2 gives the descriptive statistics of the dependent and independent variables. I 
construct measures of chronic and transitory poverty by using a balanced panel sample of 6,636 
individuals for 2001 and 2006. The sample size without missing any variable used in the regression 
models is 6,146. A standard procedure in studies that analyze determinants of chronic and 
transitory poverty is to limit the explanatory variables to characteristics observed in the initial year 
(OECD 2001). This means, in my case, working with the transfer values and the rest of the 
independent variables for 2001. However, this strategy may introduce bias in the estimation of the 
causal effect of my treatment variable (i.e., transfers) because the rest of the independent variables 
could be affected by the treatment. To avoid post-treatment bias, I include only the indicator of 
transfers and age in the 2001 values. The rest of the independent variables are the characteristics 
of members of the sample for 2001 and 2006, but their values are for 1996.  
The social assistance transfers are defined as a dummy variable in which 1 indicates whether 
the person lives in a household that receives any type of social assistance transfers, which Table 
4.2 illustrates.136 I identify this person as a “beneficiary” of Chilean social assistance. As become 
evident, this operationalization means that I measured social assistance transfers as a household 
                                                
135 In Table A3.5 of Appendix 3, I present a regression analysis only for the persistent poor and the chronic poor who lived in 
poverty only in 2006. As expected, the findings verify the results of the analysis with the complete sample of the chronic 
poor.  
136 My variable of social assistance transfers does not include the benefits of the Chile Solidario program because it began in 
2002. 
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characteristic that is imputed to individuals. This makes sense for Chilean social assistance, where 
the household is treated as a unit of analysis by the means-testing (See section 4.4). Furthermore, 
this operationalization has two advantages. First, I explicitly identify the treatment (individuals who 
receive benefits) and control (individuals who do not receive social assistance transfers) groups. 
Second, it is simple to identify the average treatment effect when we analyze the treatment and 
control groups. One disadvantage of this operationalization of social assistance transfers is that I do 
not analyze the impacts of particular social assistance programs on chronic and transitory poverty. 
Future research should deal with these effects.   
 
Table 4.2. Means and standard deviations of variables used in the analysis (unweighted N=6,146) 
 
Variable 
 
 Mean SD 
   
Indicator of poverty (continuous indexes)   
Total poverty  0.019 0.062 
Chronic poverty  0.009 0.046 
Transitory poverty  0.010 0.036 
   
Social assistance transfers (ref: non beneficiary)   
 Beneficiary   0.165 0.371 
   
Geographical area (ref: urban)   
 Rural 0.117 0.3216 
   
Indicator of resources   
Education (ref: secondary or higher)   
 Primary or lower 0.338 0.473 
Number of employed in household 1.786 1.029 
Employment status (ref: employee or inactive)   
 Unemployed 0.032 0.177 
Age    
 In years 35.866 11.949 
 In squared years 1,089.491 772.900 
Gender  of household head (ref: male)   
 female 0.175 0.379 
Marital status (ref: married)   
 Unmarried partners 0.068 0.252 
 Divorced 0.031 0.174 
 Widowed 0.009 0.094 
 Single 0.432 0.495 
   
Housing   
 Own property 0.716 0.450 
 Bad quality construction 0.019 0.138 
   
Indicator of needs    
Share of household members 0-5 0.095 0.136 
Share of household members 6-14 0.174 0.179 
Share of household members 65+ 0.038 0.105 
   
Notes: Data are weighted by longitudinal weights. Social assistance transfers and age are measured for 2001, the rest of 
independent variables are measured for 1996. Source: Survey Panel CASEN. 
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Unfortunately, the Chilean Panel does not include the scores of the means test (CAS card) by 
which an individual was selected as a beneficiary of Chilean social assistance (Section 4). To 
estimate the causal effect of social transfers, this variable is very important because it is the factor 
that determines assignation into the treatment (beneficiary) and control (non-beneficiary) groups. By 
using CAS scores as an independent variable, I can control for this selection procedure. To 
overcome this potential problem, I examine the impact of a large number of indicators that measure 
the set of dimensions on which CAS scores are elaborated. Most of these are excluded from the 
final model to avoid problems of multicollinearity and to enhance the clarity of my presentation. It 
should be emphasized, however, that none of the controls that are excluded from final model alter 
the substantive results.137   
The final specification incorporates the following set of indicators that operationalize the 
resources and needs of the individual or the household in which he lives. The first indicator is the 
educational attainment of the respondent; it is included as a dummy variable in which 1 
corresponds to a primary or lower education. I also controlled for the characteristics of housing as 
an indicator of physical capital. I included an indicator of the type of housing property, which is a 
dummy variable such that a rating of 1 reflects that the respondent has his own house or flat. 
Furthermore, an indicator of housing quality is also used as a control variable. In this last case, 1 
indicates that the respondent lives in a poor-quality structure.138 Age in years is an indicator of 
experience in the labor market. To test a non-linear association, I also include age in squared 
years. Other indicators of the labor market returns are dummy variables for the status of 
unemployed and the number of employed household members. Marital status indicates control of 
the sharing of resources in a household. Finally, I considered the gender of the head of household 
to control for the gender poverty gap, which is associated with the fact that the human capital of 
women typically is lower than investment in the skills of a man.  
With regard to the needs of the household, larger households have larger needs, and these 
needs differ depending on the age of the household members. Typically, the needs of a household 
with a large number of children or old people are higher than the needs of a household comprised 
                                                
137 Due to the lack of information in EPCASEN, I cannot include control information about health and durable goods.  
138 More specifically, 1 indicates a small wooden house (“mediagua”) or hut. 
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only of working-age individuals. Given this association between age groups and needs, I use the 
share of household members for the 0-15, 6-14, and 65+ age groups as indicators of needs.  
To control for the role of geographic characteristics in poverty statuses, I include a dummy 
variable for people who live in rural areas. I do not include measurements of shocks because the 
data set does not contain accurate indicators of unexpected events. Finally, my theory suggests 
that the effect of social assistance transfers on the chronic poor is channeled though informal work 
effort (Section 4.4). It is possible to evaluate this causal mechanism by controlling for informal work 
effort in regression models and, in doing so, direct and indirect effects of social assistance transfers 
should be estimated. However, to severely test causal mediation, a fundamental requirement is that 
cause must precede the mediator in time (Cole & Maxwell 2003, Holland 1986). It means that 
transfers must precede the informal work effort in time. Unfortunately, it is not possible to assess 
such a timeline with the information that is available from the Chilean socioeconomic panel. In a 
study with a panel of three waves, in which the dependent variable covers the last two time points 
and the treatment is measured in the second wave, we should test the causal mechanism by also 
measuring the informal work effort in the second wave. It follows that I cannot severely capture the 
causal effect of transfers on informality. In such a research design, the model should capture the 
correlation between transfers and informal work effort, not mediation. Due to this problem, this study 
focuses on the estimation of the causal effect of social assistance transfers on chronic and 
transitory poverty and leaves the examination of causal mechanism for future research.139  
 
The Econometric Model 
 
 
There are two key dependent variables in this study: continuous indexes of chronic and transitory 
poverty. These two variables are censored, as they take a value of zero for the non-poor. Due to 
this characteristic of my data, as is common for analyses that follow the component approach to 
measuring chronic and transitory poverty, I use the following censored regression models (e.g., 
Muller 2003):  
                                                
139 Following a legalistic notion of informality (see Section 4.4), I also included a measure of informal work effort for 1996 
(dummy variable for people working without contract) as an independent variable in additional regression models. The 
inclusion of this variable does not substantively modify the findings of Chapter 4. Due to missing data, I do not report the 
results with this measure of informality (the sample decreased from 6,146 to 2,177).  
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iciciccic ZTy εββα +++= 21
*  where Ni ,...,1=                                                                     (4.4)  
                                 
                   *icy  if 
*
icy  > 0             
=icy  
0   otherwise 
 
 
 
where *icy  is an unobserved latent dependent variable that represents latent chronic and latent 
transitory poverty for individual i in commune c, icy  is the observed chronic and transitory poverty, 
icT  is the dummy variable of social assistance transfers for individual i in commune c, and icZ is 
the vector of indicators of resources and needs for individual i in commune c.  
We can note that model (4.4) has a group structure. It contains individuals i within communes 
c. (4.4) also includes cα  which is a fixed effect on chronic and transitory poverty for commune c in 
1996. Commune fixed effects capture all unobserved characteristics of communes that affect both 
types of poverty. The reason for this specification is that the cutoff scores of the means proxy (CAS 
card), by which the beneficiaries of Chilean social assistance programs are selected, varies across 
communes and, by using commune fixed effects, I control any source of such variation (Carneiro et 
al. 2009). Finally, icε is an error term that represents unobserved factors that change between the 
individuals and affect chronic and transitory poverty.  
We can make an estimate of (4.4) by using a Tobit model with dummies for each commune. In 
this case, we control for all characteristics at the commune level of that do not vary between 
individuals of the same commune and focus on the variation between the treatment and control 
groups within a given commune. However, following the panel analysis literature, the maximum 
likelihood estimator is inconsistent in the presence of fixed effects when the number of individuals i 
is fixed. Even if there are a large number of communes, consistency of the maximum likelihood is 
realized only when the number of individuals per commune grows large.  
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In such a context, the semi-parametric fixed-effect censored Pantob estimator is an alternative 
by which (4.4) can be estimated without bias (Honoré 1992). This estimator strips unobserved fixed 
effects away and estimates the coefficient using only the variation within the communes in the 
regressors. The main assumption is that the remainder error icε  is independent and identically 
distributed after conditioning on the covariates. Honoré’s estimator does not assume a parametric 
form for the error term and homoskedasticity across fixed units (e.g., communes). I estimate Pantob 
using trimmed least squares. 
The Pantob estimation of coefficient 1β  in (4.4) provides the average treatment effect of social 
transfers (ATE). In the case of a negative effect of social assistance transfer on poverty statuses 
over time, the ATE would be the expected average chronic or transitory poverty penalty of receiving 
a public benefit for a randomly chosen individual from the population. Pantob estimates the ATE by 
conditioning on the indicators of resources and needs as determinants of the dependent variables. 
To test the sensitivity of this strategy of estimation, I also implement matching estimators. In the last 
case, I estimate the ATE of social assistance programs by conditioning on the indicators of 
resources and needs plus a set of dummies for communes as the determinants of treatment 
assignment. Matching estimators do not take into account the censoring of my dependent variables. 
However, in comparison with regression models, one advantage of matching estimators is that it 
also provides the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT). Furthermore, matching is a 
nonparametric approach that avoids the misspecification bias of control variables. 
The Pantob regressions and matching estimated ATE under the conditional independence 
assumption. It postulates that, conditional on a set of exogenous covariates Z (our indicators of 
needs and resources) and commune fixed effects, potential chronic and transitory poverty are 
independent of assignment into social programs. This means that both methods eliminate potential 
bias from observable variables. However, they are not robust against bias from unobserved 
variables that are associated with assignment to treatment and the outcome variables ( icε ).
140 
Following the bounding approach proposed by Rosenbaum (2002), I report sensitivity tests by 
                                                
140 To estimate the ATT and ATE, we also need to assume common support or balancing of pretreatment variables. The 
treatment and control groups must have the same distribution of observable (and unobservable) characteristics independent 
of treatment status. 
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which propensity score matching also allows the checking of the sensitivity of estimated results with 
respect to unobserved variables.  
 
4.6. Empirical Results 
 
 
4.6.1 Descriptive Analysis 
 
In this section, I will provide information about the magnitude of chronic and transitory poverty and 
descriptive evidence regarding the associations between both types of poverty and the independent 
variables described above. In this vein, following the method of Jalan and Ravallion (2000), Table 
4.3 reports the indexes of chronic and transitory poverty for independent variables and for the full 
sample (last row of Table 4.3). We note that post-transfer chronic and transitory poverty amounts to 
about 45 percent and 55 percent of total poverty, respectively, over the period from 2001-2006 for 
the full sample.141 This finding suggests that the importance of chronic and transitory poverty is 
similar in the working-age Chilean population under study.  
In the context of international poverty research, this result is similar to the estimates of Cruces 
and Wodon (2004) for Argentina for 1995–96. Their estimates suggest that 57 percent of total 
poverty is chronic and 43 percent is transitory. However, the findings for both Latin American 
countries may contrast with the evidence for advanced democracies, which suggests that a great 
deal of poverty is transitory (Fouarge 2004). However, we have consider the fact that the time span 
in my study is six years, whereas the evidence for advanced countries is, in most cases, for an 
interval of one year.  
Table 4.3 also provides the means for the indexes of chronic and transitory poverty for each 
category of transfer and control variables and calculates the proportion of total poverty that is 
chronic. In doing so, I can determine how much chronic and transitory poverty differ in their 
underlying distributions across the explanatory variables. Regarding social assistance benefits, the 
estimates shown in Table 4.3 indicate that chronic poverty prevails among individuals who live in 
households that are beneficiaries of social assistance. By contrast, transitory poverty prevails 
                                                
141 It is important to take into account that, because chronic and transitory poverty measures are estimated using the squared 
poverty gap, the interpretation of scores reported in Table 3 is not easy. Due to this problem, my explanation of findings 
focuses on percentages (last column of Table 3). The percentage for transitory poverty (55%) is not in Table 4.3. It is 
obtained from 100 minus the percentage for chronic poverty (45%). 
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among individuals who are not beneficiaries. This finding suggests a concentration of social 
assistance benefits among the chronic poor.  
 
Table 4.3. Profile of transitory and chronic poverty. Working-age population (15-64) 
 
Variable  
 
Number of 
individuals 
(unweighted) 
 
 
 
Transitory 
poverty 
 
 
 
Chronic 
poverty 
 
 
 
Total 
poverty 
Percentage 
of total 
poverty 
which is 
chronic 
      
Social assistance tranfers      
 Beneficiary 1,784 0.0242 0.0271 0.0513 53 
 Non beneficiary 4,362 0.0075 0.0048 0.0123 39 
Education of sample members      
 Primary or lower 2,933 0.0162 0.0164 0.0326 50 
 Secondary 2,717 0.0082 0.0056 0.0138 41 
 Tertiary: Technical-professional 223 0.0024 0.0002 0.0026 8 
 Tertiary: University or higher 273 0.0048 0.0004 0.0053 8 
Age of household head      
 15-27 1,678 0.0113 0.0082 0.0195 42 
 28-38 1,629 0.0116 0.0127 0.0243 52 
 39-49 1,698 0.0107 0.0082 0.0189 44 
 50-60 1,129 0.0047 0.0021 0.0068 30 
 61-64 12 0.0023 --- 0.0023 0 
Gender of household head      
 Male 5,153 0.0100 0.0080 0.0180 44 
 Female 993 0.0112 0.0109 0.0220 49 
Housing      
 Own property 4,682 0.0096 0.0076 0.0172 44 
 Bad quality construction 217 0.0268 0.0378 0.0647 59 
Number of employed in household       
  0 408 0.0154 0.1313 0.0286 46 
 1-2 4,533 0.0113 0.0092 0.0205 45 
 ≥ 3 1,205 0.0056 0.0051 0.0107 48 
Employment status       
 Employed 2,964 0.0082 0.0072 0.0154 47 
 Unemployed 222 0.0096 0.0149 0.0245 60 
 Inactivity status 2,960 0.0127 0.0095 0.0223 43 
Marital status       
 Married 2,997 0.0107 0.0078 0.0185 42 
 Unmarried partners 494 0.0168 0.0305 0.0474 65 
 Divorced 176 0.0057 0.0028 0.0085 33 
 Widowed 67 0.0020 0.0020 0.0040 50 
 Single 2,412 0.0091 0.0063 0.0154 41 
Share of household members 0-5      
 0 3,661 0.0066 0.0049 0.0115 43 
 >0-29 1,833 0.0162 0.0106 0.0268 39 
 >30 652 0.0159 0.0241 0.0399 60 
Share of household members 6-14      
 0 2,414 0.0075 0.0055 0.0129 42 
 >0-29 2,090 0.0110 0.0074 0.0184 40 
 >29 1,642 0.0138 0.0151 0.0289 52 
Share of household members >64      
 0 5,186 0.0108 0.0092 0.0199 46 
 >0-29 676 0.0086 0.0057 0.0143 40 
 >29 284 0.0031 0.0020 0.0051 40 
Geographical area      
 Rural 1,261 0.0136 0.0069 0.0205 34 
 Urban 4,885 0.0098 0.0087 0.0184 47 
       
Full sample 6,146 0.01022 0.0085 0.0187 45 
     
Notes: Estimations take into account the sampling design and weights and correspond to squared poverty gaps. The 
measures use the official Chilean poverty line. Social assistance transfers and age are measured for 2001, the rest 
of independent variables are measured for 1996. Source: Survey Panel CASEN. 
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In spite of the focalization of social benefits on chronic poverty, as I pointed out in the 
discussion of social assistance in Chile (Section 4.4), my analysis indicates that the size of the 
transfers to individual recipients is small. Table 4.4 illustrates this characteristic of Chilean social 
assistance. This table shows the proportion of social assistance transfers in the income packaging 
of the groups that compose the typology of chronic and transitory poor. For most members of each 
group the weight of benefits in the income packaging is very small. The proportion of social 
assistance transfers in the income packaging for 77 percent of the chronically and persistently poor 
(50.23 plus 26.94) is only 10 percent or lower. Regarding the rest of the poverty statuses, the 
proportion of individuals who receive 10 percent or less of the benefits is higher than 80 percent.  
 
Table 4.4. Size of social assistance transfers in 2001 by post-transfer poverty status over time. Working-age population (15-
64, N (unweighted)  =6,636) 
 
Proportion of social assistance 
transfers  in total per-capita 
household income in 2001 
Type of poverty 
  
 
Never poor 
 
 
Only transiently poor  
 
Chronically and 
persistently poor 
 
Chronically but not 
persistently poor 
     
0% 88.68 74.80 50.23 63.88 
> 0% and ≤10%    8.55 17.49 26.95 16.87 
11-25% 2.20 5.32 17.03 13.43 
≥ 26% 0.57 2.39 5.79 5.82 
     
Total 100 100 100 100 
  
Notes: Figures are the percentage of members of poverty groups in each level of benefit in the income package. The figures 
take into account sampling weights. This measure uses the official Chilean poverty line. Source: Survey Panel 
CASEN. 
 
As stated in Section 4.4, the empirical studies in advanced nations define welfare dependency 
as counting on welfare income to make up more than one-half of a household’s total income 
(Duncan 1984, Fouarge 2004). In such a context, the figures in Table 4.4 indicate that the 
proportion of social benefits in total per-capita household income is clearly lower than this threshold 
for most of the chronic and transitory poor in Chile. Thus, this finding suggests that it is unlikely that 
Chilean social assistance produces “welfare dependency” in the sense that this concept has in 
industrialized welfare states.  
Table 4.3 also provides information about the association between chronic and transitory 
poverty and the control variables. The estimation results of Table 4.3 show that there are no 
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substantive differences between chronic and transitory poverty in the case of gender of the 
household head and low educational attainment. The number of employed people in the household 
and widowed marital status also do not make a difference between the two types of poverty.  
Chronic poverty is clearly associated with a large number of children in a household, a poor-
quality housing structure, unemployment, and partners who live together but are not married. 
Transitory poverty is more heterogeneous because it dominates in association with more socio-
economic characteristics. We can note a clear prevalence of transitory poverty with higher 
educational attainment; adults between 39 and 64 years old; rural areas; divorced, married, and 
single individuals; and persons who live in a household with a low share of children.  
I interpret these profiles of chronic and transitory poverty in the sense that the differences 
between such economic states concern the magnitude of the household’s necessities and the work 
experience of the household head. Chronic poverty is dominant in the early occupational career 
stages of individuals who live in households with high necessities. By contrast, transitory poverty is 
associated with lower necessities and heads that are at the top of their productivity. Furthermore, 
transitory poverty prevails in households with a high level of resources. However, we have to take 
care with this interpretation because it is based only on descriptive information. Using regression 
models, in the following section, I provide the findings of the statistical tests of the associations 
suggested by the descriptive analyses. 
 
4.6.2 Estimated Models of Transitory and Chronic Poverty 
 
How do social assistance transfers contribute to chronic and transitory poverty? Table 4.5 reports 
the ATE estimates of censored regressions for continuous indexes of chronic and transitory poverty 
in Chile. The results support the hypothesis for chronic poverty, but not for transitory poverty. They 
suggest that the beneficiaries of Chilean social assistance in 2001 had higher chronic and transitory 
poverty for the 2001–2006 than individuals who did not receive benefits in 2001. The z-values 
associated with indicators of social transfers are statistically significant at conventional levels. The 
magnitude of the estimated effect varies by the type of poverty. The effect of social programs on 
transitory poverty is one-half the coefficient for chronic poverty.  
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Table 4.5.  Semiparametric censored regression models with fixed effects of chronic and transitory poverty. Trimmed 
least squares estimations. Working-age population (15-64) 
 
 Chronic poverty Transitory poverty 
   
Social assistance transfers (ref: non beneficiary)   
 Beneficiary    0.112**    0.057** 
 (0.027) (0.013) 
Geographical are (ref: urban)   
 Rural  -0.119** -0.042* 
                       (0.034) (0.017) 
Educational  (ref: secondary or higher)   
 Primary or lower    0.134** 0.015 
 (0.032) (0.008) 
Number of employed in household   -0.038**  -0.016** 
  (0.015) (0.005) 
Employment status (ref: employee or inactive)   
 Unemployed 0.057                      -0.016 
 (0.043)                      (0.027) 
Age   
 In years  0.012*                       0.003 
  (0.006)                      (0.003) 
 In squared years   -0.000**                      -0.000 
  (0.000)                      (0.000) 
Gender of household head (ref: male)   
 female  0.083*                       0.007 
 (0.042)                      (0.014) 
Marital status (ref: married)   
 Unmarried partners 0.061                       0.021 
  (0.035)                      (0.019) 
 Divorced -0.122*                      -0.019 
  (0.051)                      (0.016) 
 Widowed  -0.226** -0.111** 
                        (0.066)                      (0.032) 
 Single                       -0.039                      -0.014 
                       (0.041)                      (0.016) 
Housing   
 Own property                       -0.042                      -0.026 
  (0.028)                      (0.018) 
 Bad quality construction 0.036 0.068* 
 (0.041)                      (0.032) 
Share of household members 0-5    0.409** 0.089* 
 (0.077)                      (0.039) 
Share of household members 6-14    0.187**                       0.049 
 (0.069)                      (0.039) 
Share of household members 65+                       -0.099                      -0.072 
 (0.129)                      (0.047) 
   
N 6,146 6,146 
 
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01 (two-tailed tests) 
Notes: Social assistance transfers and age are measured for 2001, the rest of independent variables are measured for 
1996. Standard errors are in parentheses. Source: Survey Panel CASEN. 
 
 
Table 4.5 also shows the estimates for the control variables. The results in the case of the 
number of workers, educational attainment, and housing indicators indicate that, as one would 
expect, chronic and transitory poverty drop when household resources increase. More specifically, 
the estimates in Table 4.5 suggest that the number of employed people in a household significantly 
decreases both types of poverty, with a stronger effect in the case of chronic poverty. By contrast, 
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the coefficients of low educational attainment indicate that this social disadvantage increases both 
poverty statuses, but it is statistically significant only in the case of chronic poverty. The findings for 
housing indicate that living in a poor-quality structure significantly increases transitory poverty. 
The findings for age confirm the results of descriptive analyses. The coefficients suggest that 
chronic poverty increases with age but at a decreasing rate. The coefficients of transitory poverty 
indicate the same pattern, but they are not statistically significant. Theoretically, this finding 
suggests that work experience is not relevant in protecting against chronic poverty at the beginning 
of the work career.  
The estimations for the household head’s gender indicate a significant gap in chronic poverty. 
Scholars typically interpret this gap in terms of the lower human capital of women. Women build up 
less human capital because they interrupt their careers more often. Furthermore, the earnings of 
women in the labor market may be lower because of discrimination.  
The coefficients of the geographical area in the full sample model suggest that living in a rural 
area decreases chronic and transitory poverty. The z-values associated with this variable are 
statistically significant at conventional levels. This finding confirms cross-sectional evidence for 
Chile, which suggests a decline in the poverty gap between rural and urban areas in the 2000s 
(MIDEPLAN 2007a).  
I use marital status as another indicator of resources. My theoretical assumption is that, in 
comparison with other marital statuses, the marital union has financial advantages associated with 
household sharing and the use of common resources (Andress et al. 2006). Thus, marriage will be 
associated with lower chronic and transitory poverty. In contrast with this expectation, the findings 
shown in Table 4.5 suggest that marriage does not provide financial protection against both types of 
poverty. As we can see, the coefficients for unmarried partners and single people are not 
statistically significant, and the findings for the other marital statuses indicate that chronic and 
transitory poverty are lower for divorced and widowed individuals than for married persons.  
The last control variables are the shares of children and old people in the household, which are 
indicators of needs in a household. As indicated in the estimates shown in Table 4.5, a higher 
number of children increases chronic and transitory poverty, with the effect being stronger in the 
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case of chronic poverty. While these results make sense in light of the theoretical expectations, we 
should keep in mind that this finding may be sensitive to methodological factors associated with 
economies of scale within the household. To deal with this problem, I estimate the model with 
different equivalence scales, and the findings still suggest that a larger number of children leads to 
a higher level of chronic poverty. The association is not significant for transitory poverty. Regarding 
social assistance transfers, the consideration of equivalence scales does not substantively modify 
the effect on chronic and transitory poverty that I show above. 
 
Robustness Checks 
 
The results of regression models are highly robust to two important sensitivity analyses.142 First, as 
was previously stated, I also estimate the causal effect of social assistance transfers on chronic and 
transitory poverty using matching estimators. I use two types of matching to test whether the results 
are robust to the choice of the matching algorithms. The first type consists of propensity score 
matching. Specifically, I use nearest-neighbor matching with replacement using one neighbor 
imposing a caliper. The second type of matching does not work with propensity scores. It imputes 
the missing potential outcomes of the control group by using the outcomes of a few nearest 
neighbors of the opposite treatment group. By comparison with the propensity score matching, the 
advantages of the second type of matching include the ability to estimate bias corrections for finite 
samples and variance that allow for heteroskedasticy (Imbens & Wooldridge 2009). 
Table 4.6 shows the results of the matching estimations of the average treatment effect (ATE) 
and the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) for chronic and transitory poverty after 
controlling for the needs and the resources of individuals.143 The results of the two types of 
matching estimators confirm the findings of the censored regressions. I found evidence of an 
increase in chronic and transitory poverty associated with social assistance transfers. In comparison 
with censored regression, the effects on chronic and transitory poverty are similar. The reason is 
                                                
142 The results of sensitivity tests, which I do not show, are available on request from the author. 
143 To estimate the matching procedures, I include commune fixed effects and only some of the indicators of resources and 
needs that I use in the regression models. I selected these variables on the basis of balancing tests. This means that the set 
of variables used in matching estimations are not the same as the set of control variables included in the regression models. 
In Appendix 3, I report propensity score estimates and the independent variables used. 
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that matching estimators do not consider the censoring of dependent variables. Furthermore, the 
Rosenbaum bounds suggest that the results are quite robust to unobserved influences.144 
 
Table 4.6. The effects of social assistance transfers on chronic and transitory poverty 
 
 Propensity score matching (Nearest neighbour)  Nearest-neighbour bias corrected matching 
   
 Chronic poverty Transitory poverty Chronic poverty Transitory poverty 
     
 Effect (s.e.) Effect (s.e.) Effect (s.e.) Effect (s.e.) 
         
ATE 0.010 (0.002) 0.010 (0.001) 0.009 (0.002) 0.010 (0.001) 
         
ATT 0.011 (0.004) 0.010 (0.002) 0.011 (0.002) 0.009 (0.002) 
     
Notes:  Standard errors of propensity score matching estimators are bootstrapped each with 1,454 repetitions in 
order to take into account the additional variability introduced by the estimation of the propensity score and 
by the matching process itself. Source: Survey Panel CASEN. 
 
 
As a second robustness check, I estimated censored regression models and matching 
estimators with modifications of the dependent variables. One modification was to use social 
assistance transfers as a continuous variable. Furthermore, I have scaled up the poverty line by 50 
percent as a second modification of the dependent variables. The results are also robust in the 
case of these two modifications. 
 
4.7. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I attempted to evaluate the indirect effect of social assistance transfers on chronic 
and transitory poverty in Chile. I started by showing the findings in the literature. The next section 
presented the theoretical framework of this study, which has two parts. First, I developed the 
concepts of chronic and transitory poverty that I used in this study. Second, I offered a theoretical 
explanation of the indirect effects of transfers on chronic and transitory poverty in terms of the 
impacts of the size, targeting, and duration of benefits on productive investment and work effort. On 
the basis of this theoretical framework and a description of Chilean government social assistance 
programs, I contended that social assistance transfers should have a positive impact on chronic 
poverty in Chile. By contrast, benefits must not affect transitory poverty. I used the waves of 2001 
                                                
144 See Appendix 3. 
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and 2006 of the Chilean household panel CASEN to select working-age individuals and to test 
these expectations.  
In line with the hypothesis for chronic poverty, the findings suggest that social assistance 
transfers increased chronic poverty in Chile for 2001 and 2006. Drawing on the theory developed in 
this study, this result can be interpreted as indicating that Chilean social assistance may produce 
incentives to apply for benefits and to work in the informal sector and, in doing so, to increase 
chronic poverty. In the vein of the standard labor supply model in economics, the results of this 
chapter thus suggest that benefits raise the incentive for some type of poor to change their labor 
supply—particularly their informal work effort. Furthermore, in emphasizing the role of informal work 
effort, this research has implications for the study of the indirect effects of cash programs in 
developing countries, such as Chile. The studies and the design of welfare programs must consider 
informality, insofar as informal work effort is a mechanism that may explain how it is possible that 
social assistance transfers, although low generosity, may result in poverty persistence. My findings, 
however, do not provide a direct and thorough empirical test regarding the role of informal work 
effort in explaining the impact of social assistance transfers on chronic poverty. Future research 
must analyze in more detail the indirect effects of transfers.  
Social assistance transfers have a positive effect on transitory poverty. This result requires the 
rejection of my second hypothesis and means that, despite their small size, the benefits increase 
the inter-temporal variability in the income of the poor. Two assertions are relevant to the evaluation 
of this finding. First, the relevance and robustness of the benefit effect is clearly lower for transitory 
poverty than for chronic poverty. It follows that my analysis of the association between this type of 
poverty and social assistance transfers is preliminary and, thus, it should be examined in further 
research. Second, the positive benefit effect on transitory poverty may be associated with inter-
temporal variability in the income of a particular type of poor. The measure of transitory poverty 
used in regression analysis captures inter-temporal variability in the income of any type of poor, 
whether chronic or transitory. However, the positive benefit effect on transitory poverty may only be 
associated with the income variability of the chronic poor, who do have an incentive to remain in 
poverty or to become poor. Further research should examine this possible explanation of the 
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positive effect of social assistance transfers on transitory poverty by evaluating such effects on 
particular types of poverty status over time. To identify the causal effect, a particular challenge will 
be to overcome selection bias that may be associated not only with the selection in treatment, but 
also with the sample of particular types to be analyzed. Yearly panel data for a long period are very 
helpful in solving this kind of problem, and the findings of this study encourage the collection of this 
type of information. 
I do not claim that the quantitative data analysis of this study should be considered an 
exhaustive test of the effect of social assistance transfers on chronic and transitory poverty in Chile. 
To improve the models of transitory poverty, future studies must also consider the effects of 
idiosyncratic shocks and the effect of the economy. Finally, research must analyze in more detail 
the heterogeneity of the treatment effect, especially by considering the influence of each social 
assistance program in subpopulations. 
Despite this caveat, I believe that my theoretical argument and the empirical evidence that is 
presented suggest one important policy conclusion. Following the experience of advanced nations, 
the design must be more complex in the current Chilean policy to minimize disincentive effects. 
More specifically, such a design should consider not only the size of the transfers or investment in 
human capital as conditional cash transfer programs, but also the efficiency of the intervention 
regarding the targeting and its duration through work requirements and clear time limits. 
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Chapter 5 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The goals of this dissertation were twofold. First, the dissertation aimed to estimate and explain the 
impact of public transfers and public provision of social services on poverty in Latin America. This 
goal was motivated by the debate between two contending perspectives about the role of social 
policy in relationship to poverty reduction—that is, the debate between redistributive and productive 
investment views of social benefits for the poor. Second, the dissertation evaluated how the 
institutional context, embodied by the welfare state, shapes the impact of public transfers on 
poverty in Latin America. In this way, two leading research questions guided the discussion. The 
first research question of the dissertation asked how public transfers and the public provision of 
social services contribute to poverty reduction. Drawing on studies of welfare regimes in advanced 
OECD countries, this research question has been further elaborated, and the second pivotal 
research question asked: how the institutional context shapes the impact of public transfers on 
poverty. In answering these questions, the association between social policies and poverty has 
been gauged in two cross-national studies of Latin American countries during the 1980s and 1990s 
(Chapters 2 and 3) and in a micro study of social assistance in Chile in 2001 and 2006 (Chapter 4). 
I argued that the decision to focus the examination of the research questions of the dissertation on 
Latin American countries is appropriate on the grounds of substantive, methodological, and 
pragmatic reasons. The studies, which compose the dissertation, carry implications for what can be 
expected from social policies for poverty reduction in Latin America during the last three decades.  
To answer the core research questions of the dissertation, in Chapter 1, I developed micro-
macro models, in which the impact of public transfers and public provision of social services on 
poverty is explained in terms of the effect of both instruments on the actions and interactions of 
income groups. Two components of the model are pivotal to understanding the findings of the 
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dissertation. First, I suggested that public transfers and benefits in kind are multidimensional 
concepts; thus, a set of policy dimensions was distinguished: size, targeting, and duration. Each of 
these dimensions may have different impacts on poverty. Second, I focused on the size and 
targeting of benefits to explain their effects on poverty, indicating three classes of actions as 
explanatory mechanisms of the association between policy and poverty: productive investment, 
work effort, and public support for social policies in general. Each of the studies that comprise this 
dissertation analyzed particular policy dimensions (size and targeting) or particular actions.  
More specifically, chapter 2 presented a classification of Latin American welfare states that is 
fundamental to understanding the following analysis. In this vein, to answer the dissertation’s 
leading questions, in chapter 3, I analyzed the impact of the size of government budget allocated to 
benefits on poverty levels among Latin American welfare states. Regarding social services, a 
testable hypothesis for the size of this social policy was formulated by discussing the connections 
between public provision of social services and productive investment in human capital. For public 
transfers, hypotheses were established but on the basis of the relationships between budget size 
allocated to cash payments and public support for policy in general. These hypotheses were tested 
with empirical evidence in a sample of 15 Latin American nations in the period 1980–2000.  
Finally, chapter 4 evaluated the poverty effectiveness of government benefits provided on the 
basis of a specific criterion of targeting—that is, means-testing. More precisely, in this chapter, I 
discussed how means-tested social assistance contributes to reducing chronic and transitory 
poverty in terms of the influence of this type of public transfer on productive investment and the 
work effort—particularly informal work—of low-income groups in the Chilean welfare state. Overall, 
the three studies of the dissertation not only provided special insights into the impact of public 
transfers and public provision of social services across Latin American welfare states and in Chile 
but also demonstrated the role of the institutional context in moderating the effect of public 
transfers.  
This concluding chapter reviews the findings from the preceding three chapters before 
discussing the implications of the main results for public policy and the consequences for future 
research. Section 5.1 summarizes the results of the three studies that compose the dissertation and 
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outlines whether there is empirical evidence to support the hypotheses, which were formulated in 
chapters 3 and 4. In doing so, section 5.1 discusses how each study has contributed to 
understanding the impacts of public transfers and public provision of social services on poverty in 
Latin America. Furthermore, by considering these impacts, section 5.1 also discusses the findings 
in the context of the debate that frames the pivotal questions of the dissertations: the controversy 
between redistributive and productive investment views of social benefits for the poor (see section 
1.1). In section 5.2, some broad policy recommendations are suggested. Finally, section 5.3 
debates some important flaws of the explanatory framework and the empirical analysis of this 
dissertation and presents a set of suggestions for future research. 
 
5.1 Central Findings 
 
The presentation of the central findings is formed on the basis of the leading questions of the 
dissertation. The discussion of the results begins with the classification of Latin American welfare 
states in chapter 2. I then discuss the core findings of the multivariate analysis presented in 
chapters 3 and 4. Finally, this section ends with a discussion of additional results that are unrelated 
to the core question of the dissertation. However, they may be important to poverty research in 
general. 
 
(a) Social policy orientations differ among Latin American welfare states 
 
Chapter 2 includes a classification of the policy orientations in Latin American countries. To classify 
policy orientations, an ideal typology was developed. Four models compose the typology: 
corporatism, universalism, liberalism, and productivism. The policy orientations of Latin American 
countries were classified into the typology by using hierarchical-agglomerative cluster analysis with 
measures of the typology’s dimensions for the 1990s. While this first study of the dissertation finds 
that some countries fit more poorly than others, there is also some support for the ideal typology. 
With respect to the supportive evidence, the findings of Chapter 2 indicate that some clusters of 
countries fit the corporatist, universalist, and productivist types of welfare states. More specifically, 
one cluster is composed of welfare states that pioneered the development of social insurance 
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programs in the region (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay). This cluster approximates the 
corporatist model: program segmentation and focus on social insurance. A second cluster is 
composed of Costa Rica and Panama. Although both countries present considerable program 
universalism, only the policy orientations of Costa Rica approximate the universalist welfare state. It 
is unlikely that the Panamanian universalism emerged as a result of the development of citizen 
rights; rather, it is a result of the particular historical characteristics of this country. Central American 
nations (Dominican Republic, El Salvador, and Guatemala) plus Ecuador form a third cluster, which 
is clearly based on the commodification of the labor force and thus approximates the productivist 
welfare state. 
Cluster analysis also provides ambiguous findings. Contrasting with the three clusters 
described above, the findings of Chapter 2 indicate the existence of two additional clusters that do 
not clearly fit in any of the ideal types of welfare states. One of these clusters is composed of 
Colombia, Paraguay, and Peru. These countries exhibit the essence of corporatism as they present 
high program segmentation. Nonetheless, the corporatist ideal model also assumes focus of the 
welfare state on social insurance. Contrasting with this definition of corporatism, the findings 
indicate that this fourth cluster combines program segmentation with residual focus on social 
insurance. In Chapter 2, I then suggested that Colombia, Paraguay, and Peru compose a cluster 
characterized by residual corporatist welfare states. Finally, a fifth cluster is also composed of 
ambiguous cases. Bolivia, Honduras, Mexico, and Nicaragua form this group. The distinctiveness of 
this cluster refers to the coexistence of corporatist and productivist policy orientations.    
With respect to liberalism, the findings indicate that a distinctive liberal welfare state does not 
exist in Latin America. I suggest that this result of the cluster analysis may rely on the fact that the 
measure of liberalism used in Chapter 2 is not enough to capture liberal policy orientations in Latin 
American welfare states. Another interpretation of the findings is that the nonexistence of a liberal 
model operating in Latin America confirms the vision of some scholars that the claim of a shift of 
policy profile towards a liberal model in this region is an overgeneralization. Further research should 
discriminate between both positions by improving the measure of liberalism in Latin America. To 
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this end, the generation of information about means testing for a sample that include a significant 
number of LACs is particularly important. 
In Chapter 2, I argued that the ambiguous results of the cluster analysis do not indicate that the 
entire ideal typology is problematic, as there is clearly nothing unique in the residual corporatist and 
mixed welfare states and thus both clusters hardly merit distinct ideal types, which are not 
considered by my typology. Furthermore, I suggested that the existence of the hybrid welfare 
arrangement and the coexistence of liberalism with other logics of welfare provision in Latin 
America suggest mutations of the institutional contexts in the regions. 
To illustrate the relevance of the welfare state classification, Chapter 2 also examined the 
connection between clusters and socioeconomic outcomes. The findings revealed that the 
classification of Latin American welfare states is particularly relevant for poverty and informal work. 
More specifically, pioneer corporatist welfare states tend to have the lowest levels of poverty and 
informal work. This result indicates the effectiveness of corporatist systems to provide income 
security in the region. The unique universalist Latin American welfare state, Costa Rica, presents a 
superior capacity to not only reduce poverty in Latin America but also decrease income inequality 
and child mortality. 
 
(b) The public provision of social services does not contribute to poverty reduction in Latin 
America 
 
The first leading research question of the dissertation refers to the contribution of public transfers 
and public provision of social services to poverty reduction in Latin America. Chapter 3 intended to 
answer this question by examining the impact of the redistributive budget allocated to benefits in 
cash and in kind on poverty levels among 15 Latin American countries in the period 1980–2000. 
With respect to social services, by focusing on education and health care, I hypothesized that the 
budget size allocated to social services should lead to decreasing poverty levels in the long run 
among Latin American countries. This hypothesis did not gain support in the analysis of the 
dissertation. In chapter 3, the findings of cross-country analysis indicate that the cumulative health 
and education spending does not have a significant impact on poverty rates.  
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The cross-country analysis also included a measure of the education investment’s outcome, 
which were the years of education for the population aged 25 and older. The analysis revealed that 
this outcome measurement clearly contributed to reducing poverty in Latin America in the period 
1980–2000. At first glance, this result contradicts the findings of health and education spending. In 
Chapter 3, however, I proposed two factors that may explain these findings. First, there is a 
considerable lag between the public investment in social services and the outcomes of this 
investment—years of education and poverty—and the measure of benefits in kind used in this study 
perhaps does not completely capture this lag.  Second, cumulative health and education spending 
and years of education measure different things and thus may reflect different causal determinants 
of poverty. Spending figures reflect the effort of the welfare state to provide social services. They 
are a measure of the welfare state’s flows to services. Years of education measure the stock of 
human capital. Moreover, years of education are a result of a set of factors, not only interventions of 
the welfare state. In fact, a significant portion of the investment in education and health care in Latin 
America is private (see chapter 3). Thus, there are reasons to doubt the validity of years of 
education as a measure of public provision of social services.  
All in all, the findings of the dissertation suggest that investment in human capital does help to 
reduce poverty, but it is an open question if increasing human capital is associated with the 
intervention of the welfare state in Latin America. That said, one important avenue for the future is 
to more clearly identify the effectiveness not only of public spending in social services but also of 
additional sources of human capital by analyzing the indirect effects of these factors on poverty 
levels that operate via their effects on human capital and from the human capital to poverty. 
 
(c) The contribution of public transfers to poverty reduction depends on the institutional context  
 
With respect to public transfers, the dissertation asked not only how public transfers contribute to 
poverty reduction in Latin America but also how the institutional context shapes the impact of this 
instrument of the welfare state on poverty. To examine these research questions, the term 
“institutional context” designated clusters of welfare states in Latin America. Chapter 3 examined 
these inquiries by focusing on the budget size that the state assigns to public transfers. The theory 
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of this chapter implicates a set of hypotheses about the impact of the public transfer’s size on the 
level of poverty in the clusters that conform to the classification of Latin American welfare states as 
described in chapter 2. More precisely, the hypotheses of chapter 3 suggested that the size of 
government budget allocated to public transfers will decrease poverty levels in pioneer corporatist 
and universalist welfare states, and the poverty reduction is higher in the latter. By contrast, with 
both clusters, I hypothesized that the size of government budget allocated to public transfers would 
be associated with higher poverty levels in residual corporatist, productivist, and mixed Latin 
American welfare states. Using an unbalanced panel of 15 Latin American countries for the period 
1980–2000 and pooled OLS regressions, these expectations were verified. Thus, the social policy 
that may be successful in reducing poverty in Latin America is associated with the granting of a 
considerable budget size for public transfers, with the most significant reductions occurring in the 
institutional context that provides benefits based on citizenship. This institutional context is the 
universal welfare state. 
 
(d) Social assistance transfers increases chronic and transitory poverty in Chile 
 
In chapter 4, I took a different angle to examine the research question of the dissertation about the 
impact of public transfers on poverty. I studied the case of Chile and examined the effectiveness of 
government benefits in poverty reduction with household panel data for Chilean working-age 
individuals in 2001 and 2006. More precisely, chapter 4 looked at the impact of a particular type of 
public transfer, social assistance benefits, on absolute poverty status over time (chronic and 
transitory poverty) at the micro level. I argued that social assistance should affect only chronic 
poverty, increasing the levels of this type of poverty in Chile. The findings verified the prognosis for 
chronic poverty and suggested that some kind of indirect behavioral effect on labor supply results 
from the design of social assistance programs in Chile. As explanatory mechanisms, I suggested 
that cash welfare is associated with incentives to apply for benefits and to work in the informal 
sector, and, in doing so, to increase chronic poverty. Nonetheless, it is important to say that, due to 
lack of data, I did not severely test these mechanisms. Evidence in the literature, though, confirms 
the plausibility of some of the assumptions of my argument. For transitory poverty, the hypothesis 
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was, however, rejected. The results indicate also a positive effect of benefits on this type of poverty, 
but the magnitude and sensitivity of this finding are lower than the results for chronic poverty and 
thus suggest that further research is necessary to verify my findings. I also suggested that perhaps 
the positive effect of social assistance transfers on transitory poverty is associated with particular 
types of poor people. 
Although the domain of the primary inference of Chapter 4 is at the micro level, the results of 
the analysis of the Chilean social assistance have implications at the level of countries. The findings 
for chronic poverty suggest that when the opportunities to get a job in the formal sector are low, 
social assistance transfers, although their generosity is low, may produce poverty. I discussed the 
role of opportunities in their association with chronic poverty and present some descriptive evidence 
with respect to the association between informality and human capital (Section 4.4 in Chapter 4). 
However, opportunities can be also considered as a characteristic of macro units. For instance, the 
findings of this dissertation suggest that social assistance in a country with a significant informal 
labor market may have a different effect on poverty than in a country with strong formalization of the 
labor force, insofar as in this last type of institutional context the low benefit’s generosity may not be 
associated with incentives to apply for social assistance. It is an implication of my dissertation that 
should be evaluated by further research.  
Before the conclusion considers the policy implication of the dissertation’s findings, results that 
are not related to the leading questions of this dissertation but may be relevant to the study of 
poverty in general are discussed. Despite the core of the micro analysis regarding the impact of 
social assistance transfers on chronic and transitory poverty, this dissertation also discussed the 
impacts of needs and resources on both poverty statuses over time. The findings confirmed the 
expectation that individuals who live in households with high needs present higher chronic and 
transitory poverty, as the effect is stronger in the case of chronic deprivation. Likewise, it is clear 
that chronic and transitory poverty decrease when the resources in the household increase. 
In chapter 4, I also presented the socioeconomic profiles of chronic and transitory poverty. The 
results indicate that the poor are not a homogenous group that exhibits a common set of socio-
demographic characteristics. According to the results, chronic poverty dominates in households 
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with high necessities and where the head of the household is at the beginning of his/her work 
career. By contrast, transitory poverty is associated with lower necessities and with heads of 
household who are at the top of their productivity. 
In the outline of this study (chapter 1), I framed the leading research questions in the debate 
between the redistributive and productive investment views of social benefits for the poor. To briefly 
review both views, the redistributive perspective pursues the reduction of poverty through the 
provision of cash payments on the basis of the desire to help others. The second perspective, the 
productive investment view, is motivated by the desire for self-help and defends the provision of 
social services as a mechanism to reduce poverty. In such a context, how do the main findings of 
the dissertation contribute to the debate between these two views? As mentioned in the outline of 
the dissertation, although a clear resolution of this controversy is unlikely, this dissertation intended 
to contribute by providing new evidence and, in doing so, reject bad arguments. Thus, the findings 
of the dissertation add meaningful insights to this debate in two important ways. First, they show 
that public provision of social services has not contributed to decreasing poverty in Latin America. 
However, because of the relevance of human capital to poverty reduction, any public intervention 
aimed to enhance the productivity of citizens should be an important weapon to fight the war on 
poverty.  
Second, the findings of the dissertation indicate that a universal approach to the provision of 
public transfers does help to reduce poverty not only in advanced Western democracies but also in 
developing countries such as Latin American nations. Because most public transfers in Latin 
American welfare states are public expenditure in the form of pension, the finding for social 
assistance transfers in the Chilean welfare state does not falsify this conclusion. Instead, it 
suggests that the effectiveness of the targeted social assistance in reducing poverty is open to 
doubt once indirect incentive effects are considered. This finding of the dissertation carries an 
important implication for the relative value that liberal reforms may have for the well-being of the 
population in developing regions such as Latin America. To put it simply, the analysis of the 
dissertation indicates that the universal view of social protection should be not substituted for 
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means-tested welfare programs. It is an open question to what extent universalist social insurance 
and means-tested benefits can be used as complements to reduce poverty.  
 
5.2 Policy Implications for Latin American Welfare States 
 
Based on the findings of this study, the discussion now turns to their policy implications. This 
Section 5.2 will suggest some broad policy recommendations that not only recapitulate the 
particular policy implications mentioned in the preceding chapters but also indicate general 
guidance for policy makers and citizens. First, policy makers should have a vested interest in 
incorporating elements of the institutional context into the design of policy. This recommendation is 
very important in Latin America countries, as these welfare states are typically treated by policy 
makers as more or less identical to one another or, at the other extreme, as nations marked by vast 
socioeconomic diversity (chapter 1). According to the results of this dissertation, Latin American 
welfare states neither fall into an extreme divergence nor converge to a unique regional identity. 
Rather, political economies in Latin America are classified as belonging to different institutional 
contexts with different consequences in political economic outcomes, particularly poverty. In this 
vein, a significant finding of this dissertation is that the institutional contexts that perform best in 
Latin America include welfare states with high program universalism and considerable redistributive 
budget assigned to public transfers. This important result points to specific challenges for future 
social policy, especially in today’s context of pressures to liberalize markets and to retrench the 
welfare state in a globalized world. One challenge of particular importance is how to coordinate the 
institutional path of best performers in the regions with these pressures. As a starting point to attack 
this challenge, the findings of this study suggest that policy makers in pioneer corporatist and 
universalist welfare states should consider incentive problems for the design of social policy—for 
example, through entitlement requirements associated with work requirements and clear time limits. 
Second, concrete government programs should take into account both the productive 
investment and work effort of individuals. The theoretical framework of this study (chapter 1) 
contends that neither investment-oriented nor work-oriented factors singlehandedly account for 
poverty; rather, there are intricate interactions between both factors. Furthermore, the institutional 
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context shapes such micro mechanisms by producing particular preferences for redistribution (e.g., 
public support for redistributive policy in general) among citizens. In other words, the impact of 
social policy on poverty is not explained by a mono-causal mechanism but rather by a complex 
group of explanatory factors. Unfortunately, I think it is impossible to decide where policy needs to 
intervene—in productive investment or in work effort—by taking into account only theoretical 
criteria. The reason is that no unified theory exists in social science that provides a set of clear 
statements about micro mechanisms and institutional contexts that are relevant to explain poverty. 
In fact, as I said in the outline of the dissertation (see Section 1.5), only weak causal theories in 
social sciences offer an ambiguous guide to make a prognosis. In such a context, moral and ethical 
principles should be an integral part of the evaluation of government interventions. Of course, a 
discussion of these principles is beyond the scope of this study, but the findings of the dissertation 
establish a “window frame” by indicating that the deliberation required to design adequate policy 
solutions could take into account the productive investment and work decisions of potential 
beneficiaries in particular institutional contexts and the redistributive preferences that result from 
these. 
Third, citizens—policy makers, government, and private actors—need to think of the poor as a 
heterogeneous group. In short, there is not one type of poverty, but many. There is a large set of 
different theoretical and empirical approaches to identifying different types of poverty (chapter 1). In 
this study, I distinguish between chronic and transitory poverty and suggest that each faces 
particular sets of behavior. The policy implication of this statement is that future actions of policy 
makers should be directed to the design of specific welfare programs for a particular type of 
poverty. As the studies of poverty dynamics point out (Duncan 1984, Jalan & Ravallion 2000), 
chronic poverty should be attacked by improving the productive investment of individuals who live in 
this condition, particularly financial and human capital. Although this study did not analyze the 
impact of unexpected events or shocks, the theory suggests that an anti-transitory poverty policy 
must be focused on labor and family events such as unemployment or the birth of a child. 
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5.3 Suggestions for Further Research 
 
This study aimed to estimate and explain the impact of public transfers and public provision of 
social services on poverty in Latin America and to evaluate how the institutional context shapes the 
impact of public transfers on poverty in this region. To reach this goal, various decisions about the 
theoretical framework and methodological design have been made. Obviously, these decisions may 
be challenged on substantive grounds. This section will specifically discuss three issues related to 
the theoretical and methodological basis of the dissertation that deserve further attention. These are 
(i) the theoretical model, (ii) country selection and observation period, and (iii) methodology. 
Drawing on the discussion of these issues, suggestions for further research are offered. 
With respect to the theoretical model, the explanations of the effectiveness of social policy in 
poverty reduction based on micro-macro models are incomplete. These explanations are 
incomplete because they raise even further questions. Put another way, the explanations contain 
black boxes. This becomes evident in the study about Chilean social assistance (chapter 4). In this 
research, I suggested that the impact of cash benefits on chronic and transitory poverty seems to 
have incentive effects on informal work effort. However, my explanation depends on a set of 
assumptions that are documented in the literature but have not been stringently evaluated by 
empirical research in Chile. It is not clear how different components of the decision’s actors (for 
example, opportunities, motivation, and costs) produce such effects. Furthermore, black boxes 
emerge in the cross-national regression analysis section of the dissertation (Chapter 3). Here, the 
public support for redistributive policies in general is the core explanatory mechanism of the impact 
of institutional contexts on the poverty effect of public transfers. Based on the power-resource 
theory, Chapter 2 theoretically deduced connections between universalism and public support. I 
presented some descriptive evidence but the question remains whether such connections exist 
among citizens in Latin America under the statistical control of a set of potential confounding 
factors. To my knowledge, there are no empirical studies about the impact of institutional contexts 
on public opinions among Latin American welfare states.  
Although the existence of black boxes does not invalidate the findings of the dissertation with 
respect to the claim of the causal effect of social policies on poverty (see Section 1.6 in Chapter 1), 
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I think the empirical study of these black boxes or unresolved questions is a promising avenue 
opened by the dissertation for further research in Latin American countries and in other developing 
countries, insofar as black boxes tell us how and why the effect of policy on poverty arises. A 
particularly insightful area of research is the micro mechanism suggested in the dissertation, using 
experimental methods. The findings of the dissertation encourage further research of scientific 
projects in this vein. 
Second, the scope of any empirical study is limited by the country selection and the 
observation period. In this dissertation, for example, the analysis is regionally limited, as it focuses 
on Latin America. Moreover, cross-national analyses have been restricted to the 1980s and 1990s, 
and the micro study has analyzed data of the 2000s. This regional and temporal limitation is an 
important aspect to consider when debating the scope of the findings of the studies that compose 
the dissertation. A pivotal question in the cross-national analysis was the following: How does the 
institutional context shape the impact of public transfers on poverty in Latin America? To answer 
this question, policy orientations of LACs were classified into ideal types of welfare states. 
Furthermore, hypotheses about the moderator role of institutional contexts were formulated. 
Beyond these hypotheses being verified in the empirical analysis, this dissertation omits a 
significant institutional context—the liberal welfare state, which appears relevant for welfare 
provision in some Latin American nations in the 2000s. Unfortunately, the lack of data required the 
analysis of observation periods, which preclude the evaluation of the consequences of the liberal 
reforms on poverty. This clearly limits the scope of this dissertation, particularly in the face of rising 
liberalization of current welfare states in Latin America. In such a context, it is highly desirable to 
extend the analysis of the dissertation toward recent observation periods. The analysis of the 
Chilean welfare state appears to be a rich information source. This nation is a unique case in the 
Latin American context, as the liberal reforms in the Chilean welfare state are almost 30 years old. 
Cohort analysis could then be useful to capture the socioeconomic consequences of the welfare 
state among generations that are shaped either by a corporatist institutional design or by the recent 
liberal reform focused on means-testing. Hence, for future research, it seems promising to pursue 
the analysis of institutional contexts and the respective changes across history and birth cohorts.
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Third and finally, some pitfalls with respect to methodology require further attention. Two 
aspects of data sources and operations are particularly relevant. The first relates to a need for 
disaggregation. A number of studies have attempted to evaluate the distributive impact of entire 
welfare states by using aggregate social expenditures. However, the aggregate benefit approach 
presents a set of problems (Chapter 3). For this dissertation, one of the most relevant problems 
relates to the fact that the aggregate expenditure approach assumes that there is, within each 
welfare state, a strong internal coherence across the goals of different program areas (Pedersen 
1999). This might not be the case; different categories of government benefits may not be 
comparable in terms of their goals. In Chapter 3, I intended to handle this methodological challenge 
by disaggregating government benefits into public transfers spending and social services 
expenditure, but it is necessary to expand in the need for disaggregation. That is particularly 
relevant for public transfers, as the measures used in the dissertation aggregate benefits—social 
insurance and social assistance transfers—are actually used for different goals. In the future, it 
could prove fruitful to focus on specific programs or areas of the welfare state. 
The second aspect of the methodology that requires further examination relates to the 
multidimensional nature of social policy concepts. To evaluate the impact of public transfers and 
public provision of social services on poverty, the studies of the dissertation focus either on the 
budget size assigned to social policy (Chapter 3) or on a particular eligibility criterion, which is 
means-testing (Chapter 4). Further research is therefore needed to study the impact on poverty of 
other criteria (social insurance and citizenship (Chapter 1)) and to examine in a multivariate analysis 
these targeting criteria and the size dimension. Such an endeavor seems promising in the current 
context, in which the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) has gained access to datasets from seven 
Latin American countries belonging to different institutional contexts. By doing so, LIS provides the 
opportunity to analyze and to compare harmonized microdata from different types of welfare states 
in high- and middle-income countries around the world. The analysis of such data will contribute to 
the study of welfare states in Latin America.  
In spite of the limitations that are discussed in this section, this dissertation stands as an 
important contribution to the study of the welfare states and their socioeconomic consequences in 
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Latin America, and it is hoped that some of the thoughts presented in this dissertation will be an 
initial point for comparative research of welfare states in this region.  
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Appendix 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Measuring the Role of State in Public-Private Mix: Public Pension and Public Healthcare Coverage  
 
Program universalism is measured by the average of two coverage rates. The first is the proportion 
of the economically active population above the age of 20 who make contributions to a pension 
system over different years during the 1990s. This is an indicator of pension coverage in the 
economically active stage. Table A1.1 provides information about this measure. In respect to the 
time at which coverage rates are measured, scholars use average data for a time period rather than 
for single years in order to reduce the risk of distortions resulting from exogenous shocks (Castles & 
Obinger 2008). In this study, the measurement validity of average pension coverage rates for the 
period 1990–1999, however, is open to doubt, as these may not capture a welfare state model but a 
hybrid of different types of welfare systems. In the 1990s, some Latin American countries 
introduced liberal reforms in their pension systems. This implies that a time series of coverage rate 
for a country in the 1990s includes measures for different types of policy orientation. At first glance, 
the consideration of coverage rates corresponding to years in the 1990s after the reform should not 
highly differ from the estimates for years before reform because it takes a generation 
(approximately 65 years) for a reform of the pension system to mature. However, it does not 
completely rule out that the average rate for all periods from 1990 to 1999 captures in some way 
liberal orientations in pension provision. 
To overcome this problem, I took pension coverage rates for a single year before the 
application of reform in a given country and for which data existed for the 1990s (Table A1.1). When 
this was not possible (due to unavailability of data), I took the year in which the reform was initiated 
or the nearest year after the reform.145 This strategy meant that I captured the pension system 
before the liberal reforms. The exception is Chile. In this country, the liberalization of the pension 
                                                
145 Lack of data precludes the use of averaged data for time periods before the reform (for example, 1980–1993). 
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system began in 1981, but I used a coverage rate in 1992 for this country. By doing so, the 
information for each country of the sample corresponds to the 1990s. In spite of how the Chilean 
coverage rate may capture a hybrid of liberal and corporatist policy orientations (see Section 2.3 in 
Chapter 2), the analysis of information for the 1990s minimizes the influence of liberal reform 
because, as said in Chapter 1 (see Section 1.6), a considerable time lag exists between reforms of 
pension system and their observables socioeconomic outcomes. It follows that ten years after are 
not enough to clearly observe consequences of this reform. The data sources of pension coverage 
rates are Rofman and Lucchetti (2006) and Mesa-Lago (2005).   
 
Table A1.1. Information about coverage rates 
 
  Healthcarea   Pensionb  
 
Country Year used in the 
analysis 
Year of 
reformc 
Year used in 
the analysis 
Source of pension coverage rate used 
in the analysis 
    
Argentina 1991  1994d 1993 Rofman and Luccetti (2006) 
Bolivia 1997 1997 1996 Mesa-Lago (2005) 
Brazil 1998 No reform 1993 Rofman and Luccetti (2006) 
Chile 2002  1981e 1992 Rofman and Luccetti (2006) 
Colombia 1993 1994 1993 Mesa-Lago (2005) 
Costa Rica 1994 2001 1993 Rofman and Luccetti (2006) 
Dominican Republic 2000 2003 2000 Mesa-Lago (2005) 
Ecuador 1994 No reform 1993 Rofman and Luccetti (2006) 
El Salvador 2001 1998 1995 Rofman and Luccetti (2006) 
Guatemala 1995 No reform 1998 Rofman and Luccetti (2006) 
Honduras 2000 No reform 1994 Palacios and Pallares-Miralles (2000) 
Mexico 2002 1997 1997 Mesa-Lago (2005) 
Nicaragua 2001 No reform 1993 Rofman and Luccetti (2006) 
Panama 1996 No reform 1996 Palacios and Pallares-Miralles (2000) 
Paraguay 1999 No reform 1999 Rofman and Luccetti (2006) 
Peru 2002 1993 1993 Mesa-Lago (2005) 
Uruguay 2000 1996 1997 Mesa-Lago (2005) 
 
Note: (a) Percentage of total population covered by public health system; (b) coverage of the labor force is the proportion of 
the economically active population who make contributions to a pension system; (c) “no reform” means that a country did 
not adopt an liberal reform of the pension system (source: Calvo et al. 2010); (d) for Argentina, system re-nationalized in 
2008; and (e) reform of Chilean system in 2008 that reintroduced the state as the provider of welfare for some occupational 
categories. 
 
The second indicator of coverage is the percentage of the total population covered by the 
social health system. Healthcare coverage has two modalities: social assistance and social 
insurance care. According to the author of the data used in the analysis, Mesa-Lago (2007), in most 
LACs, the social assistance sector covers the health status of low-income groups, which cannot 
access social insurance and the private system. Social insurance focuses on the formal labor force 
in Latin America and the state contributes to its financing through general revenues and taxes.  
There are no time-series data for healthcare coverage in Latin American welfare states and, thus, I 
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used data from the 1990s for single years (see column “year used in the analysis” for pension in 
Table A1.1). Due to the lack of data, I used measures of healthcare coverage in the early 2000s for 
seven countries: Chile (2002), Dominican Republic (2000), El Salvador (2001), Honduras (2000), 
Mexico (2002), Nicaragua (2001), Peru (2002), and Uruguay (2000).  
Finally, pension and healthcare coverage rates cover different populations; that is, pension 
coverage regards the economically active population and healthcare rates cover the total 
population. Due to this difference in the reference population, my measure of the state’s role in the 
public-private mix provides only a rough measure of program universalism. Unfortunately, to my 
knowledge, there are no data representing public pension and public healthcare that consider the 
same population for Latin American welfare states (e.g., coverage of public healthcare and public 
pension only of the economically active population).   
 
Summary Index of Status Segmentation 
 
The index of status segmentation is the number of pension programs weighted by public transfer 
spending as a percentage of total public spending in 1993. I used this single year because most 
Latin American nations implemented pension reform in 1993 or after and, in doing so, the index 
captured only the system prevalent before the reform and not a mixture of different systems. As 
said above, the exception is Chile. For this country, I also used 1993 as reference year and 
information about the number of pension programs regarding only the old corporatist system. By 
doing so, only one system is captured by the base line (program’s number) of the index and, thus, I 
maximized the measurement validity of my indicator. Furthermore, to analyze connections between 
institutional arrangements and socioeconomic outcomes for 1990s, it makes sense to analyze 
information about the old systems because that decade is too early to clearly observe the 
socioeconomic consequences—particularly income inequality, education outcomes, and poverty—
of liberal reforms of the welfare state in Latin America.   
The values of the summary index are bound between six and zero, where zero and six 
describe the minimum and maximum levels of status segmentation, respectively. The number of 
pension programs is based on funds mentioned in Social Security Programs throughout the World 
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(SSA 1993). With respect to public transfer spending as a percentage of total social spending, this 
variable was compiled by the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the 
Caribbean (ECLAC/CEPAL) (see Avelino et al. 2005). ECLAC provides data series for the 1990s. 
However, it is important to say that the rank order among LACs and public transfer spending, which 
is suggested by the figures in 1993, does not substantively vary when average data for the 1990s 
are used. Furthermore, although the standard approach in the OECD is to measure spending as a 
share of GDP, I use public transfer spending as a percentage of total public spending because 
measuring spending relative to the total budget more clearly reveals differences between 
developing countries (Rudra 2008, Wibbels & Ahlquist 2007). 
Besides the denominator used to measure spending (as a percentage of public budget or as a 
percentage of GDP), public transfer spending is defined as the provision by the government of cash 
benefits to households and individuals in order to provide support during circumstances that 
adversely affect their welfare (Adema & Whiteford 2010). The ECLAC data series covers spending 
of central governments (at the national level) and expenditures of federal and local governments 
where they are significant, except in Mexico. In Mexico, spending at sub-national levels is not 
included in the ECLAC series, which means that the ECLAC’s figures for this country are under-
estimated (ECLAC 2009). 
Unfortunately, the ECLAC data series of public transfer spending provides only the sum of 
government expenditure on social insurance and social assistance benefits. It is not possible to 
disaggregate the ECLAC data series in these two types of benefits in cash and, in doing so, to 
capture the focus of the corporatist welfare state on social insurance or the priority of means-testing 
in the liberal institutional context. However, this is not a problem when measuring corporatism 
because the bulk of spending in the social security category goes to social insurance. In fact, by 
using the data series of public transfers spending from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
Huber et al. (2006) pointed out that social insurance accounts for 83 percent of public transfer 
spending in Latin America. Moreover, Segura-Ubiergo (2007) reported that the correlation between 
the IMF and the ECLAC data series exceeds 0.85.  
I obtained the summary index by using the following mathematical formula: 
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!!!!"#$#%& ∗ !!                                                                                                                          (1a) 
 
in (1a) the variables Pi and Ni represent public transfers spending as a percentage of total social 
spending and number of pension programs in country i, respectively. To understand the use of the 
weight (Pi/PUruguay), it is important to take into account two elements. First, as mentioned in 
Chapter 2, I used the weight to compensate for differences across LACs with respect to the 
relevance of social insurance as an instrument of the welfare state. On the ground of the definition 
of corporatist welfare state, a country possessing a high number of pension programs but placing a 
weak priority on social insurance in the government budget (e.g., Colombia, Paraguay, and Peru) 
cannot be regarded as highly corporatist. Second, the original values of public transfer spending as 
a percentage of total social spending are low for most countries in Latin America (smaller than 
fifteen percent). This implies that the weight can largely modify the original scores of the countries 
in the index without weighting. To avoid these extreme modifications, the weight is public transfer 
spending as percentage of total social spending divided by public transfers spending as percentage 
of total social spending for the country (such as Uruguay) with the maximum score (52.7 percent). 
The weight, then, captures the country’s priority of the social insurance system into the public 
budget relative to the largest Latin American social insurance system. The more similar the priority 
of a given social insurance system to the Uruguayan social insurance system, the higher the 
weighting score. The maximum weighting score is one (Uruguay).    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A1.2. Measures of the typology’s dimensions by clusters: 17 Latin American countries 
 
   
 
Subsidiary role of the state in public-private mix 
   
Role of the state in public-private 
mix 
  Role of the 
market in public-
private mix 
   
Focus on social 
services 
 
     
Country Public transfer 
spending as % 
of budget 
Number of 
pension 
programs 
Index of 
corporatism 
Pension 
coverage 
Healthcare 
coverage 
Average 
coverage 
Private expenditure on 
health as % of total 
health expenditure 
Human capital spending 
as % of budget 
         
Pioneer corporatist         
 Argentina 28.40 3.00 1.78 44.22 94.00 69.11 42.90 27.67 
 Brazil 41.20 3.00 2.59 45.89 75.50 60.69 57.64 15.95 
 Chile 31.50 6.00 3.97 61.14 67.50 64.32 51.90 25.18 
 Uruguay 47.60 6.00 6.00 73.00 54.60 63.80 56.06 19.98 
 Average 37.20 4.50 3.59 56.06 72.90 64.48 52.13 22.19 
         
Residual corporatist         
 Colombia 12.60 4.00 1.05 32.00 73.70 52.85 32.70 19.65 
 Paraguay 14.80 4.00 1.24 14.36 54.40 34.38 58.42 26.27 
 Peru 14.50 4.00 1.21 31.00 56.00 43.50 45.24 19.34 
 Average 13.90 4.00 1.17 25.79 61.37 43.58 45.45 21.75 
         
Universalist         
 Costa Rica 13.10 1.00 0.28 68.93 86.20 77.57 23.90 22.46 
 Panama 15.10 2.00 0.63 50.00 100.00 75.50 33.22 23.68 
 Average 14.10 1.50 0.45 59.47 93.60 76.53 28.56 23.07 
         
Productivist         
 Dominican Rep. 3.50 2.00 0.15 30.00 67.00 48.50 73.00 21.92 
 Ecuador 11.70 2.00 0.49 38.03 46.00 42.02 50.86 22.43 
 El Salvador 7.50 2.00 0.32 25.84 55.80 40.82 59.16 20.60 
 Guatemala 6.60 2.00 0.28 18.90 46.60 32.75 59.08 24.08 
 Average 7.33 2.00 0.31 28.19 53.85 41.02 60.53 22.26 
     
Mixed         
 Bolivia 3.90 8.00 0.66 12.00 55.80 33.90 37.32 27.55 
 Honduras 0.40 5.00 0.04 24.00 63.70 43.85 48.22 29.66 
 Mexico 2.50 4.00 0.21 37.00 87.10 62.05 55.60 37.50 
 Nicaragua 0.00 4.00 0.00 24.38 67.90 46.14 46.80 30.70 
 Average 1.70 5.25 0.23 24.35 68.62 46.49 46.99 31.35 
     
Note: Measures use data from different years of the 1990s. Original measures (without Mean-standardization and winsorizing).   
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Table A1.3. Socioeconomic outcomes by clusters: 17 Latin American countries 
 
  Income Security   Equality  
   
Country Absolute poverty ratea Informal laborb Economically active 
female populationc 
Income inequality 
(Post-transfers Gini) 
Child mortalityd Years of educatione 
 
Pioneer corporatist       
 Argentina   7.94 42.30 36.05 0.47 26.00 7.95 
 Brazil 31.16 57.90 37.75 0.55 53.00 3.97 
 Chile 14.52 39.70 27.05 0.55 15.00 7.34 
 Uruguay   3.73 36.20 41.20 0.43 23.00 6.79 
 Average  14.34 44.03 35.51 0.51 29.25 6.51 
       
Residual corporatist       
 Colombia 32.10 57.60 33.35 0.56 31.00 4.53 
 Paraguay 26.77 69.20 24.65 0.57 36.00 5.74 
 Peru 29.47 66.20 34.60 0.55 62.00 6.42 
 Average  29.45 64.33 30.87 0.56 43.00 5.56 
       
Universalist       
 Costa Rica 17.18 43.10 24.90 0.45 15.00 5.69 
 Panama 28.40 45.10 29.50 0.56 24.00 7.80 
 Average 22.79 44.10 27.20 0.50 19.25 6.75 
       
Productivist       
 Dominican Rep. 16.25 50.60 33.60 0.48 22.00 7.51 
 Ecuador 34.85 66.00 26.00 0.57 42.00 6.09 
 El Salvador 31.28 54.80 26.35 0.52 41.00 3.82 
 Guatemala 34.60 64.30 19.15 0.54 66.00 2.69 
 Average 29.25 58.93 26.28 0.53 43.00 5.03 
       
Mixed       
 Bolivia 36.65 75.50 31.70 0.58 109.00 4.96 
 Honduras 25.90 59.30 22.65 0.53 43.00 3.98 
 Mexico 25.25 51.70 28.75 0.54 39.00 6.12 
 Nicaragua 54.30 65.70 34.15 0.55 57.00 3.81 
 Average 42.28 63.05 29.31 0.55 61.92 4.72 
       
R squared 0.55 0.61 0.36 0.22 0.37 0.25 
       
Note: Socioeconomic outcomes are average for the period 1990-1999. (a) headcount ratio calculated from 2.5 US dollars per day poverty line; (b) proportion of workers in informal jobs as 
percentage of labor force; (c) economically active female population aged 10 years and over as a percentage of the total female population aged 10 years and over ; (d) number of deaths 
before the age of five per 1000 live; (e) average years of education for the population age 25 and older; R-squared from OLS regressions only with clusters as dummy variables.  
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Table A1.4. Duda and Hart stopping rule for cluster analysis of Figure 2.1 using Ward method 
 
Number of cluster Je(2)/Je(1) Pseudo T-squared 
   
1 0.35 28.11 
2 0.27 13.65 
3 0.57 5.92 
4 0.63 3.51 
5 0.31 4.45 
6 0.21 3.80 
7 0.22 7.14 
8 0.02 64.76 
9 0.45 2.49 
10 0.00 . 
11 0.00 . 
12 0.06 17.02 
13 0.32 2.12 
14 0.00 . 
15 0.00 . 
 
Note: Mean-standardized and winsorized measures. Stata 11.1 was used to estimate figures. 
 
 
Robustness Test of Cluster Analysis 
 
 
Table A1.5. Duda and Hart stopping rule for cluster analysis using complete linkage method 
 
Number of cluster Je(2)/Je(1) Pseudo T-squared 
   
1 0.35 27.72 
2 0.54 9.01 
3 0.46 8.28 
4 0.57 1.50 
5 0.18 4.52 
6 0.46 5.82 
7 0.22 7.14 
8 0.02 64.76 
9 0.45 2.49 
10 0.00 . 
11 0.00 . 
12 0.06 17.02 
13 0.32 2.12 
14 0.00 . 
15 0.00 . 
 
Note: Mean-standardized and winsorized measures. Stata 11.1 was used to estimate figures. 
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Table A1.6 Duda and Hart stopping rule for cluster analysis using average linkage method 
 
Number of cluster Je(2)/Je(1) Pseudo T-squared 
   
1 0.35 27.72 
2 0.54 9.24 
3 0.57 5.92 
4 0.63 3.49 
5 0.21 3.80 
6 0.22 7.14 
7 0.46 5.82 
8 0.02 64.76 
9 0.00 . 
10 0.00 . 
11 0.45 2.49 
12 0.06 17.02 
13 0.32 2.12 
14 0.00 . 
15 0.00 . 
 
Note: Mean-standardized and winsorized measures. Stata 11.1 was used to estimate figures. 
 
 
Figure A1.1 Classification of Latin American welfare states in the 1990s. Complete linkage method 
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Figure A1.2 Classification of Latin American welfare states in the 1990s. Average linkage method 
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Appendix 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Modeling Strategy 
 
In this section, I explain the modeling strategy used to estimate growth and distributional effects of 
the size of government budget allocated to public transfers and the public provision of social 
services on poverty. The statistical models assume that both social policies indirectly affect the 
poverty level in a given country, either through economic output or through the inequality of income 
distribution (Section 3.4 in Chapter 3). To simplify the illustration of the modeling strategy, this 
section models only the distributional effect of the size of government budget allocated to the public 
provision of social services on poverty. However, the same procedure is valid for more complex 
models that include growth effects and additional independent variables. The following three 
equations represent both channels through which the size of government budget allocated to public 
provision of social services affects poverty: 
 
itititit onDistributiLogOutputLogPovertyLog ,1121110 )()()( εβββ +++=                     (1b) 
ititit ServicesOutputLog ,22120)( εββ ++=                                                                      (2b) 
ititit ServicesnDitributioLog ,33130)( εββ ++=                                                               (3b) 
 
In these models, Log means the logarithmic transformation of variables. The variables included 
in the models are poverty level (Poverty), economic output (Output), inequality of income 
distribution (Distribution), and the size of government budget allocated to the public provision of 
social services (Services). For the present explanation of the modeling strategy, it is not necessary 
to describe the particular measures of the variables (see Section 3.4 in Chapter 3). In each 
equation, the βs represent parameter estimates and ε is the error term. For each β, the first 
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subscript corresponds to the number that identifies each equation—1 for equation 1b, 2 for equation 
2b, and 3 for equation 3b—and the second subscript identifies the parameter in the equation. For 
the variables, the subscripts i and t represent the country and the year of observation, respectively. 
Equation 1b indicates that the poverty level depends only on two factors: economic output and 
inequality of income distribution. Furthermore, according to my argument in Chapter 3, Equations 
2b and 3b predict that social services do not have a direct effect on poverty. The size of 
government budget allocated to the public provision of social services affects poverty indirectly 
through two variables: economic output and inequality of income distribution. To derive a single 
prediction equation for growth and distributional effects of social policy on poverty levels, we 
substitute Equations 2b and 3b into 1b. The following equations demonstrate the substitution of the 
distributional effects equation 3b into the poverty prediction equation 1b: 
 
ititititit ServicesOutputLogPovertyLog ,1,33130121110 )()()( εεβββββ +++++=   (4b) 
 
ititititit ServicesOutputLogPovertyLog ,1,312311211301210 )()( εεβββββββ +++++=  (5b) 
 
In Equation 5b, the effect of the size of government budget allocated to the public provision of 
social services on poverty through income distribution is represented by β12β31. This parameter 
estimate is composed of the combined effects of the size of government budget allocated to the 
public provision of social services on inequality of income distribution (β31) and of inequality of 
income distribution on poverty (β12). The product of these parameter estimates is replaced by the 
single parameter 51γ  in equation 6b. Furthermore, the coefficients β10 and β12 β30 are constant 
values and can be combined into a single parameter 50γ , for the sake of parsimony. The resulting 
equation is the following transformed expression of Equation 5b: 
 
ititititit ServicesOutputLogPovertyLog ,1,312511150 )()( εεβγβγ ++++=                 
(6b) 
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Thus, in Equation 6b, 51γ  represents the distributional effect of the size of government budget 
allocated to the public provision of social services on poverty. To estimate the distributional effect, 
the model must control for the economic output. By conditioning on the economic output, the model 
eliminates the path from social services to economic output to poverty level and, thus, the 
coefficient for services provides information on only the distributional effect path. Of course, 51γ
should be an unbiased estimation of distributional effects only under the assumption that economic 
output and income distribution are the unique predictors that directly impact poverty (Equation 1b). 
In this study, I use an extended version of model 6b that includes additional independent 
variables to estimate growth and distributional effects of the size of government budget allocated to 
public transfers and public provision of social services on poverty (Models 3.1 and 3.2 in Section 
3.4 of Chapter 3). One of the advantages of Equation 6b is that the parameters can be easily 
estimated by using the Ordinary Least Squares estimator (OLS). If the specification of the model is 
correct, OLS provides unbiased estimations. However, the error term of Equation 6b suggests that 
the assumptions of heteroscedasticity and normality are questionable. In Equation 6b, the error 
term is: 
 
itit ,1,312 εεβ +                                                                                                                                   (7b) 
 
This error term is a composite that results from the sum between the stochastic component of 
Equation 1b and the product between the error term of Equation 3b and the parameter estimate for 
the effect of the inequality of income distribution on poverty. This latter coefficient can affect the 
distribution of the error term in Equation 6b and, in doing so, produce heteroscedasticity and non-
normal errors. The robust cluster variance estimator in Chapter 3 provides unbiased standard errors 
in the presence of heteroscedasticity and serial correlation. I test the robustness of the study 
findings to non-normal errors by using least absolute value regression (LAR), which is more efficient 
than OLS in the face of errors with non-normal distributions (Section 3.5). 
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Formalization of Hypotheses  
 
In this section, I formalize the hypotheses of Chapter 3 in terms of null and alternative hypotheses 
by using Models (3.1) and (3.2) (Section 3.4). The betas in the formalization correspond to the 
coefficients in both models. Hypothesis 1 states that size of government budget allocated to public 
provision of social services has a negative impact on the level of poverty. This expectation should 
work through economic output. Hypothesis 1 and the corresponding null hypothesis are 
represented as 
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The following hypotheses refer to the effect of public transfers on poverty levels. I argue that 
this effect of public transfers should work through income distribution. More specifically, Hypothesis 
2 contends that the size of government budget allocated to public transfers has a negative effect on 
the level of poverty in pioneer corporatist and universalist welfare states. Hypothesis 2 yields the 
null and alternative hypotheses 
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Hypothesis 2 is further elaborated by the expectation that the negative effect of the size of 
government budget allocated to public transfers on poverty is larger for universalist welfare state 
compared to pioneer corporatist welfare states. Thus, Hypothesis 2a is represented by  
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Finally, Hypothesis 3 contends that the size of government budget allocated to public transfers 
has a positive impact on the level of poverty in residual corporatist, productivist, and mixed welfare 
states. Hence, the formalization of this last hypothesis is  
 
0:
0:
121
120
>
≤
β
β
H
H
 
 
 
 
Table A2.1.    Preferences for income inequality in Latin American Welfare States, 1996 and 2006 
 
Country Percentage of the respondents that reporting values lower or equal to 4 
 
  1996   2006  
   
Argentina 30.80 41.20 
Brazil 37.60 37.00 
Chile 40.10 48.00 
Dominican Rep. 14.30 -- 
El Salvador 27.60 -- 
Guatemala -- 20.80 
Mexico 31.80 30.00 
Peru 27.00 15.50 
Uruguay 46.70 33.20 
 
Note: Answers in a 1-10 agreement scale in which 1 regards the phrase “Incomes should be more equal” and 10 represents 
the phrase “We need larger income differences as incentives.” Source: World Value Survey. 
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Appendix 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Propensity Scores and Rosenbaum Bounds 
 
 
Rosenbaum bounds simulate the existence of unobservable variables that determine the treatment 
assignment. In my case, positive selection based on unobserved factors might induce a spurious 
positive effect of social assistance transfers. Positive selection means that those most likely to be 
beneficiaries of Chilean social assistance also have high chronic and transitory poverty even 
without participation in the social assistance programs and given that they have the same vector of 
control variables as the individuals in the comparison group. Table A3.2 reports how great the 
impact of unobserved factors needs to be to change the statistically significant positive effect of 
benefits on both types of poverty to insignificance. In the first row, it is assumed that my study is 
free of the effects of unobservables, where Gamma=1. An increasing Gamma value indicates that 
the influence of unobservables on the odds of receiving benefits increases. The critical value of 
Gamma at which we have to question my conclusion regarding positive effect of social assistance 
transfers for those beneficiaries is between 1.75 and 2 for chronic poverty and between 1.5 and 
1.75 for transitory poverty (see “P value +” column). Thus, to change my findings the unobserved 
factor would have to increase the odds of receiving social assistance transfers by 75-100 percent in 
the case of chronic poverty and by 50-75 percent for transitory poverty. These magnitudes are high, 
especially for chronic poverty, and suggest that my results are robust with respect to the influence 
of unobserved determinants. 
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Table A3.1. Propensity score estimation  
 
Variable 
 
 Coefficient z-statistic 
   
Geographical area (ref: urban)   
 Rural    0.238** 2.64 
Education (ref: secondary or higher)   
 Primary or lower    0.956** 13.88 
Employment status (ref: unemployed)   
 Employee   -0.585** -3.66 
 Inactive                      -0.281 -1.77 
Age    
 In years    0.049** 2.71 
 In squared years   -0.001**                        -3.13 
Gender  of household head (ref: male)   
 female    0.509** 5.90 
Marital status (ref: married or single)   
 Unmarried partners    0.759** 6.94 
 Divorced                       0.127 0.65 
 Widowed                      -0.038                        -0.12 
Housing   
 Own property 0.222 2.91 
Share of household members 0-5    1.480** 6.22 
   
Constant   -2.195** -5.87 
   
Log likelihood -3126.422  
   
N 6,031  
   
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01 (two-tailed tests)   
Notes: Logit estimates. Social assistance transfers and age are measured for 2001; the rest of independent variables are 
measured for 1996. Fixed effects for communes are not shown. Source: Survey Panel CASEN. 
 
 
Table A3.2. Rosenbaum bounds for ATT. Nearest neighbour (1) matching 
 
 Chronic poverty  Transitory poverty 
   
Gamma P value +  P value - P value +  P value - 
     
1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1.25 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1.5 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 
1.75 0.029 0.000 0.349 0.000 
2 0.394 0.000 0.957 0.000 
2.25 0.877 0.000 0.999 0.000 
2.50 0.993 0.000 1 0.000 
2.75 0.999 0.000 1 0.000 
3 0.999 0.000 1 0.000 
     
Note: Results based on Stata  ado ‘rbounds’. Independent variables of Table A3.1 are used as a conditioning set. ‘+’ (‘-‘) 
reports the results for positive (negative) selection on observables. Nearest neighbour (1) means that one neighbour was 
used to estimate the Rosenbaum bounds. 
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Illustration of the Measures of Chronic and Transitory Poverty 
 
In this section of Appendix 3, I illustrate the measures of chronic and transitory poverty used in the 
study and discuss the measurement validity of those indicators. Following Adcock and Collier 
(2001: 531), a measurement is valid when the scores derived from a given indicator can 
meaningfully be interpreted in terms of the concept that the indicator seeks to operationalize. It 
follows that, to discuss the measurement validity, we must first define the concept under 
examination. Chronic poverty is defined as poverty that persists in inter-temporal mean income, 
which is lower than the absolute poverty line (Section 4.3.1). Following a standard approach in 
economics and the sociology of social stratification, inter-temporal mean income captures long-run 
(so-called “permanent”) income (Hauser & Warren 1997, Sorensen 2000). As a behavioral concept, 
the concept of permanent income assumes that individuals adjust their consumption patterns to 
their long-term expected living conditions (DiPrete 2002). The adjustment of consumption is 
typically made in terms of productive investment, which results in a particular level of capital 
accumulation. It follows that the level of inter-temporal mean income (or permanent income) 
indicates the level of capital accumulation in the sense that higher mean income indicates greater 
accumulation. For instance, a person who obtains only a primary education will orient her 
productive investment to the long-term expected living conditions corresponding to the wealth 
associated with her human capital. Thus, this person should present low levels of permanent 
income—and, thus, a low level of capital accumulation—insofar as her human capital is low. For the 
concept of chronic poverty, the notions of permanent income and capital accumulation imply that 
the chronic poor are individuals with low levels of capital at one time point, which is a result of the 
permanent failure to accumulate capital. The concept of transitory poverty denotes inter-temporal 
variability in income for individuals who experience poverty at some time point.  
In Chapter 4, I used two indicators that capture these concepts of chronic and transitory 
poverty: continuous indexes and a categorical variable that measures a typology of chronic and 
transitory poor (Section 4.3.1). To keep the illustration of these measures as simple as possible, 
Table A3.3 presents both indicators when the headcount ratio is used to estimate them. I have 
information about their poverty statuses of six individuals at two points in time, P1 and P2. In the 
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columns for P1 and P2, poor is 1 and not-poor is 0. The rectangles with dotted lines represent the 
groups that comprise the typology. The rectangles with solid lines denote the continuous indexes. 
Individual 1 is chronically/always poor; that is, he is persistently poor and his mean income is below 
the poverty line. This group represents 5% of the Chilean population analyzed in this study. 
Individuals 2 and 3 lived in poverty at time 1 or time 2 and their average income is also below the 
poverty line. My estimates, working with Chilean data, indicate that 4% of the population included in 
the analysis is chronically but not always poor. Individuals 4 and 5 experienced poverty at time 1 or 
time 2, but their average incomes are above the poverty line, so they are only transitory poor. Both 
individuals score only in the index of transitory poverty. It becomes evident that the index of 
transitory poverty and the group of transitory poor in the typology capture different things. The index 
denotes inter-temporal income variability, which can affect not only transitory poor but also 
chronically deprived individuals. Transitory poor is associated with inter-temporal income variability 
only for individuals that experience poverty at a particular time point but with mean incomes over 
time above the poverty line. The transitory poor represent 15% of the Chilean population used in 
the analysis. Finally, the last group is represented by individual 6, who is not poor at time 1 and time 
2. In the Chilean data used in this study, 76% are in this last group.146  
 
 
Table A3.3. Chronic and transitory poverty by using headcount ratioa 
 
Case 
(Individuals) 
P1 
(poverty status at 
time 1) 
P2 
(poverty status at 
time 2) 
Total poverty 
((P1+P2)/2) 
Chronic poverty    
(mean income ≤ 
1)    
Transitory poverty 
(total poverty – 
chronic poverty) 
      
1 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 
      
2 1.0 0.0 0.5 1.0 -0.5 
      
3 0.0 1.0 0.5 1.0 -0.5 
      
4 1.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.5 
      
5 0.0 1.0 0.5 0.0 0.5 
      
6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
      
Notes: (a) Income is normalized by the poverty line, so income equals 1 if the income equals the poverty line. 
 
 
                                                
146 I obtained the estimations of the proportion for each typology group in the Chilean population by using a sample of 6,636 
individuals and sample weights. 
Chronic, always 
Chronic, not always 
Transitory 
Not poor 
Index of chronic 
poverty  
Index of transitory 
poverty 
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I used the typology only for descriptive analysis. To estimate the causal effect of social 
assistance transfers on chronic and transitory poverty, I used continuous indexes. In Table A3.4, 
the scores of these measures are shown in the columns on the right. I estimated the measures of 
total, chronic, and transitory poverty on the basis of equations 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3 (Section 4.3.1). If 
the headcount ratio is used, a problem for the causal analysis becomes evident. The index of 
chronic poverty is a categorical variable with 1 and 0, so I have to use a logistic or probit regression 
in the analysis of such a variable. However, as mentioned in the study (Section 4.5.1), we cannot 
straightforwardly interpret and compare the coefficients of logistic or probit regressions across 
groups. For the analysis in Chapter 4, the problem is that the differences between the logistic or 
probit regressions of chronic and transitory poverty in the estimated coefficients of being a 
beneficiary of social assistance tell us nothing about the differences in the underlying impact of 
social assistance transfers for both types of deprivation. 
 The reason for this problem associated with binary regression models relies on the fact that, to 
consistently estimate the logistic or probit regressions, it is necessary to assume that the variance 
of the errors is fixed (1 for probit and !!/3 for logit). Standard statistical software incorporates the 
identifying assumption and estimates coefficients, which are standardized by scaling the variables 
and residuals so that residual variances are either 1 for probit or and !!/3 for logit (Williams 2009: 
535). In other words, the estimated coefficients of a regression model for categorical variables are 
not the original parameters. It follows that we cannot actually estimate regression coefficients and 
the underlying residual variance of binary regression models separately (Long & Freese 2006). As 
Allison (1999) pointed out, this characteristic of binary regression models may produce biased 
estimations when residual variances differ across groups. If residual variances differ across groups, 
the standardization will also differ and, thus, coefficients across groups cannot be compared. For 
instance, the effect of social assistance transfers may be is identical for chronic and transitory 
poverty, but if their residual variances differ, the coefficients of benefits will differ as well. 
To compare causal effects across groups, the recommendation is to avoid analysis of 
outcomes in terms of dichotomies and qualitative variables if continuous alternatives exist (Mood 
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2010).147 I follow this advice by using the squared poverty gap to estimate the measure of chronic 
and transitory poverty defined in the text. In doing so, I can compare the coefficients of semi-
parametric regressions in Chapter 4. As stated in Section 4.5, these regression models use minimal 
assumptions for the error term. 
Table A3.4 illustrates the use of squared poverty gap to measure chronic and transitory 
poverty. Note the two advantages of continuous indexes using squared poverty gap. First, the scale 
of variables is numeric and, thus, the estimation of causal effect should be more straightforward 
than with categorical variables. Moreover, not-poor scores zero in measures of chronic and 
transitory poverty, which means the indexes are censored for this group. Nonetheless, a potential 
problem for the estimations related with censored dependent variables can be solved by using an 
appropriate statistical method (Section 4.5.2). 
. 
 
Table A3.4. Chronic and transitory poverty by using squared poverty gap  
 
Case 
(Individuals) 
SG1 
(squared gap at 
time 1) 
SG2 
(squared gap at 
time 2) 
Total poverty 
((SG1+SG2)/2) 
Chronic poverty 
((1-mean income)! 
     If mean income ≤ 
1)   
Transitory poverty 
(total poverty – 
chronic poverty) 
      
1 0.1194 0.2807     0.2000      0.1916 0.0085 
      
2 0.7404 0.0000 0.3702 0.1837 0.1864 
      
3 0.0000 0.2959 0.1479  0.0160 0.1319 
      
4 0.0038 0.0000 0.0019 0.0000 0.0019 
      
5 0.0000 0.0840 0.0420 0.0000 0.0042 
      
6 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
      
Notes: (a) Income is normalized by the poverty line, so income equals 1 if the income equals the poverty line. The squared 
poverty gap is (1 – normalized income)!. 
 
With respect to the second advantage, any type of the poor presents scores in the index of 
transitory poverty because they present inter-temporal variability in income. That is not the case 
when the headcount ratio is used. More particularly, this last aggregate poverty measure does not 
capture inter-temporal variability in income among the persistent poor. We observe this advantage 
of the squared poverty gap in individual 1 in Table A3.4. This presents 0 in the index of transitory 
                                                
147 To estimate the causal effect, another disadvantage of an analysis with categorical dependent variables is that the 
robustness checks (e.g. Rosenbaum bounds) that I used in Chapter 4 do not work with logit or probit models. 
Chronic, always 
Chronic, not always 
Transitory 
Not poor 
Index of chronic 
poverty used in 
analysis 
Index of transitory 
poverty used in 
analysis 
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poverty in Table A3.3, but when the squared poverty gap is used, his score in the transitory poverty 
index is 0.0085. This characteristic of the squared poverty gap implies that an individual may 
contribute to chronic and transitory poverty if his income varies over time, regardless of the 
sequence of poverty statuses over time. 
To clearly show the measurement validity of continuous indexes, the use of squared poverty in 
estimating chronic and transitory poverty means that the continuous index of chronic poverty 
captures the concept of chronic poverty used in this study in terms of the presence and inequality of 
poverty for individuals with low levels of capital at a single time point, which is a result of failure in 
capital accumulation. Such a failure is measured by the mean income over time below the absolute 
poverty line. The concept of transitory poverty is captured in terms of the deviation of total income—
that is, the sum of incomes at particular points in time—from the average of incomes for particular 
years. This deviation captures the level of income variability for individuals who experienced 
poverty, regardless of whether they are always or temporary poor. 
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Table A3.5.  Semiparametric censored regression models with fixed effects of chronic poverty. Only persistent poor and 
chronic deprived individuals who were not poor in 2001. Trimmed least squares estimations. Working-age 
population (15-64) 
 
 Chronic aoverty  
   
Social assistance transfers (ref: non beneficiary)   
 Beneficiary   0.124**  
 (0.029)  
Geographical area (ref: urban)   
 Rural  -0.119**  
 (0.035)  
Educational  (ref: secondary or higher)   
 Primary or lower   0.144**  
                                                 (0.034)  
Number of employed in household -0.040*  
 (0.017)  
Employment status (ref: employee or inactive)   
 Unemployed 0.051  
 (0.046)  
Age   
 In years  0.012*  
  (0.006)  
 In squared years   -0.000**  
 (0.000)  
Gender of household head (ref: male)   
 Female  0.090*  
 (0.040)  
Marital status (ref: married)   
 Unmarried partners 0.054  
  (0.038)  
 Divorced  -0.131*  
  (0.054)  
 Widowed                                                 -0.247**  
  (0.066)  
 Single                                                 -0.044  
 (0.044)  
Housing   
 Own property                                                 -0.047  
  (0.032)  
 Bad quality construction 0.037  
 (0.049)  
Share of household members 0-5    0.449**  
 (0.083)  
Share of household members 6-14    0.196**  
 (0.072)  
Share of household members 65+                                                 -0.111  
 (0.137)  
   
N 5,856  
 
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01 (two-tailed tests) 
Notes: Social assistance transfers and age are measured for 2001; the rest of independent variables are measured for 
1996. Standard errors are in parentheses. Source: Survey Panel CASEN. 
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